


# СЕРГЕЙ КРЕМЛЁВ

**МИФЫ  
О 1945  
ГОДЕ**



## Abstract

A new book by the leading historian of patriotic forces. The holy truth about the Great Victory of the Soviet people in the Second World War. Refutation of the most vicious, false and odious myths about 1945 - about the "incompetent Soviet command" and "unjustified losses" during the assault on the Seelow Heights, about the Vlasovites who allegedly "liberated Prague" and "raped by the Red Army of Germany", about "aggressive Stalin", who dreamed of capturing all of Europe, and "humane" allies who saved the world from the "Bolshevik yoke", etc. "The enemies of Russia want to change

the majestic image of the Russian soldier, still standing in Treptow Park with the German girl he saved in his arms, on the image of an Asian dirty in soul and body, raping women and stuffing his "sidor" with everything that comes to hand, not only for historical falsifications, but also for the needs of tomorrow. Before you destroy Russia, you must spit on it ... "But as long as the memory of the Holy War and its heroes is alive in us, as long as we are proud of our grandfathers who broke the back of fascism, we honor their Banner and bow before their feat, we are invincible.

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## **Sergei Kremlev**

### **MYTHS ABOUT 1945**

*They won. And we lost. They won. And we gave in. We hardly love our Motherland today. They also loved. Therefore, in force! Therefore - in the Stars, therefore - in glory, And therefore the Banner of Victory winds. They preserved the greatness of the State, And we provided trouble for the Motherland. They proudly flew over Europe, We are now barely crawling after it. They conceived great goals, And we missed what we had. Stalin greeted them as a winner With his calm smile from the Mausoleum, Now, whatever you look, the country is the destroyer, And you can't make out who is vile and vile? Above them, the Victory Banner blazed! A shabby "chicken" is waving about themselves.*

*And, therefore, the victory is not yet ours. She is now with them, in that Stalinist May, When only Judas was rewarded with a noose. They created. We are just breaking. And only infamy is our lot. As long as.*

04/23/98



## Instead of a preface

Myths of the 45th year? Can we talk about them? Do they exist? The year 1945 is not a time of defeats, but of victories and Victory, and for this reason alone the year 1945 should be sufficiently "transparent" for everyone. After all, they usually hide what they don't want to talk about - bitter or shameful. And then there are rumors and myths. And joy, it would seem, is always on the surface.

However, today the joyful year of our Victory is also overgrown with vile gossip. The Yankees allegedly liberated Europe, and the Russians allegedly raped half of Germany... Stalin allegedly destroyed "free Poland"... The Vlasovites allegedly liberated Prague... The USSR declared war on Japan, allegedly in violation of the Neutrality Pact...

Yes, various myths have accumulated around the victorious 1945 over the past decades - on the one hand. On the other hand, do

we know everything about it, do we imagine it so well - the victorious 1945? Indeed, even those who fully deserve both our respect and our trust are far from always accurate. In 1977, I spoke to the personnel of military unit 15,654 -

I cite this case from memory, so I can be mistaken in something about the guest of that serious military unit - Nikolai Mikhailovich Kotlyar, candidate of legal sciences, the first prosecutor of Berlin. More than thirty years have passed since May 1945 - a considerable period both for the country and for the

individual, especially for a person not of his first youth already in 1945. However, the colonel (or lieutenant colonel, I don't remember - more than thirty years have passed since then) of Justice Kotlyar looked youthful, was an excellent storyteller, endowing himself with all his appearance, intonations and the essence of the story.

Even now I remember him with warmth, and at the same time I wrote down some that's how I remember it.

Without being responsible for stenographic accuracy, I quote that old entry in the book about 1945:

The signing of the Act of unconditional surrender was expected at 15.00. There is a huge crowd in front of the palace. Women, soldiers, officers, generals are waiting. At 12 o'clock I got into the hall with the journalists. 6 center table with the letter "P" and another small table.

Everyone is hungry (they were afraid to miss it), but there is only one thought - something did not work out. Zhukov will come in and say: "Generals, officers, take your places! The war continues."

At the table is a large group of generals (Vyshinsky ordered that no one below the lieutenant general be allowed in). At 3:00 plus one minute, the side door opens and Zhukov enters. Face sullen sullen. Well, it is! He passed, sat down at the table, silently sits.

Everyone thought - why is he silent for so long? The next day he was asked: "Why did you keep silent for so long, marshal?" And he replied, "How long? It seems to me - no. I just wanted to catch my breath." And indeed, the recorders recorded - for about a minute he was silent. And it seemed to everyone - with half an hour.

The British, Americans, French sat down. Vyshinsky is sitting, and behind him is his corps - 16 of our diplomats. Zhukov

commands: "Bring in the German delegation." It became interesting to me - well, who will meet these field marshals and grand admirals? According to the laws of military ethics - a general, no less. Well, given what happened, Colonel. Well, taking into account the fact that the Nazis - the major is enough, but - a senior officer. Keitel enters with a highly raised

marshal's baton, proudly. Behind him are others. Two junior lieutenants are rushing towards them from two sides! The gymnasts are pristine dark. And quite disrespectfully indicate where to go.

When Keitel realized that it was he who was being met, he would have eaten the lieutenants alive! He walked over and threw the wand on the table. Ignoring this hysteria, Zhukov calmly, very calmly: "Is the German delegation ready to sign the Act of Unconditional Surrender?" Keitel and the others sat in silence. Keitel leaned towards

Stumpf (**Colonel-General, member of the German delegation. - S.K.**) and whispered something quietly. Again the peak of tension - what are they talking about? And here

Zhukov - and his voice is commanding, God forbid everyone, as he hits his fist: "I ask you, are you ready to sign the Act of unconditional surrender?" Keitel cringed, trembled, and when he was translated, very timidly said "Javol". The next day, Zhukov was asked: "Why did you

explode, marshal?" And Zhukov replied: "Well, how! There is such a thing, the end of the tragedy, and they suddenly whisper. Maybe they're going to refuse, you bastards!" So, the moment of signing has come. Vyshinsky turns to his guys

and peers at them for a long time, as if he does not know well. And then he beckons the youngest to him: "Come here, Comrade Petrov." And he takes out an ordinary student's pen with a feather wrapped in a piece of paper for 2 kopecks. From another pocket he takes out an ink bottle wrapped in pink paper and gives it to Petrov. A table and two shattered ones, as in a bad KECh  
**(apartment**

**operational part.** - S.K.), a chair - for the Germans ... "This is where my then notes break off. Brought them

here is why. Then we, young guys, listened to Nikolai Mikhailovich excitedly, with burning eyes, which was quite understandable. But now, knowing a lot and having seen a lot, including the newsreel about that day, I understand that, perhaps, not all the details of this day, reported by Nikolai Mikhailovich, took place.

So, no matter how much I peered into the photos and film frames that captured Marshal Zhukov and Keitel at the moment of signing the Act of Unconditional Surrender, I did not notice either the ink bottle or the student's pen in Keitel's hand. Actually, he signed the Act of Surrender, most likely, with a fountain pen. And I must assume - his. Although he really sat at a separate small table.

And the signing ceremony itself did not begin at three in the afternoon, but at midnight from May 8 to 9 and ended at 0 hours 43 minutes on May 9, 1945

of the year.

That is, in the story of not just a contemporary of the events, but their direct witness, and not just a witness, but a person with professionally enhanced observation, reality intertwined with what was not, however, it was transformed in the soul of the narrator into something that was.



So, Colonel Kotlyar was far from being accurate in everything, but can his story be called a myth? Are the inaccuracies of his story dangerous for the true understanding of the historical situation of 1945 and the atmosphere of that era by the

descendants? Of course not! For **this particular case**, there is no danger of a serious, fundamental distortion of historical truth. If Keitel dipped not a school pen, but an expensive clerical pen into the inkwell of a massive bronze writing instrument, and not into a student's tumbler, or even didn't dip anything at all, but wrote with an "eternal" pen, the story of the Soviet military lawyer does not introduce fundamental distortions into history. On the contrary, if his story is not formally reliable in everything in a number of small details, it is absolutely reliable psychologically and should be of interest to us no less than newsreel footage.

But can the current allegations that the soldiers of the Red Army, having entered the territory of Germany, allegedly raped two million (!) German women, be considered just an inaccuracy? In confirmation of this statement, photographs of the torn victims, their stories and so on are published today.

I am by no means inclined to say that these photos and stories are fakes. They are formally historical, but the historical truth misrepresent.

We will talk about this in our place.

Moreover, in **this** particular case, the truth is distorted not only maliciously, but also purposefully. And the point here is not the desire to retroactively disavow the Soviet Liberator Warrior in the eyes of the peoples and, above all, the European peoples, and especially in the eyes of the leading people of Europe, the German.

More precisely, the essence is not only in this desire. It is necessary not only to historical falsifications, but also for the needs **of tomorrow**. And, perhaps, the second is more important than the first.

Well, actually! To finally destroy a great nation with great cultural and historical merits to humanity is one thing.

And it's quite another thing to rid the world **civilized** community of the logically degenerate descendants of the "wild Bolshevik hordes", who, if they defeated the best American in the world ... sorry - the German army, it is only because these, who do not value their own, much less someone else's life subhumans filled up with their corpses all the trenches and trenches of the enemy, and only because of this they were able to reach Berlin.

Today in Europe, and even in the "Rossiyanin", some people also say that the Russian "barbarians" simply crushed the Reich, exhausted under their weight, with a dark mass. And then, they say, these "savages" plundered and raped

Germany and Europe. "This is what the Russians were, and so initially cruel and ignorant, and besides, they were also accustomed to total violence by the bloody cannibal Stalin," such is the background of the stories about the allegedly total raped in 1945

German women.

To destroy such a villainous, but in fact - villainously mythologized, Russia for supposedly **civilized** peoples is not only permissible, but also necessary.

And it doesn't matter to destroy them with what - nuclear or precision weapons, bombs of skillfully paid terrorists, skillfully paid actions of renegades or genetically modified products.

For the future justification of any violence against Russia, sixty years after 1945, it was necessary to drag ancient raped and allegedly raped grandmothers to TV cameras and fill the consciousness of new generations of Europeans with "dung heaps" of old photographs. Before destroying Russia, it must be spit on. And we keep

hanging our ears and drooling instead of counteracting these lies. I wonder how long this "Tolstoyism" in the Putin-Medvedev version will continue?

I begin my book at the end of the year preceding the 65th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War.

war of 1941-1945 over the Nazi invaders. And, perhaps, it would be more correct to call it "Myths and truth about 1945", but the truth about that great year in the history of Russia is so diverse and large-scale that such a generalizing title would impose on the author too large and hardly feasible obligations.

**The whole** truth about that great year can only be told as a result of serious collective work at the state level. However, nothing of the sort will be done at this level for this anniversary, of course. Very much - against the backdrop **of all** the truth about the twelve months of 1945, about the enormous work of the state by Stalin and his associates in that year - the truth about the current "acts" of the "Russian" "society" will turn out to be insignificant and vile.

My task is more modest. I will just say - as best I can - about some remarkable facts and events of 1945, which began with the growing collapse of the Anglo-Saxon troops during the German counteroffensive in the West in January and ended with the release of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria on December 29, 1945 from the duties of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR in connection with his appointment as curator of the Atomic Problem.

Between these two, albeit divergent, but equally belonging to the year of the Victory, many other events took place: the defeat of the Wehrmacht in East Prussia; the liberation of Warsaw and Prague; transfer from evacuation to the old quarters of Soviet military officer schools; the March memorandum of the physicist Leo Szilard to President Roosevelt; the death of General Chernyakhovsky, the capture of Vienna; storming of Berlin; the capture of former General Vlasov; the death of Politburo candidate Alexander Shcherbakov; Yalta and Potsdam conferences; capitulation of Germany and Japan; Roosevelt's death; resignation of Churchill; the third Heroic Stars of Alexander Pokryshkin, Georgy Zhukov and, finally, Ivan Kozhedub; Victory Parade on Red Square; the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; our phenomenal tank thrust across the Greater Khingan and the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army; the formation of the Soviet Atomic Special Committee; release after

filtration checks at the Lubyanka of a number of Soviet generals,  
captured...

All this is 1945. I will

not be able to tell - even briefly - about many things that I mentioned above and, moreover, about not mentioned. However, about something that deserves, I hope, the attention of the reader, I will still say. Indeed, sometimes the well-known facts of the beginning of 1945 often turn out to be "facts" in quotation marks, also overgrown with various kinds of myths.

I mean, by the way, the famous "seventeen moments of spring", during which the "role" of Stirlitz was played not by the mythical Maxim Maksimovich Isaev, but by the real US Ambassador to Moscow Averell Harriman. At the same time, my story,

although fragmentary, refers not only to the first five military months of 1945, which ended the war in Europe, and to an incomplete month of the war between the USSR and Japan, but in general to the whole of 1945. After all, the

events after May 9, 1945 flowed from the events that preceded the Victory, and were often directly connected with them, as, for example, everything related to atomic research in the USA and the USSR.

On the other hand, in 1945 a number of events and processes that had begun as early as 1944 came to an end. Thus, it is hardly possible to talk about the liberation of Warsaw in January 1945 without saying anything about the reasons for the refusal of the Soviet High Command from this operation in the summer and autumn of 1944.

So sometimes - not often - my story goes beyond the time frame of the last year of the war and the first year of peace. I hope the reader will forgive me for this.

***December 5, 2009,  
18:05***

## 1945: "Information for Thought"

The Soviet bestseller "Seventeen Moments of Spring", based on which a television series much better than the book was staged, gave us the apt expression "information for thought." I think it

would not hurt me to give the reader at least a brief general "information for thought" about 1945 before talking about something specific - mythologized or real. So, 1945 ... At the most important theater of his

military operations - the European one, he began the same way it ended: with the Wehrmacht's attacks on the Anglo-Americans, which began with the Wehrmacht's counteroffensive on December 16, 1944 in the Ardennes. The Allies, having a huge advantage in ground technology, not to mention aviation, retreated and, what good, could come to the second Dunkirk.

The Red Army, having taken a strategic pause, was preparing for the most difficult battles of the final year of the

war. On January 12, 1945, the Vistula-Oder offensive operation began, which ended on February 3. On January 13, the East Prussian offensive operation began, which ended on April 25, 1945. Ahead were the Balaton

defensive operation, Vienna offensive operation and the Berlin offensive operation.

Behind, in 1944, were the capitulation of Romania and Finland, the entry of Soviet troops into Bulgaria, the announcement - on December 28, 1944 - by the Provisional National Government of Hungary of the German war ... Ahead was

the liberation of Warsaw and Prague. The Vistula-Oder operation of the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of Marshal Zhukov and the 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of Marshal Konev began much earlier than expected. This decision by Stalin was prompted by requests from Churchill and Roosevelt for help to the Allies, who were failing in the Ardennes.

The operation was carried out in cooperation with the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian and 4th Ukrainian fronts under the command of Marshal Rokossovsky, General of the Army Chernyakhovsky and General Petrov and became part of the general strategic offensive of the Red Army on the 1200-kilometer front with the task of opening the way to the Oder River in the direction of Berlin.

Already on the first day of the offensive, the 1st Ukrainian Front broke open the enemy's defenses in depth, by the end of the third day defeated his operational reserves, by January 18 started fighting on the outskirts of Krakow, and on January 23-28 went to the Oder and immediately captured the bridgeheads to the north and south of Breslau

(Wroclaw). Two powerful strike groups of the 1st Belorussian Front came out with their main forces to the Oder in early February.

On January 17, 1945, Warsaw was liberated. Then the 1st Belorussian and 2nd Belorussian fronts moved on to exploiting their success, on February 24 starting the East Pomeranian operation in Pomorie.

Having broken through the Pomeranian defensive "wall", on March 5 we reached the Baltic Sea, on March 28 we occupied Gdynia, and on March 30

- Danzig (Gdansk). Having cleared Pomerania, it was possible to start preparing the Berlin

operation. The East Prussian operation began a day later than the Vistula-Oderskaya and continued almost until the end of April, ending on the 25th. Its success ensured the attack on Berlin from the northeast, and the tip was directed to Koenigsberg - the current Russian Kaliningrad. The Koenigsberg

operation actually became the final part of the East Prussian operation. On the night of April 9-10, the remnants of the strongest Koenigsberg garrison, led by the commandant General Losch, surrendered - about 50 thousand soldiers and officers. On April 25, 1945, Pillau was taken - now the Russian Baltiysk. By this time, the danger to the Red Army that arose at the beginning of March in Hungary, in the area of Lake Balaton, had long been eliminated. Little has always been written about the Balaton operation - the only defensive operation of the Red Army in 1945. Defensive, not offensive. But in this



operations, the valor and military skill of our troops had an effect no less, and perhaps even more, than in offensive operations. However, more on this will be discussed later. Success in the Balaton operation prepared the basis for the Vienna operation, which lasted from March 16 to April 13, 1945.

The Vienna operation was carried out by the forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front under the command of Marshal Malinovsky and the 3rd Ukrainian Front under the command of Marshal Tolbukhin. As a result, Soviet troops cleared the western part of Hungary, by April 7 they reached the approaches to the capital of Austria, Vienna, and on April 13 captured it by storm.

However, although the battles for Austria were stubborn, the losses in them were far from being as great as those that the Soviet troops suffered in Germany itself. Especially in the Berlin direction. In total, 26 thousand Soviet soldiers died in the battles for Austria. Behind

each of the deaths in the war is a tragedy, because in the war, people in the prime of life most often die en masse. But the "Austrian" figure is incomparable with our losses in Germany proper, where the tension of the struggle was immeasurably greater.

The Berlin offensive operation began on April 16, 1945 and ended in fact with the end of the war - on May 8. The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front under the command of Marshal Zhukov, the 2nd Belorussian Front under the command of Marshal Rokossovsky and the 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of Marshal Konev advanced on Berlin.

At 14:25 on April 30, 1945, the Banner of Victory was raised over the Reichstag. On May 1,

1945, two eights of fighters under the command of the Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel A.V. Vorozheykin passed over the Reichstag at low altitude and dropped two huge red flags with inscriptions on one of them: "Long live May 1!" and on the second: "Victory". Victory! And on May 2, 1945, the Berlin

garrison  
officially  
capitulated. The

guns fell silent, the time for diplomacy began. Even against the backdrop of winter military battles, the first major diplomatic battle of 1945 took place - from February 4 to 11 near Yalta in the Livadia Palace

The Crimean Conference of Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill was held with the participation of foreign ministers and chiefs of staff.

The second such "battle" after the end of the war took place in the summer of 1945 in Germany, in the Berlin suburb of Potsdam in the Cecilienhof Palace - from July 17 to August 2. Questions of the post-war order of the world were discussed there by Stalin, the new US President Harry Truman, and the British Tory Prime Minister Churchill, who was already hanging in the balance, who was replaced on July 28 by the Laborist Attlee.

However, Truman and Churchill still managed to conduct a joint "atomic" sounding of Stalin, which looked very much like blackmail. On July 16, 1945, the first Trinity atomic bomb with a capacity of 21,000 tons of TNT was successfully tested at the Alamogordo test site in New Mexico, and a delighted Truman informed Stalin that the United States "had received a new weapon of extraordinary destructive power". Churchill at that time watched Stalin's reaction, but he

reacted to the news indifferently, from which the two Anglo-Saxons concluded that the Russians were far from their own bomb - if they knew anything about its capabilities at all.

How true this conclusion was, we will have time to talk later.

On August 6, 1945, at 8 hours 16 minutes 2 seconds local time, the main "atomic" secret ceased to be a secret - the Little Boy uranium bomb was detonated over Hiroshima.

August 9 plutonium bomb "Fat man" ("Fat Man" - in honor of Churchill) incinerated Nagasaki.

At this time, Soviet troops were already fighting against Japan. On September 2, 1945, the Japanese Surrender Act was signed aboard the USS Missouri. In Moscow, the first meeting of the Soviet "atomic" Special Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was held under the chairmanship of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria.

In Washington, profits were counted; in London and Paris, holes in pockets that had become leaky during the war. In

the Soviet Union, terrible losses were counted. 1710 cities and towns, 70 thousand villages and villages, 32 thousand industrial enterprises were destroyed.

They

died ... However, how many Soviet people died during that war, they will not agree to this day. The total figure ranges from 20 "Khrushchev" million to 27 million "Gorbachev" and almost 50 million "democratic".

At the same time, even the "Gorbachev" figure, as it seems to me, is one of the myths of perestroika, and the classic figure of twenty million, which was named by Stalin, is close to the truth. He had no need to downplay the loss and destruction. For what? If the death toll were even thirty million,

the

people would blame them not on Stalin (it was not his fault, although this is a separate conversation) and the Soviet government, but on Hitler.

On the contrary, it was **beneficial** for Stalin —forgive me this inappropriate word here—to maximize the scale of the losses and losses of the USSR. It would be beneficial if Stalin were a politician. However, he was a man not only of a great mind, but also of a great soul, and therefore he considered the truth to be the only possible option for himself.

"Yes, it would be thicker, no matter how bitter it is," as the poet Tvardovsky said.

The Year of Victory was

coming to an end... Snow fell on the ruins of cities, villages and villages of Great Russia, Ukraine and Belarus for the second time in 1945, now it is autumn. In the former occupied territory of the USSR, life was not yet in full swing in 1945 - the devastation was very fresh and terrible here.

Life here is rather warm. The country

still had to go through the hungry year of 1946 and the meager year of 1947, but, leafing through the old New Year's Eve issue of Ogonyok for December 1947 today, you see that by the end of this year the fruits of the Victory of 1945 were evident. The country

was already living and smiling.

However, even in 1945, it was clear to all healthy forces in the USSR that this would be the case, because in this year Russia achieved an outstanding success in its turbulent history - the World

defeated the War. And the year 1945 opened up the widest prospects for the World. It is a pity that 1991 and all subsequent years crossed them out, replacing

truth with lies and vile myths.

## Hidden Truth 1945

It would seem that today there is no need to hide the truth about 1945. The truth of the 45th is, as already mentioned, not the truth of the 41st ... In 1945, a lot of things happened that we have every right to be proud of, and very few things that we are ashamed to mention.

This year we advanced, we won, we increased our authority and finally became the second world power, having reasonable prospects for future superiority. It's for the championship! Why not?

Yes, America was rich and powerful. However, even then its power was not only the result of the efforts of the talented - then - American people, but also the result of the growing parasitism of the United States on the rest of the world. Parasitism, including on someone else's intellect due to the organized global "brain drain" from various countries to America. And we lived with our brains! And not bad - then - them

moved.

The general world development and the development of anti-imperialist tendencies in the world would inevitably weaken the United States, but would strengthen our influence, including economic influence, because the post-war USSR was an attractive and gigantic market for all types of goods, from heavy industry equipment to exotic bananas.

And all these very real prospects had their source in the Victory on May 9, 1945. The authority of the USSR grew and grew! So

what is there to be ashamed of? What to hide? On what basis to create myths?

Nevertheless, from a certain, quite definite moment, a paradoxical situation began to take shape: the farther from Victory Day - from May 9, 1945 - the more and more the main truth about the Victory of 1945 is obscured and **hidden**.

The starting point for the process of concealing this truth was Gorbachev's "catastrophe", and the subsequent reference points were the rule of Yeltsin and subsequent Yeltsinoids.

As a result, today, despite the abundance of declassified facts, documentaries (mostly supposedly documentary) films, memoirs of surviving veterans, despite the abundant flow of books, articles and Internet materials, the main truth about the Victory of 1945 has almost disappeared from the mass public consciousness of middle and even older generations.

What can we say about the younger generations uncritically drinking dirty lies from propaganda "puddles", trampled by various kinds of **hooves** on the road to the truth?

The reason for the increasing concealment of the truth about the Victory of 1945 is not archival limitations or difficulties in understanding this truth. The main reason is different. After all, the main truth about the Victory of 1945 is simple and until August 1991 (more precisely, until March 1985, in which the "best German" Gorbachev was brought to power in the USSR) was publicly available and well-known. This truth was

quite open, it was told in secondary and even primary school to all citizens of the Soviet Union. It was brought to mass consciousness so widely that it even began to bother and seem somewhat boring - like everyone has long and well known, but such an uninteresting multiplication table. This, now hidden, truth - point by

point. 1) The victory in the Great Patriotic War was won not by the Russian Federation and not even by Soviet Russia, but by the great multinational Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

2) The whole country became a single military camp, living under the slogan: "Everything for the front, everything for

the Victory." 3) The peoples of the USSR in this war at the front and in the rear were led to the Victory of 1945 not just by the state leadership, but by the **socialist** state leadership with the All-Union state leadership headed by the Communist Party (Bolsheviks). The Communists were the main force of the Active Army, and millions of them died a heroic death in the battles for the freedom and independence of our Motherland, for the Victory of 1945. 4)

The victory of 1945 was also due to the fact that at the head of the State Defense Committee, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Red Army



political and state genius - Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin.

5) The victory of 1945 became possible only because the Soviet government and the socialist system were able to unleash the creative forces of the masses with unprecedented fullness.

6) The Red Army in 1945 was, on the whole, a brilliant, well-coordinated, excellently functioning mechanism, the work of which was skillfully controlled by the command of all levels, and above all by the high command and the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander. I could go on and on, but I think that's enough. Here it is - the hidden truth about the Victory of 1945. Hidden not by archives, but hidden by the current government and "democrats" of all colors - tricolor, "yellow-black", "orange" and gray-brown crimson.

I understand that fans of cheap and false "sensations" or "cool" "revelations" will most likely be disappointed by this truth. But what to do - the truth "twice two - four", although it belongs to the boring ones, cannot be replaced by the pseudo-truth of the rezuns. For them, "twice two" is equal not only to five or seven there, but in general to what is required of them. If someone wants to comprehend

historical truths according to Rezunov and other similar "tables" **of "multiplication"**, I cannot prevent him. But to help, sorry, can not. As the unforgettable "Lyolik"-Papanov said: "If a person is an idiot, then this is -

for a long

time." However, for some reason it seems to me that the future is not for idiots, no matter how intensively they are propagated in the current "Rossiyanin".

In the meantime, a well-defined set of vile myths about our Victory is still in use, relating both to the entire war and to its final stage in 1945. Here are some of these myths:

Stalin in 1945 filled up the Germans with corpses.

It was not the Soviet soldier who won, but the Russian soldier.

Even the Russian soldier did not win, because until the very end fought wars not by skill, but by numbers and obscenities.

The Russians were cruel and got a reputation for not liberators, but rapists and marauders.

The Red Army soldiers hated Stalin and did not respect their own commanders, whom there was nothing to respect.

Because of Stalin, the Warsaw Uprising drowned in blood and was destroyed Warsaw.

The war was won not by the Russians, but by the allies.

Stalin's main mistake was that he showed Europe Ivan, and Ivan - Europe.

Some of these myths have a very ancient origin and were put into circulation both by Western Sovietologists and by renegades like the Chechen Avtorkhanov, a direct Nazi collaborator during the war years, who later switched to the Yankees, or younger renegades like Grigory Klimov.

Sometimes active admirers of the latter certify Grigory Petrovich as a "brilliant Soviet officer", but they do not notify the public that this "brilliant" 1918 (!) Year of birth until the end of 1943 (!) while the boys born in 1923 were dying near Minsk, Kiev, in Odessa and Sevastopol, in Stalingrad, on the Kursk Bulge and again near Kiev ... They were dying, and the brilliant graduate student felt (sorry for the frankness) female students and graduate students, taking advantage of the military shortage of that that he personally "in his pants" had.

In the autumn of 1943, the "booking" was removed, and Klimov fought for some time, was wounded, and awarded. But even here he was lucky - from the front-line POLL (a separate regiment of the reserve officers), he, thanks to his excellent knowledge of languages, did not end up in the trenches again, but in the Military Diplomatic Academy of the General Staff. After graduating from it, he received the major's "wings of a serf" - as officer shoulder straps were called among *him*. I think that the front-line soldiers, who earned these shoulder straps with sweat and blood, would not have shaken hands with him for these words alone.

Or maybe they would "slap" it.

Sent to the apparatus of the occupying Soviet military administration in Germany, Klimov fled a couple of years later to the American zone of Germany, from where he was taken to the United States to work in closed projects for the destruction of his homeland. After working there for a good five years, he retrained as a "whistleblower" of the Harvard

project", but he remained an anti-Soviet and defector, that is, a traitor.

In the West, Klimov made his debut with the book "Berlin Kremlin", which in itself is a complete myth. In the vast collection of major anti-Soviet works, one can hardly find a more vivid example of total and malicious myth-making, where the real past is misinterpreted and abundantly watered with "darkness" gleaned from the cellars of the myth-maker's soul. Here Klimov outdoes even Avtorkhanov and Solzhenitsyn. That is why, in my book on the myths of 1945, I will give a few

revealing quotes from the "Berlin Kremlin", starting with the following:

"If any German comes up to a Soviet soldier and tries to say to him: "Ivan is a schlecht" (shlecht is "bad"), the soldier will punch him in the teeth without talking. If the same German scolds Stalin, Soviet power and communism with the last words, then the soldier will surely give him his last cigarettes. This is an automatic reaction ... "Thinking about how to convincingly prove to the

reader the **vileness** of this statement of Klimov, I finally decided to simply resort to a counter-quotation from one of the Western authors.

I have cited the assessments of the German Major General Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin more than once, but I hope that those who are familiar with them from my previous books or from the original source will forgive me. They really hit the Klimov myth not in the eyebrow, but in the teeth!

The tanker Mellenthin fought in Poland, in France, in the Balkans, in Africa, on the Eastern Front, then again in France, in Belgium - in the Ardennes (we'll talk about them later) and, at the very end, in Germany itself, ending the war as chief of staff 5th Panzer Army.

In 1956, his book "Panzer battles 1939-1945", published in our country in 1957 ("Tank battles 1939-1945"), was published in London, where he wrote:

"The Russian soldier loves his "mother Russia", and therefore he fights for the communist regime, although, generally speaking, he is not a political fanatic. However, it should be borne in mind that the party and its organs have enormous influence in the Red Army. Almost all commissars are urban dwellers and come from working class backgrounds. Their courage borders on recklessness; these people are very

smart and determined. They managed to create in the Russian army what it lacked in the First World War - iron discipline ... Discipline is the main trump card of communism, the driving force of the army. It was also a decisive factor in achieving the enormous political and military successes of Stalin ... ... The skilful and persistent work of the Communists led to the

fact that since 1917 Russia has changed in the most amazing way. There can be no doubt that the Russian is increasingly developing the skill of independent action, and the level of his education is constantly growing ... "This opinion alone of a convinced and honored anti-Soviet and anti-communist smashes the myth of Klimov and

the Klimovs, like a concrete-piercing projectile - a carelessly made concrete wall. And the truth about the 45th year? Well, today, under the Pharisaic official doxology of the two-headed Yeltsinoids, our Victory itself has become a controversial category for the younger generations.

Young people argue - was there a Victory, was this Victory necessary? And the youngest do not even argue, they are actually indifferent to the past, the present, and the future. The generations that

made 1945 a victorious year for the Soviet Union have almost completely passed away, and those few who are still alive, as a rule, do not find the moral and physical strength to dissociate themselves from the hypocritical "triumphs" of power and hit with their fists on table on the eve of the next anniversary of the Victory, illegally taken on **a medium-term lease** by the current Kremlin. The total social schizophrenia of the current "Russian" is

also manifested in the fact that the destroyers of a great power make speeches about the greatness of the Victory, anti-Soviet people issue posters depicting the Order of Victory with the proud letters "USSR" on it, and snickering municipal thieves - "rulers" on the day of May 9 recklessly treat everyone, including the boys, "front-line" hundred grams - by no means, by the way, not so obligatory at the front on any day.

The front-line soldiers went into the ground, to their grandchildren and great-grandchildren, instead of the truth about the war, the media and official authorities

"feed" at best a half-truth, and more often a frank lie.

But the core of the truth about the war and about its final, victorious, 1945 is as sharp as an awl.

And, as you know, you can't hide an awl in a bag. Even if this "bag" is worked out in the Kremlin - even the "Berlin" performed by the traitor-defector Klimov, even in the Moscow model of the 2000s of the XXI century.

## About the allegedly weak and demoralized Germany of the 1945 model and the strike in the Ardennes

It is believed that by the beginning of 1945, Germany was already so weakened that not only about her victory in that war, but even about an honorable peace, there could be no question. Moreover, the Anglo-Saxons (not Stalin, by the way), having rummaged through the annals of their history, pulled out and put into circulation the old term "unconditional surrender", making it a *condicio sine qua non* (an indispensable condition) for ending the war with the Reich.

Indeed, from the second half of 1944, the Reich began to noticeably weaken - the tension of the war, the loss of many conquered regions with their economies, the lack of raw materials and energy, and also - not to a decisive extent - the growing strategic bombing of German territory by the allies affected.

Industrial production began to decline, reserves were depleted.

However, the Reich was so strong even in 1945 that such a major Allied military leader as General Patton could write in his diary ... However, more on that later. And now - about

the blow of the Wehrmacht on the allies at the turn of 1944 and 1945 and at the beginning of 1945. These last German offensives in the West are not valued very highly today. Yes, and in real time, Churchill - at the Crimean Conference of 1945 in a conversation with Stalin - declared that Hitler "prepared a web, but forgot about the spider." However, it was easy for him to joke like that on February 4, 1945, when the

Soviet offensive in the East had been successfully developing for more than a crescent. From the middle of the last month of 1944 to the middle of the first month of 1945, the Allies had no time for jokes. In December 1944, they were convinced that the Reich was still strong, because on December 16, the Wehrmacht's penultimate offensive operation in World War II, the Ardennes, began.



The last was the Balaton operation in March 1945 against the Soviet troops in Hungary, and today it is very instructive to compare the course of these two operations, but everything has its time. While - about the Ardennes ...

I am not writing the history of that war. Like my 10 Myths About 1941, this book is nothing more than a sketch of events. Therefore, I will not describe in detail - following the allegedly accurate classics of military history, the British Liddell Hart and Fuller, the Germans Tippleskirch, Mellenthin, Guderian, the Americans Patton, Bradley, Pogue, the Frenchman Darcy - describe how in the autumn of 1944 Hitler personally came up with the idea of a capsizing strike on the Allies, as Field Marshal Rundstedt, the commander-in-chief of the German armed forces in the West, allegedly opposed this, in an atmosphere of supposedly exceptional secrecy, the German offensive was being prepared on December 16, 1944 ... However, the exact fact is that this offensive turned out to be completely unexpected

for the Allies. On the eve of it, Montgomery, the British commander, exchanged sarcastic letters with Eisenhower, the American commander, about a five-pound bet made a year ago.

Hitler presented both of them with a much larger bill, which he intended to receive in Antwerp. The Fuhrer's plan was later judged as a gamble, but rather it should be judged as bold. Suffice it to say that, according to Liddell Hart, on the third day of the offensive, December 19, the Germans were half a kilometer from a huge fuel depot near Stavelot, where more than 11 million liters of gasoline were stored. If the Germans had received this vital gasoline for them, things could have gone

differently in the West. After all, the allies did not show any special fighting qualities, although they had an advantage in everything, and above all in aviation.

Having left, after landing in Normandy in June 1944, by December 1944, on the approaches to the Rhine, the Anglo-Americans further behaved passively. It can be assumed that they seriously counted either on a quick general capitulation of Germany, or, more likely, on a separate peace with her. Of course, a separate agreement with

the Germans behind the back of the USSR would have caused a storm of protests and indignation in the world, but the bosses of the West have always been able to

appease the electoral beast. They would calm her, presumably, and this time, however ...

However, the Reich was by no means going to give up yet, and on December 16, 1944, Field Marshal Rundstedt delivered the first unexpectedly powerful blow to the Allies in the general direction of Liege. The Allied front was quickly opened, and the Germans were preparing for the complete liquidation of its entire northern wing. The fronts are not geese, but on one wing they

also cannot fly far, and the Wehrmacht, having finished with the allies in Northern France and Belgium, would not deprive the southern wing of the collapsing allied front with its attention. The German attack was completely unexpected. Historian John Toland

later wrote:

“75 thousand American soldiers on the front from Echternach to Monschau on the night of December 16 went to bed, as usual ... That evening, not one of the American commanders seriously thought about a major German offensive.”

The offensive impulse of the Germans - especially parts of the Waffen-SS - was very great. This can be seen not only from the arrows of the offensive on the maps of the situation and the pace of advancement, but also from photographic and film documents of that time. It is enough to peer into the expression on the face of a young, but clearly experienced in military affairs, a soldier of the SS troops captured by the Allies, to understand that for him the war is not lost, but only begins in earnest, because this guy draws strength no longer in thoughts about Minsk, Kiev, Moscow and Leningrad, but in the understanding that he is defending his own homeland.

The Allies retreated in panic. Here is the picture described by the American journalist Ralph Ingersoll, a participant and witness of the hostilities in Europe:

“German troops broke through our line of

defense on a front of fifty miles and poured into this gap like water into a blown up dam. And from there, along all the roads leading to the west, the Americans fled headlong. However, then everything changed. The improvement in the weather allowed Allied aviation to

deliver almost unpunished bombing strikes on communications and troops, the Germans were sorely lacking fuel.

The German counter-offensive dried up.

But to make it clearer to the reader how difficult it is to understand after the fact (I apologize for the involuntary pun) what was happening then on the Western Front, I will inform you that, according to Eisenhower's headquarters, German losses during the Ardennes offensive amounted to 220 thousand people, and Rundstedt's chief of staff, General Westphal estimated them after the war at 25 thousand people. Wow discrepancy,

huh? Things are easier with the original numbers. And they are about these are...

Before the start of the German offensive, the Allies had 63 divisions on a front of 640 kilometers (of which 15 were armored), 10,000 tanks, and 8,000 aircraft. Plus - reserves. The Germans had 73

divisions (including 11 tank divisions) and 3 brigades. At the same time, the shortage of a number of divisions was 30-40%. The

Wehrmacht strike force included the troops of Army Group B: the 6th SS Panzer Army of SS Obergruppenführer Dietrich, the 5th Panzer Army of General Manteuffel and the 7th Army of General Brandenberger. The group included about 900 tanks

and 800 air support aircraft, according to the Soviet History of World War II. According to, for example, the Englishman J. Fuller, in the grouping there were 1000 tanks, 3000 aircraft and "many

thousand cars.

Whatever you think, the overall balance of power was not very comforting for the Germans. Nevertheless, they could have had success, moreover, a decisive success. Subsequently, General Halder declared that the forces used for the offensive in the Ardennes "were the last pennies of an impoverished man," but he clearly came down with this.

After the war, the Wehrmacht generals blamed all their own sins on Hitler (here the Germans were not alone - the Soviet generals also blamed all their sins, especially the pre-war and first military ones, at the suggestion of Khrushchev on Stalin). However, Hitler was quite able to think strategically in 1945. For example, Panzer General

Mellenthin, already mentioned by me, claims that on the eve of our offensive in the winter of 1945, Guderian warned de Hitler on January 9 that "the Eastern Front

resembles a house of cards," but Hitler de "stubbornly continued to think that the training of the Russians was just a gigantic bluff."

In fact, the above statement is a gigantic general bluff, since back on December 4, 1944, Hitler wrote in a letter to the head of the Hungarian fascist government, Ferenc Salashi, that very soon the reserves available in the West would be needed to be transferred to the East, since "the Russians in the very near future launch a gigantic offensive against East Prussia and Upper Silesia." Actually, Hitler planned to carry out the offensive in the West before the need

arose to repel the offensive in the East, which would require troops removed from the Western Front. However, a decisive breakthrough did not happen, the situation stabilized. Not resigned to the idea that the Reich

had failed to regain the initiative on the Western Front, Hitler authorized a new offensive, which began on January 1, 1945, and again initially gave good results.

On the Western Front, everything again hung in the balance, not only for the Germans, but also for the Allies. In support of what has been said, I will cite only one, but eloquent fact.

On January 4, 1945, the commander of the 3rd American Army, General George Patton, wrote in his diary:

"We can still lose this war."

It was then that Churchill turned to Stalin, in fact begging him to speed up the Soviet offensive. On January 6, 1945, the British Prime Minister sent the following message to "Marshal Stalin":

"Very heavy fighting is going on in the West, and at any time big decisions may be required from the High Command. You yourselves know from your own experience how disturbing the situation is when one has to defend a very wide front after a temporary loss of initiative. It is highly desirable and necessary for General Eisenhower to know in general terms what you intend to do, since this, of course, will affect all of his and our most important decisions. According to the message received, our

emissary Air Chief Marshal Tedder was in Cairo last night, weather bound. His trip was greatly delayed through no fault of yours. If he has not yet arrived to you, I will be grateful if you can let me know if we can count on a major Russian offensive in the Vistula region or somewhere else during January and at any other points that you may wish to mention. I will not pass on this highly classified information to anyone, with the exception of Field Marshal Brooke and General Eisenhower, and only on condition that it is kept in the strictest confidence. I consider the matter urgent." Stalin, having received this request for help, the desperation of which was only thinly veiled

by the dryness of the presentation, January 7, 1945

years ago he

replied: "Unfortunately, Air Chief Marshal Mr. Tedder has not yet arrived in Moscow.

It is very important to use our superiority against the Germans in artillery and aviation. In these types, clear weather is required for aviation and the absence of low fogs that prevent artillery from conducting aimed fire. We are preparing to advance, but the weather is not favorable for our advance. However, taking into account the position of our allies on the Western Front, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to finish the preparations at an accelerated pace and, regardless of the weather, open wide offensive operations against the Germans along the entire central front no later than the second half of January. You can be sure that we will do everything that is possible to do in order to assist our glorious allied forces. In a sense, in the winter of 1945, the

situation of 1914 was repeated, when the success of the allies in France was ensured by the blood of the offensive of the Russian army of Samsonov. Now, of course, everything was different - we were going to attack soon and so. But the Britons and Yankees considered it possible - **for themselves** - to advance only when "the last button was sewn to the uniform of the last soldier." But the Russians, too, would not have interfered with those week or two that remained before the start of our **comprehensively prepared** offensive in the West with a general direction to Berlin.

However, they had to start advancing - from the Baltic to the Carpathians - earlier than planned. It was necessary to save the allies from the threat of Dunkirk. And our

offensive really saved the Allies from disaster. On January 12, 1945, the Vistula-Oder operation began, and on the same day the Germans were forced to stop the offensive and transfer the 5th and 6th tank armies to the East. Later, the 6th Panzer Army will play the role of a battering ram at Balaton, but there, as they say, it "did not break off." The enemy was not the same. In this book, I will repeatedly refer to the report of

the Deputy Chief of the

General Staff of the Red Army, General of the Army Antonov, which he made on February 4, 1945 for the participants in the Crimean (Yalta) Conference. Speaking about the course of the Soviet offensive, he then said:

"Due to unfavorable weather conditions, this operation was supposed to begin at the end of January, when the weather was expected to improve.

Since this operation was considered and prepared as an operation with decisive goals, we wanted to carry it out in more favorable conditions.

However, in view of the alarming situation created in connection with the German offensive in the Ardennes, the High Command of the Soviet troops gave the order to launch the offensive no later than mid-January, without waiting for the weather to improve. (...) The offensive was launched in

extremely unfavorable conditions ... which completely excluded the work of aviation ... "

Antonov then added that artillery observation was limited to a hundred meters. But we concentrated a huge amount of large-caliber artillery in the breakthrough zone, and the accuracy of shooting was very important. One way or another, by the time of Antonov's February

report, success

has been reached. But already on January 15, 1945, Stalin wrote to Roosevelt:



"After four days of offensive operations on the Soviet German front, I now have the opportunity to inform you that, despite the unfavorable weather, the offensive of the Soviet troops is developing satisfactorily. The entire central front, from the Carpathians to the Baltic Sea, is in motion to the west. Although the Germans desperately resist, they are still forced to retreat. I have no doubt that the Germans will have to scatter their reserves between the two fronts, as a result of which they will be forced to abandon the offensive on the western front ...

As for the Soviet troops, you can be sure that, despite the existing difficulties, they will do everything possible to ensure that the blow they have taken against the Germans is as effective as possible. At the Crimean

Conference in February 1945, Churchill expressed "deep gratitude and admiration for the power that was demonstrated by the Red Army in its offensive."

Stalin replied that "the winter offensive of the Red Army, for which Churchill expressed gratitude, was the fulfillment of a comradely duty." He also noted that "according to the decisions taken at the Tehran conference, the Soviet government was not obliged to undertake a winter offensive." Today, this is also forgotten or

deliberately obscured by malicious and malicious myths about Stalin and the essence and significance of the actions of the Red Army in 1945 and in general in that war. **But it was**, and in my book I will return to the theme of Stalin's nobility and the dexterity of his Western partners more than once. The theme is worth

it! Another thing is surprising ... It would seem that the situation around the "Ardennes syndrome" is so advantageous for us that this vivid example of the fulfillment of our allied comradely duty could be included in the USSR even in school history books. However, even in the "Brezhnev", 70s edition, the academic "History of the Second World War", the Ardennes collisions were described as losing for the Germans from the very beginning.

But then it turns out that the fact of accelerating the Soviet winter offensive in 1945 was not so significant? Modesty on the part of the authors of the capital Soviet work is strange,

going back, however, back to the Khrushchev era, which is also more than strange.

Nevertheless, the fact remains: in the Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the United States and Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 published in 1957 by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Politizdat. Both Churchill's letter to Stalin dated January 6, 1945 and Stalin's reply are missing.

Why would this, gentlemen, "fighters of the ideological front of the Central Committee of the CPSU", the future anti-communists Yeltsinoids? I understand why Fuller, Liddell Hart, Mellenthin, Tippleskirch, Guderian, Poghue, Darcy and other Western historians keep silent about the significance of the offensive in the East for **saving**

the front in the West. I understand why the American General Bradley, with the dexterity of a sharpie, attributes the success of the Soviet winter offensive to "the strategic influence of the success of the Allies in the Ardennes."

But why didn't Soviet military historians give a harsh rebuff to this? Did they prepare positions in advance to receive overseas "tugriks" and grants after 1991, or what?

The allies - even when they were in Europe under real bombs, shells and bullets - treated the war more like a game. To be convinced of this, it is enough to read the memoirs of their generals. The Germans, who opposed them in the West, knew what they were fighting for - for Germany. Field Marshal Rundstedt, assuming the post of commander of troops in the West, said that he would fight "to gain time to prepare his offensive in order to eliminate the threat to German soil." This is the "top" of the army. And here is her "bottom", the testimony

of the captured

Lieutenant Erich Lis, commander of the 7th company of the 112th motorized regiment of the 20th tank division, given in the information of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 5th Guards Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front dated March 9 1945: "We are told from above that our time will come. New connections will be created. These formations will throw the Russians out of Germany."

The cited information of the intelligence department of the 5th Guards Army gives different opinions - it was already, after all, March 1945.

And if the captured company commander, Lieutenant Holz, was convinced: "The war will end this year with our victory," then the captive Volkssturmist Kreuss Kornel admitted: "The successes of the Red Army ... terrify the soldiers ... The defeat of Germany kills the spirit of the German soldier, while the Russians their successes are only encouraging."

However, the spirit of resistance in the Germans faded only gradually. Under the new year of 1945, General Mellenthin again got to the front - to command the 9th Panzer Division. He later wrote: "Most of my soldiers were Austrians, and despite heavy losses, their morale was still high." These are the Austrians! What can we say about the "imperial"

Germans! The Germans were truly broken only at the very end of April - broken not so much materially as morally. A lot of evidence can be cited on this score, but I will refer to the memoirs of twice Hero of the Soviet Union Air Marshal Yevgeny Yakovlevich Savitsky. Just in the last days of April 1945, this illustrious pilot unexpectedly got the opportunity to observe a ground battle from the ground and even participate in it.

It turned out like this... Organizing interaction with the tank army of General Bogdanov, Savitsky spent the night with the chief of staff of the army, General Radzievsky, in a village near Brandenburg, and as a result they had to get involved in a night battle of our tank company with a German battalion.

Savitsky later recalled: "The three of us, with an officer and a soldier who happened to be nearby, I went up to the second floor of an empty ... house. Radzievsky with two other officers remained downstairs ... I

knocked out the frame with a butt. The area was in full view. Bathed in yellowish moonlight, it has become a battlefield. It was easy to distinguish our soldiers from the German ones. And not only in terms of color. In some other way,

our guys fought, quickly and efficiently. It was as if they weren't playing with death involuntarily, but they were doing their usual, albeit difficult, work. Soon this military

work was to end. But for that for this to become a fact, it was necessary to fight until the last day of the war. And sometimes even after.

In the West, a lot has been written about the Ardennes operation, but not so much is true. And it's funny, for example, to read some parts of the memoirs of the famous Otto Skorzeny, who commanded a special commando unit under the "brand" of the 150th tank brigade in the Ardennes

operation. There are more weighty, and at the same time more funny examples. So, already after the war, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, justifying his failure in the Ardennes, told the English military historian Liddell Hart that during the Ardennes offensive "the only troops that he ( Rundstedt. - S. / S.) was allowed to dispose of were guards, standing against his headquarters.

It turns out that not only Gogol's non-commissioned officer's widow could flog herself, but the German field marshals were much more than that! After all, if things were as Rundstedt described, then a more or less self-respecting commander would have to thank the Fuhrer for the honorable offer to take command of the troops in the West, but categorically refuse such a "high honor", which turns a military general into a "wedding". In reality, both at the end of

1944 and at the beginning of 1945, German generals commanded and disposed of on the Western Front, who had not lost either full power or the ability to win - with luck - battles. At the turn of 1944 and 1945, many generals of

the Western Front, as well as their subordinates, had not yet lost faith that they were capable of winning the war, or at least keeping the situation from catastrophe. Only when this failed, did the post-war general and

field marshal, sorry, **scams** like the one described above begin.

## About the economy of the Reich, allegedly defeated by the Allies from the air

The former minister of armaments of the Third Reich, a former favorite of Hitler, Speer managed to quickly "denazify himself." Therefore, in his memoirs, he sometimes simply slanders the former "boss", for example, denying him a sense of humor. In his memoirs,

Speer persistently tried to stick out his role as the "savior of Germany" from the passion that allegedly seized the Fuhrer for the total destruction of the Reich's economy. However, acquaintance with the true state of affairs suggests that Speer blamed too much from his sore head onto the dead head of the Fuhrer. Fortunately, it didn't matter, and Speer had to leave

from the loop...

The myth of Hitler's strict order to destroy everything and everyone is also at odds with the ideas of Hitler's will, the authenticity of which is not disputed and in which Hitler orients the German people towards the continuation of the "further battle of the nation" and the "continuation of the construction of the National Socialist state."

Hitler was not so stupid not to understand that without factories and infrastructure you can't fight and you can't build anything. So it's unlikely that he thoughtlessly ordered everything to hell to blow up, blow up and blow up ... The Allies completely

destroyed Germany. But they destroyed main city. But the factories...

In 1947, the book "IG FARBEN" was published in the West, in 1948 it was published in our country under the name "IG Farbenindustri". The author of this very interesting and non-standard book was the American economist and journalist Richard Saccioli. After the war,

Saccioli had a rare opportunity to become acquainted with the archives of the Reich and its economy. So, he wrote that, provided that fuel, materials, repairs and transport were provided, the German economy could operate at almost 90 percent of its maximum capacity until the end of the war.

So what was the result of the strategic "carpet" bombing of German territory? A bombed-out economy or hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties? Sexuli's book begins

So:

"Deep in the forests of Eastern Bavaria, the Nazis hid their latest military factories. You can drive past them on the road and see nothing. You can fly over them - and again, see nothing but a dense green cover of forests. Military factories are well camouflaged... As a rule, workshops are scattered

over a large area and are interconnected by kilometers of green pipelines." Sesyuli knew what he was writing. Drafted into the American army, he was a member of Colonel Bernstein's group, which was

investigating the IG concern of the German Farbenindustrie. He traveled all over the American, and not only the American zone of occupation and collected the richest activities supplemented chemical documentary material, by personal impressions.

Here is a specific example given by Sesyuly: "On a lawn in a Bavarian forest stands an unfinished building ... with a vaulted roof - ... about 800 m long, more than 90 m wide at the base, and more than 30 m high. It was intended for the Messerschmitt aircraft manufacturing plant ". The plant was buried in the ground, the thickness of the dome was 6 meters. And this

construction, begun only in August of the 44th, the Reich continued **until mid-April of the 45th**, when the troops of the United States of America entered this zone. "Most of the German cities were turned into ruins," Sesyuly wrote. - In the zone occupied by the

American army, the only large city not seriously affected was Heidelberg. At first glance, it seemed that decades would have to pass before Germany became a manufacturing country again. At the sight of the ruins of cities, it was impossible to imagine that the factories remained untouched.

However, this was exactly the case. The allies bombed the central areas of cities - residential areas. They were less covered by air defense forces, and most importantly, the houses of the Germans had nothing to do with property of US citizens, unlike many German

enterprises that were directly owned by US firms or in which US capital predominated. Other variants of relations and distribution of property

were also possible. Saxuli frankly admitted: "More than any other concern in the world, IG Farbenindustrie became the center of a network

of international cartels that control an amazing range of products - oil, rubber, dyes, nitrogen, explosives, aluminum, nickel, rayon . About five thousand kilometers separate the office of IG Farbenindustrie in Frankfurt am Main in Germany from the Atlantic coast of the United States of America, but IG Farbenindustrie could tell a lot about the American military industry ... "In this situation, not everyone in the United States needed a lying German industry, especially heavy industry, is in ruins. And this additional political protection, combined with the high anti-aircraft defense of Germany's military factories, provided its economy with a completely stable mode of activity that the bombings could not derail. However,

there were influential forces in the United States who wanted not only to defeat the armed forces of the Reich, but also to destroy its economy, above all, the same heavy industry. Already on May 11, 1945, the directive of the joint chiefs of staff of the United States and England to General Eisenhower No. 1067 was approved at the White House.

The directive was based on the program of an American Jew, former Treasury Secretary in the Roosevelt government, Henry Morgenthau. And the goal of the program was the dismemberment of Germany and its agrarianization.

In terms of industry, the directive prescribed: "a) to prohibit and prevent the production of iron and steel, metals, automobiles, chemicals, colored machine radio-  
electrical equipment, tools, heavy machine  
equipment ... except for the purpose of preventing famine or disorder or disease that might threaten the occupying forces. b) prohibit and prevent the restoration of enterprises

and equipment of these industries, except for the needs

occupying troops.

However, people interested in the post-war development of the German economy - under the control of the United States, of course - were still more in Washington and New York. They determined the target designation for US strategic aviation: to destroy cities, but not to touch factories. In the end, they headed for the new industrialized Germany, whose economy was largely preserved by the end of the war. For simpletons, already

during the war, a myth was created that the bombing of the Reich by the Allies and caused the collapse of the Reich.

In this book, I - for nothing that I graduated from the Kharkov Aviation Order of Lenin Institute named after N.E. Zhukovsky with a specialization in "liquid rocket engines" - I will not talk much about how much the Germans achieved by 1945 in the development of the latest models of military equipment and before of all - in the field of rocket technology, jet aircraft and electronics.

But I'll say

something... One of our well-known rocket scientists (if I'm not mistaken, Chertok) recalled that what our rocket men saw in defeated Germany in 1945, they defined as follows: "This is something that cannot be." From

personal experience, I can recall a similar testimony of one of my teachers at KhAI. When a prominent specialist in the field of bladed (not from the word "shovel", but from "compressor or turbine blade") machines, Academician of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR Proskura, head of the KhAI department, got acquainted with the German captured rocket "iron" in the forties, he stated literally the same : "This can't be!", referring to the crazy for those times the speed of rotation of the turbopump elements engine of the German unit ballistic missile "V-2".

In the 1970s, together with my fellow students, I studied the rocket engine of the German anti-aircraft missile "Reintochter" ("Daughter of the Rhine"). Even then it was useful for future rocket scientists - the design of some elements of this engine was so interesting and original. Actually, at the Soviet reproduction of the German combat ballistic missile "V-2" - the first in the world - we, the students, managed to stand and "feel" everything in detail.



Even in the 70s, the Reich rocket masterpiece was impressive. The Germans also had amazing achievements in the field of creating aviation jet gas turbine engines and jet aircraft. And in the problem of creating an

atomic bomb, they are not so far behind.  
from the rest.

Perhaps, the Germans, as a national community, lacked in the Second World War (as, indeed, in the First, too) that collective ***spiritual*** stamina that the Soviet era managed to instill in the peoples of the USSR and, above all, in the triune Russian people.

As for the German economy, its ***material*** condition in 1945 could have provided the Germans with a long resistance - contrary to the myth that the allied bombing destroyed the material basis of the power of the Third Reich.

## Was it possible to get into the Warsaw "sleigh" not in the winter of 1945, but in the summer of 1944?

One of the persistent myths of that war, the chronological origin of which goes back to the summer of 1944, and the end falls on January 1945, was the myth that the Red Army allegedly could have liberated Warsaw in the summer or early autumn of 1944, and not in mid-January 1945. However, Stalin allegedly did not want to do this, because the uprising that "flared up" in Warsaw on August 1, 1944 was organized not by leftists, but by pro-Western forces. To begin

with, instead of an epigraph to the section, let me remind you that more than 600 (**six hundred! 11**) thousand Soviet soldiers and officers died in the battles for free Poland in 1944-1945.

The losses of the Polish Army in the same two years amounted to 26 thousand killed and missing. If we take into account the losses of the Poles in 1939 during the hostilities in the Polish-German war and, in general, all the combat losses of the Poles on all fronts of the Second World War, including their losses in the Allied forces, then the total figure will not even "reach" even a third of the losses of the peoples USSR, incurred during the

liberation of Poland. This circumstance alone should have ensured **the only** historically and morally justified attitude of all subsequent generations of Poles to the words "Russian" and "Soviet" - grateful and reverent! Instead, the Poles and "Russian"

"democrats" to this day poke us in the nose at Katyn, where the Poles were shot by the Germans in 1941, in order to blame it on the Russians in 1943. The myth about the

possibility of liberating Warsaw in the summer of 1944 is superimposed on the already modern myth about the alleged possibility of an "ambiguous interpretation" of the history and background of the Warsaw Uprising, although a study of documents and an analysis of the general political and military-political situation of that time unequivocally leads to the conclusion that Stalin was completely right and the meanness of actions Churchill and the emigrant Polish "government" warmed by Lon

first with General Sikorsky, and then with the politician Mikolajczyk.

One has only to be surprised at the strange "toothlessness" of the authors of the compilers of the 14th [3 (1)] volume of the "Russian Archive" - "The Great Patriotic War. USSR and Poland: 1941–1945. On the history of the military alliance. In the comments to this, they declare that they have gone “from their own interpretation of events” around the Warsaw Uprising, allegedly in the interests of “objectivity”. Although what is there to "interpret" - today this unsightly story for the West and the Poles looks clear as glass. Of course, someone may remember the expression

“through **a cloudy** glass”, but in this case, I repeat, everything is clear, like the window glass of a good housewife on fine spring days. If, of course, you have an honest look. However, first things first...

Since 1938, the successor of the  
Communist Party of Poland,  
dissolved by the bourgeois government in 1938, was the Polish Workers' Party (PPR). After the occupation of Poland by the Germans, armed underground formations were created

on its territory not only by the PPR (“Peerites”) - the Army of Ludov, but also by the armed underground formations of the “Londoners”, at first, from June 1940, called the “Union of Armed Struggle”, and from March 1942 - Craiova Army (AK, "akovtsy").

In each "army" there were several tens of thousands of people (in the AK, according to some sources, up to 200-300 thousand, but this is clearly with all the "dead" souls). Ludov's army

was less numerous, but much more active. The Craiova Army did not conduct active military operations against the Germans, limiting itself mainly to "gathering forces." One of the first commanders-in-chief of the AK, General Rowiecki, was arrested by the Gestapo in Warsaw on June 30, 1943, but was executed, by the way, only in August 1944, after the outbreak of the uprising in Warsaw. After the arrest of the Rovetsky AK,

General  
Komorowski (Bur-Komorowski, from the underground nickname "Bur").

On New Year's Eve on January 1, 1944, the "left" underground organizations of occupied Poland created in the deep underground

Craiov Radu Narodov (KRN).

Bolesław Bierut was elected chairman of the KRN, and the initiative for the creation came from the Polish Workers' Party. The KRN was supposed to unite all democratic forces with two immediate goals: the fight against the German occupiers and opposition to the policies of the Polish government in exile in London and its "delegation" in Poland. At its first

meeting on New Year's Eve 1944, the KRN called on the Poles to fight in alliance with the USSR for the expulsion of the Germans, for the achievement of national independence and the creation of a truly democratic Poland. On

July 21, 1944, after the entry of the Red Army into the territory of Poland and the creation of the Polish Army in the USSR, the Craiova Rada Narodowa formed its temporary body of central executive power - the Polish Committee of National Liberation. On July 22, he published his manifesto of a very "leftist" content. On July 26, 1944, an agreement was signed between

the Soviet government and the PKNO. The agreement, in particular, provided that as soon as one or another region of Poland ceases to be a war zone, its leadership will pass into the hands of the PKNO. On July 26, 1944, the Prime Minister of the London government, Stanisław Mikołajczyk,

went to Moscow for negotiations with Molotov and Stalin. And on August 1, 1944, an armed uprising began in the capital of Poland under the leadership of the anti-Soviet and

pro-Western Home Army. It is possible to deny the connection between the events of January and July 1944 and the uprising of August 1, but only

to unscrupulous, frivolous and ignorant people. There was a connection! And it's the most direct. Mikołajczyk, who went to Moscow, had no special "trump cards" in his hands, except

for political and financial support from the Churchill government, America and the world cosmopolitan elite that created Piłsudski's "post-Versailles" Poland. Therefore, Mikołajczyk

I really hoped that the successful uprising in Warsaw, undertaken exclusively by the forces of the Home Army, led by Tadeusz Bur Komorowski, would be a "strong argument" in the Moscow negotiations.

The Londoners had to hurry - the Soviet troops were advancing towards Warsaw, and, which was even more dangerous for the London Poles, together with the Russians, the 1st Polish Army of General Sigmund Berling from the Polish Army was

advancing on Warsaw. And the Polish Army, formed with the help of the USSR, was subordinate to the Craiova

Rada Narodowa and PKNO. Even if only the Red Army liberated Warsaw, the Polish capital would still be transferred by us under the control of the KRN. And if Berling's troops entered Warsaw, the chances of the Mikolajczyk government to return to power - and so almost zero - would simply disappear.

Therefore, there could be no question of any coordination of the actions of the Warsaw forces of the Home Army with the Soviet command, with the command of the Polish Army and the leadership of the People's

Army. On the contrary, on July 22, 1944, Bur-Komorowski, in a telegram to his "commander-in-chief" in London, on the one hand, stated the need "not for a single minute" to stop the fight against Germany, and on the other hand, he proposed "to spiritually mobilize the entire society to fight with Russia."

The British government, of course, had information about the impending uprising of the AK, but the allied Soviet government did not inform about this. In addition to quite understandable reasons, it should be clearly noted here that if Stalin had known about the plans of the AK in connection with the approach of Soviet troops to Warsaw, he would immediately and decisively refuse to support such plans. That is, the London Poles intended to put Stalin before the fact.

On July 30, 1944, Mikolajczyk reached the Russian capital, and on August 1, Bur-Komorowski began to operate in the Polish capital. From any point of view, and above all from the military point of view, it was a gamble. In Warsaw, there was a 16,000th (according to other sources - 20,000th) German garrison, and the AK forces numbered up to 40,000 people, but very poorly armed (about 3.5 thousand units

small arms). Heavy weapons were not at all and could not be, not to mention tanks and aircraft. Churchill, in his

psychologically and historically false World War II, had the audacity to throw the blame for the premature uprising on ... Moscow, which allegedly called for him in its radio broadcasts. What is strange, this version is not rejected as completely untenable, and the above-mentioned publishers of documents from the Russian Archive. Taking into account the fact that Soviet formations could

soon go directly to Warsaw, Moscow Radio really spoke of the need for a direct active struggle of the Poles. On July 1, 1944, the *Volna Polska* newspaper published a large appeal of the Military Council of the 1st Army of the Polish Army to compatriots signed by Generals Berling, Swierchewsky and Zawadzky before the army entered Poland. "Compatriots! Through the fiery front line, we send you, brothers and sisters, words of hope and faith in imminent liberation. Raise your head proudly. For the Motherland, the end

of captivity is approaching, the hour of the revival of freedom is approaching ... "And it ended like this:"

Everyone to fight! Don't waste a minute. Take up arms! Beat the Germans!... ...Join the ranks of the People's Army (that is, the People's

Army. - **S.K.**). Destroy the manpower, weapons and equipment of the Nazi invaders.

Derail trains, blow up bridges. Burn German warehouses.

Prepare all for an uprising with weapons in hand against the German invader.

To arms, Poles!" On July 26, 1944, the political administration of the 1st Ukrainian Front addressed the Polish people. Here is the most "extremist" part of the appeal: "Poles! In the name of the speediest liberation

of your native land from German occupiers help the Red Army in every possible way.

Expose German agents spreading lies and sowing panic.

Help the Red Army units maintain order.  
Continue your peaceful work...

Remember! The sooner the Nazi army is destroyed, the sooner peace will

come ... "That is, Moscow really called on the Poles to fight. But only a cretin (or such an insolent as Churchill) could put on the same level propaganda programs that morally prepare people for the upcoming battles, and specific operational decisions on a specific uprising, and even where - in the capital of Poland! What - Stalin was just sleeping and thinking how he could stir up the Poles in Warsaw? Rave! But nonsense

at

the highest level of falsification of history, coming from such a figure as the head of the British military cabinet! At the same time, Churchill himself admits that Boer had stocks of food and ammunition for seven to ten days.

So what and who did Boer count on? To Churchill? On Montgomery? To Eisenhower? To the "womb Bosca Czystochowa"? Or, nevertheless, on

Stalin and Rokossovsky? The calculation was, of course, on the Russians - always covered in mud and hated, but, as the same Boer understood, noble, as a rule,

to the point of forgetting their interests. The calculation was vile, but he was. However, this time the Poles - in Warsaw and London, as

well as Churchill in London, miscalculated. And the point was not even that Stalin had no desire to pay with Russian blood for the return to Poland of an unambiguously anti-Soviet and anti-Russian government. After all, in 1944, as in 1939, the Poles behaved so impudently and stupidly that Mikolajczyk in Moscow, at the talks on August 6–7 with representatives of the PKNO, rejected the proposal to create a coalition government representing all the democratic forces of the country.

And for this reason alone, Moscow's refusal to support the Varsovians provoked by London would be fully justified. Of course it's a pity

deceived people, but, in the end, in Warsaw, the "Akovites" fired at the Germans, following the instructions of London, and in the rear of the Soviet armies that liberated Poland, the same "Akovites", following the instructions of London, fired

at the Red Army. Churchill writes that "the Russians wanted the non-communist Poles to be destroyed, and at the same time maintained the opinion that they

were going to their aid." This is a total lie, starting with the fact that in the uprising, when it suddenly began, the forces of the underground communist People's Army also took an active part.

However, I repeat, it was impossible to completely ignore the fact that in advance - both from the statements and from the actions of the leadership of the AK - it was clear: "non-communist Poles", even if the Red Army rescued them, would subsequently destroy the soldiers of the same Red Army. According to incomplete data, only for the period from July 28 to December 31, 1944, 277 Soviet officers and soldiers were killed and 94

wounded by AK detachments. And yet, Stalin was not guided by a sober, but vile calculation - like Churchill a little later, when he brutally suppressed the "left" uprising in Greece. Stalin's restraint was explained differently - the liberation of Warsaw in the late summer and early autumn of 1944 was unrealistic for purely military strategic reasons. I will talk about this a little lower.

Moreover, it was the Warsaw Uprising that complicated the situation. Churchill reports that by August 4 the Germans had brought "five hastily concentrated divisions" to Warsaw. According to him, the Hermann Goering division from Italy was also delivered to Warsaw, and soon two more SS divisions. Churchill himself

wrote this, but he was, as far as I know, not entirely accurate. So, the tank division "Hermann Goering" operated on the Soviet-German front even before the uprising. In a report dated July 30, 1944, the commander of the 2nd Tank Army, Major General Radzievsky, informed the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, Marshal Rokossovsky: "... The presence of a

fortified line of the Warsaw UR (fortified area. - **S.K. ) (infantry division. - S.K.)** Lieutenant General Fronek (captured by us). There are bunkers



**(long-term firing point. - S.K.),** occupied by art. parts. Minsk Maeovetsky **(suburb of Warsaw. - S.K.)** is occupied by the tank division "Hermann Goering" ... "

It is significant that General Radzievsky then reported: "...

Enemy aviation is continuously bombing the battle formations of the corps. I

earnestly request: 1.

With a bomber strike, sweep away Minsk Mazovetsky from the ground, where a concentration of about 100 tanks and self-propelled guns has been established. 2. Cover

the district of the army with fighter aircraft. 3. Our aviation is completely inactive. 4. Accelerate the supply of fuel and oil. I'm starting to breathe." On August 1,

1944, Radzievsky was forced to give an order to the army to go on the defensive. I quote the beginning of the order: "The active

army on August 1, 1944. The enemy is

part of the 73rd infantry division, TD "Hermann Goering", TD SS "Dead Head", 5th MD SS "Viking", 19th TD, 6th Warsaw The guard regiment, relying on the Warsaw fortified area, offered stubborn resistance to the 2nd TA at the turn: Yablonka, Legionovo, Charna Struga, Marks, Okunev, Tsekhuvka, Zbytki.

The 2nd TA goes on the

defensive ... "The Warsaw fortified area was a powerful defense system with pillboxes, field-type fortifications, anti-personnel and anti-tank minefields and barbed wire. It consisted of more than 50 thousand people, 1158 guns and mortars, 600 tanks and assault guns.

That is, the "Akovtsy" revolted, having at hand a powerful German group. We should have crushed it.

General "Boer" immediately after the outbreak of the uprising sent two telegrams to London. The

first read: "We

started fighting in Warsaw at 17.00 on August 1st. Send extremely necessary ammunition and anti-tank weapons..."

Although the Russians were nearby, and the allies were in Italy, the Boer, as we see, "coordinated" its actions not with the first, but with the second and

asked for help distant geographically, but close ideologically allies. At the same time he had the audacity to demand in a second telegram via London:

"Since we have begun open battles for Warsaw, we ask the Russians to help us with an immediate attack from outside."

From the side of a man who does not have at his disposal even five thousand lightly armed rebels, this **"helped us"**, said in relation to the mighty Soviet group in Poland, looks even more impudent than the assurances of the fabled fly sitting on the plow that she de

"also plows."

Soviet troops in Poland were really strong. However, you can't have everything at once. By the autumn of 1944, we had already achieved tremendous success, but we paid a considerable price for this. There were no forces for a new fast tension yet. And sometimes I had to defend myself. On August 3, 1944, the Germans broke through the front of our 3rd Panzer Corps and occupied the city of Voloshin. The 50th and 51st tank brigades were temporarily cut off from the main forces.

In an unequal battle with superior enemy forces, parts of the corps destroyed over 3,000 thousand soldiers and officers, 109 tanks, 120 vehicles, 36 armored personnel carriers ... But our losses were considerable.

Nevertheless, possible assistance was provided to the Varsovians. I do not write "all possible" just because this assistance since the beginning of August has been provided in amounts much more than possible. After all, Boer Komorowski and AK, by their adventurous performance, put us in a very difficult position, changing the configuration of the dislocation of parts in an uncalculated way. And the fact that the Germans began to transfer units to Warsaw not only did not help us, but interfered.

And above all, it interfered with the successful assault on Warsaw. Churchill later falsely accused Stalin of allegedly not helping the Poles in Warsaw and at the same time maintaining the opinion that it was going to help them.

In fact, after August 1, 1944, Soviet and Polish troops were almost continuously engaged in active hostilities. I can not quote in full or at least in part - because of their voluminousness -

various combat documents confirming this, but I will give a few lines from several reports, orders, directives:

"On the night of July 31 to August 1 and on the following days, units of the 1st dp (infantry divisions. - S.K.) and the 2nd dp received the task of forcing the Vistula River ..." - from the political report of the political department of the 1st Army of the Polish Army. Troops

of the 8th Guards. During August 2, 1944, the armies fought an unsuccessful battle on the western bank of the Vistula and continued to transport infantry, artillery, ammunition and cavalry, "from the report of an officer of the General Staff of the Red Army to the representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command" Comrade Zharov "(operational pseudonym of Marshal Zhukov).

"Irrecoverable losses of the material part: T-34 tanks -155, M4-A2 tanks - 48, IS-2 tanks - 4 ... SU-85 self-propelled guns - 18 .... total armored units - 244, "- from the certificate of the 2nd tank army on losses from July 20 to August 8, 1944.

"In the last days, formations and units of the army fought off counterattacks of large enemy infantry and tanks northwest of Warsaw ...", - from the political report of the head of the political department of the 2nd Tank Army, Major General of the Tank Troops Matyushin, to the head of the political department of the 1st Belorussian Front, Lieutenant General Galadzhev. "Commander

of the 8th Guards. the army to allocate the most complete and best-knit rifle regiment, the officers of which have experience in street fighting and especially experience in fighting in the city of Stalingrad ...

The commander of the 1st A (P) (**1st Polish Army. - S.K.**) to accept the regiment, transport it to the west. the bank of the Vistula River and use it to consolidate and expand the bridgehead of the units of the 3rd Infantry Division (p) (**3rd Polish Infantry Division. - S.K.**) ... ", - from the order of the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front to the commander of the 8th Guards army and the 1st Polish Army on the transfer of a rifle regiment from the 8th Guards Army to temporary operational subordination to the commander of the 1st Polish Army.

Enough?

If necessary, more than a dozen such documents can be cited. In August 1944, the

losses of the 1st Belorussian Front amounted to 114,400 people, including 23,483 killed. That is, the Russians in August 1944 also died for Warsaw, as the heroic but deceived by their commanders died. Two Soviet paratroopers-officers were dropped

to the "Bur". At first he refused to accept them. It was only on August 10 that the Poles, via London, agreed to the release of the Soviet liaison officer.

Stalin nevertheless stopped the offensive in Poland in other directions and redirected troops to Warsaw. In mid-September 1944, units of the 1st Belorussian Front, together with units of the 1st Polish Army, began to prepare for the assault. In the

period from 16 to 20 September, six reinforced Polish battalions crossed the left bank of the Vistula and captured the embankment in Warsaw, but the Bur did not support them. He needed not Red Poles in Warsaw, but containers with weapons, ammunition, food, medicines - from Red Russians. So after all, there were containers! On September 15, the

Bur, in a desperate situation, finally established contact with the Soviet and Polish command. And until October 1, 1944 - the day of the final suppression of the uprising - the 16th Air Army, together with the 1st Polish mixed air division, made 4821 sorties to help the rebels, including 1361 - to bombard and attack enemy troops.

156 mortars, 505 anti-tank rifles, 2667 machine guns, rifles and carbines, 3.3 million rounds of ammunition, 515 kilograms of medicines, more than 100 tons of food were dropped. And this was not all that we then gave the Warsaw people after September 15 and **until** September 15, 1944. Of course,

already in August, the rebels had the only reasonable way out: to break through from Warsaw, from the encirclement, to us. But this would mean the collapse of the uprising, and Bur-Komorowski and the Londoners hoped, apparently, that Churchill and Roosevelt would be able to "squeeze" Stalin and encourage him either to make extraordinary efforts himself, or to allow the allies to organize air support for Boer at the expense of

shuttle flights of US strategic bombers landing on the territory already occupied by Soviet troops.

It is significant that on August 3, when Stalin received Mikolajczyk, he stated:

— The minute of the liberation of Warsaw is approaching. Since August 1, our underground army has been fighting the Germans. This army has already achieved significant success, although outside help is urgently needed.

Mikolajczyk then asked Stalin to help him travel to Warsaw. "But the Germans

are there," Stalin answered. "Warsaw will be free from day to day," the an "arrogant" Pole from London.

"God forbid that it be so," said the Supreme. But everything went "wrong", and Churchill and the "Boer" started a song about the allegedly decisive importance of air support, moreover, it was from the side of the allies. Like, if the Russians allow Allied shuttle flights to their territory, then Warsaw will win. "Air bridges" have never saved

anyone, except perhaps by delaying the agony. So, on August 13, 1944, the representative of the British military mission in the USSR, Colonel of the General Staff R.N. Brinkman, wrote to the General Staff of the Red Army, Major General Evstigneev, that the Poles asked London "to drop additional weapons and ammunition for 3,000 people in the Kampinos forest area 10 miles north Warsaw", but American and British aviation experts are aware that the success of such operations is more than doubtful (the expression "such an operation was considered practically impossible" was even used). However, it was important for Churchill, who sheltered the "government" of

Mikolajczyk, to look good in front of the Poles in the form of **post-war** British roguery in Poland. Therefore, Churchill persistently blackmailed Stalin, including Roosevelt in this. In a letter to Churchill dated August 5, Stalin reasonably noted that:

“... The Regional Army of the Poles consists of several detachments, which are incorrectly called divisions. They have no artillery, no aircraft, no tanks. I can not imagine,

how can such detachments take Warsaw, for the defense of which the Germans put up four tank divisions, including the division "Hermann Goering" ... "

Churchill did not let up, and on August 16, Stalin reported that, "having familiarized himself more closely with the Warsaw affair", he was convinced that "the Warsaw action represents a reckless terrible adventure, costing the population great sacrifices." Stalin further wrote:

"This would not have happened if the Soviet command had been informed before the start of the Warsaw action and if the Poles had maintained contact with the latter. In the situation that had arisen, the Soviet command came to the conclusion that it should dissociate itself from the Warsaw adventure, since it could not bear either direct or indirect responsibility for the Warsaw action.

On the night of August 16, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Vyshinsky invited the US Ambassador to Moscow and read him the following statement:

"The Soviet government cannot, of course, object to British or American planes dropping weapons in the Warsaw region, since this is the business of the Americans and the British. But it strongly objects to American or British planes landing on Soviet territory after they have dropped their weapons in the Warsaw area, since the Soviet government does not want to associate itself either directly or indirectly with the adventure in Warsaw.

Churchill calls this statement "surprising", but rather the opposite would be surprising. After all, the air actions of the allies could not in any way provide a favorable turning point in the course of the uprising. So, on September 18, one hundred American "Flying Fortresses" appeared in the daytime over Warsaw and dropped from a large, practically safe, height of four and a half kilometers to

parachutes a thousand containers. However, the rebels did not get almost  
Nothing.

On September 20, 1944, the chief of staff of the 1st Belorussian Front, Colonel-General Malinin, reported to the General Staff in Moscow that people who had arrived from Warsaw showed that all the cargo dropped on September 18 in the city area fell into the hands of the enemy. "Thus," Malinin concluded, "the British and  
Americans are practically arming and supplying not the rebels, but  
Germans.

That is, the Allied air drop actions were unambiguously propaganda. Moreover, their long-range sight was obviously anti-Soviet, designed to separate the Poles from Russia.

To dissociate themselves from such unworthy fuss was the only reasonable solution. And Churchill kept pushing. It ended up that on August 22, 1944, Stalin answered him and Roosevelt clearly and harshly, and I will give Stalin's answer in full:

"Secretly and personally from Prime Minister I.V. Stalin. To  
the President, Mr. F. Roosevelt, and  
to the Prime Minister, Mr. W. Churchill, I have  
received your and Mr. Churchill's message regarding Warsaw. I want to  
express my views. Sooner or later, but the truth about a  
handful of criminals who started the Warsaw adventure for the sake of  
seizing power will become known to everyone. These people took advantage  
of the gullibility of the Varsovians, throwing almost unarmed people under the  
German guns, tanks and aircraft. A situation has arisen where every new day  
is used not by the Poles to liberate Warsaw, but by the Nazis, who inhumanly  
exterminate the inhabitants of Warsaw. From a military point of view, the  
situation that has arisen, which attracts the increased attention of the Germans  
to Warsaw, is also very unfavorable for both  
the Red Army and the Poles. Meanwhile, the Soviet troops, who have  
recently met with new significant attempts by the Germans to go over to  
counterattacks, are doing everything possible to break these counterattacks of  
the Nazis and go over to a new

broad offensive near Warsaw. There can be no doubt that the Red Army will spare no effort to defeat the Germans near Warsaw and liberate Warsaw for the Poles. It will be the best and real help

anti-Nazi Poles.

Stalin was absolutely right. But could Warsaw have been taken in the autumn of 1944? Unfortunately

no! And in

order to make my negative answer more convincing for the reader, I will temporarily take him back to much earlier times. In 1928, a teacher at the Military Academy of the Red Army named after M.V. Frunze Vladimir Melikov, who was quite loyal to Tukhachevsky and not very loyal to Stalin, published the book "Marne - 1914. Vistula - 1920. Smyrna - 1922" about three major operations of recent wars.

What is interesting for us now is what this military Trotskyist wrote about the Soviet-Polish war. And he wrote, say, this:

"The wide scope of energy in the operational plan (*of the command zap **commander of the Western Front Tukhachevsky.*** - **S.K.**) was inversely proportional to the state of the rear of his armies and the economic situation of the country, which could not provide materially for our advancing armies in a timely manner."

That's right.

But it is true not only for 1920, but also for 1944! Approaching the Vistula in the summer of 1944, the Red Army expended, as in 1920, a lot of strength. The Soviet country, although it was not the same as in 1920, was also tired. To work fourteen hours a day, as in 1941 and 1942, was no longer enough strength. Yes, and there was no urgent need for that.

It was necessary to stop, take a break, pull up the rear, accumulate strength, and only then ...

Then, as we know, it was possible to begin - albeit prematurely due to the failures of the allies - a powerful winter



offensive in 1945. In

January **1945**, but not in the autumn and even more so in the summer of

**1944**. Let's return to Melikov. Trying to justify Tukhachevsky, he argued that in 1920 Tukhachevsky's plans were de "filled to the limit with both will, and determination, and energy, and especially risk."

As for the will, determination and energy, I would be careful to say, but Tukhachevsky always had an abundance of reckless risk. And Melikov himself admitted that "one inch of strategic error could negate miles of the most brilliant tactical successes."

Melikov derived a really good formula, and Stalin, who most likely knew Melikov with difficulty, could not help but appreciate it. So was it worth it to risk miles of future strategic successes of the Soviet Union at the final stage of the Great Patriotic War in order to support "by an inch" the anti-Soviet and, most importantly, **initially failed**, Warsaw Uprising?

After all, the risk for us in 1944 was no less real than in the year 1920s The same Melikov understood:

"A maneuver that is bold in design can only achieve real and lasting success when it is well thought out and financially secured."

What if things turn out differently? Well, we find the answer again in Melikov:

"As in the battle of the Marne, so in the battle of the Vistula, the many weeks of success of the attacker eventually led to a strategic failure and the withdrawal of all his armies."

Yes, in 1920 the famous "Miracle on the Vistula" happened - already the red units stationed near Warsaw were quickly defeated.

The Warsaw operation of 1920 began on July 23 with the expectation of capturing Warsaw by August 12. At the start of the operation, our troops were at the Grodno-Slonim-Pinsk line, at a distance of up to 300 or more kilometers from the Polish capital. By August 10, the troops of the Western Front under the command of Tukhachevsky reached the line

Mława - Pultusk - Siedlce - Lubartów. If the reader picks up a map, he will be convinced that these were already the closest approaches to Warsaw - forty to fifty kilometers. On August

13, 1920, the then Red Army captured Radzimin, 23 kilometers northeast of Warsaw. And on August 16, the Poles launched a counteroffensive, broke through our front, and on August 19 they were already approaching the Western Bug. By the end of August 25, the troops of the Western Front rolled back to the Lipsk-Svisloch line - east of Brest. The 4th

Soviet Army and two divisions of the 15th Army were unable to break through to the East, retreated to the territory of East Prussia, where they were

interned. Then we wrote that the attack on Warsaw was not adequately secured, that there was not enough transport, the troops suffered a lack of reinforcements, food, ammunition, which, as the troops advanced, the changed balance of forces made itself felt more and more. Lenin stated that "with too rapid advance almost to Warsaw, a mistake was undoubtedly made", that "when we approached Warsaw, our troops were so exhausted that they did not have the strength to win further" ... So it was in the summer of 1920 of the year. And what about the summer of 1944? During

the summer offensive of

1944, our troops, before

reaching the Vistula, passed six hundred kilometers with stubborn battles and heavy losses. As in 1920, they needed replenishment, rest and rear support. The rear lagged far behind, it took time to regroup the troops. After all, the more successfully the war goes on, the more it exhausts the winning side. At the end of

the war, one must be much more careful with successes than at the beginning of the war with them. Although prudence in war never hurts.

Such a detail... The Quartermaster's Office of the 1st Ukrainian Front in April 1945, even after repeated requests, could not receive 65,000 sets of uniforms for a new replenishment. Having a delivery order since January 1945. This is a real war.

Yes, in 1945, and even by the autumn of 1944, one could confidently say that the war of the Soviet people against the Nazi invaders was drawing to a close. But the closer to the end, the higher the voltage. And Stalin did not smile at all to receive in the summer or autumn of 1944 a second "miracle on the Vistula", now a German one. Moreover, Stalin, who himself fought in the Soviet-Polish war, remembered well how Tukhachevsky's unrestrained reckless impulse ended. That is why Stalin was doubly cautious

in Polish affairs. Everything was repeated in terms of success, but should not have been repeated in terms of disaster. And there was such a danger. For

example, the directive

of the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief "Zharov" (this, I remind you, was then the operational pseudonym of Marshal Zhukov) to the commander of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belorussian Fronts dated July 19, 1944, began with the following statement:

"In almost all the advancing divisions, corps and armies, on the way to the front, a lot of reinforcements, artillery, ammunition and logistics institutions lagged behind. Stretching the rear has reached 400-500 km ...".

Translated from the military language into ordinary, this meant that the mother-infantry, on foot, whipped up the dust of Polish roads and kneaded their own dirt without normal food, with a lack of ammunition, without the support of heavy artillery and

tanks. And here is what the Military Council of the 2nd Belorussian Front reported on July 18, 1944 to the head of the rear of the Red Army, General

of the Army Khrulev: ""The situation with gasoline is very difficult. The troops don't even have one tank filling station... One-way delivery distance reaches 450 km on bad roads. The front consumes 400-450 tons of gasoline daily at the rate of 7,000 tons per month **(with real consumption, this should have been enough for a maximum of seventeen days**

... In parts, interruptions began in the delivery of ammunition and food, and parts of reinforcement in a number of cases

idle due to lack of gasoline ... "

This picture was typical.

Below - only documents ...

From the report of the commander of the 47th Army to the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front about the reasons for the protracted nature of the fighting and the slow pace of the offensive of the army troops in August 1944:

"... Throughout the month of August, the troops feel a lack of ammunition, and on 29.8.1944, the supply of the main types of ammunition is from 0.2 to 0.6 BC (**ammunition. - S.K.**).

With such a state of army formations, it becomes difficult to carry out serious tasks without reinforcement with tanks, aircraft and replenishment of divisions ... "

From the report of the Military Council of the 48th Army to a member of the Military Council of the 1st Belorussian Front dated August 25, 1944:

"... At the moment, we only have: 5 SU-76, 4 ISU-122I 1 captured "tiger" ... ...

the army suffers heavy losses every day. For one day only, 24.8.44, there were 224 people killed and 717 wounded ... During the last battles, the composition of military units has changed significantly ... The main contingent is a new replenishment. The number of servicemen - privates who have been at the front since 1942 and even more so since 1941 - is calculated

units...

The entire personnel of the rifle companies are replenishment fighters called up in the regions of Eastern and Western Belarus ... "

And here is the quality of the replenishment:

“Assessing the replenishment fighters, the commander of the 2nd battalion of the 391st joint venture (**rifle regiment. - S.K.**) Captain Samokhvalov declares: “We need to work and work with these fighters. They have absolutely no combat training, are not accustomed to military discipline, have not been in battles, and they have little real soldierly spirit. Many of them spent all three years only escaping from the Germans, hanging around in different places. You have to work with them for a long time and hard, otherwise they can let you down during the battle "..."

From the report dated August 30, 1944, the representative of the General Staff of the Red Army "Comrade Zharov" (Marshal Zhukov) about the admission of untrained reinforcements to the 8th Guards Army:

“In the second half of August, it was received from the Belarusian Military District for reinforcement (**Uh-huh. - S.K.**) Guards. divisions of the 8th Guards. army 5488 people ... All untrained ...

The supply of such a large number of little-studied, untested and not participating in battles replenishment to the guards, with a small number of divisions and low staffing of rifle companies, creates a ratio in which the main combat core of the guards dissolves

as part of the infused replenishment ... "

Already from these quotations it is clear how much the Red Army was bled dry in the battles for Poland by the autumn of 1944. As I said earlier, it was urgently necessary to switch to a tough defense, to gain a foothold on the achieved lines, to train and test replacements. And then - the

uprising of AK in Warsaw. The Britons, in a message from the "Government of His Majesty" to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Molotov on September 5, tried once again to justify the adventure, and on September 9, 1944, the British Ambassador in Moscow, Archibald Clark Kerr, was handed a response, where, among other things, it was said:

“The Soviet Government would like an impartial commission to be organized to find out exactly by whose order the uprising in Warsaw was started.

and who is to blame for the fact that the Soviet military command was not notified about this in advance. No command in the world, either British or American, can put up with the fact that in front of the front of its troops an uprising is organized in a big city without the knowledge of this command and contrary to its operational plans (allocations are mine everywhere. - S.K.) . It is clear that the Soviet command should not

make an exception..."

What is incomprehensible or two-faced here? In addition, everything was clearly explained further:

"There is no doubt that if before the uprising in Warsaw asked the Soviet military command O expediency of arranging an uprising in Warsaw in early August, then the Soviet command would have dissuaded from such an undertaking, because the Soviet troops, who had fought over 500 kilometers and were quite tired, were not then ready to storm Warsaw, bearing in mind that By that time, the Germans had already managed to transfer their tank reserves from the west to the Warsaw area ... "

I note that Moscow nobly and delicately did not then hint to the Britons that if they and the Yankees fought well and actively in the West, the Germans would not be able to transfer tank reserves to the Warsaw area, and this would help the Warsaw people to an immeasurably greater extent than the reset " show" of the allies in the sky over Warsaw. Despite the tough response, dissociating itself

from adventurers and villains, the Soviet Headquarters, at the end of August 1944, ordered the 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts to break through to Warsaw. After all, it was not Churchills, Clarks and Mikolays who died there, but ordinary people. Those for whom Stalin worked all his life.

But then we did not manage to advance further than the Warsaw suburb of Prague. On September 21, 1944, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, Marshal with a sonorous surname Rokossovsky reported to Moscow to a certain "comrade Semyonov":

"I report on the situation in Warsaw:

According to many sources, mainly interviews with people leaving Warsaw and agents abandoned by us, it has been established that the total number of armed insurgents who continue to fight the Germans in the city does not exceed 4,000 people, operating in isolation in three districts. (...)

Considering the number of insurgents, their extremely weak weapons, isolation in separate pockets, as well as the lack of a unified military leadership and political unity, the insurgents do not represent any real force in the struggle for Warsaw, and one cannot count on them any significant help. (...)

According to the testimony of a number  
of

people who left Warsaw, it is known that in August the rebels still received weapons, ammunition, food and medicine dropped by British aircraft, however, according to the general statement of the respondents, most of the goods fell into the hands of the Germans due to their dropping from a great height.

(...)

The overwhelming majority of our droppings of cargo by PO-2 aircraft hit their intended purpose, which is confirmed by everyone who left Warsaw and our agents. We continue further

assistance to the rebels with weapons, ammunition, food and medicine."

And on September 23, "Comrade Semyonov" - this was, of course, Stalin's then operational pseudonym - talking with the US and British ambassadors Harriman and Kerr, in response to Harriman's question about whether Marshal Stalin believed that operations in the Warsaw area were developing satisfactorily, replied that he considered the situation in the Warsaw region to be

unsatisfactory. The unnaturally started uprising naturally fizzled out. September 14, 1944 Soviet and Polish troops

occupied Polish Prague, and on October 2, the "Akovtsy" officially capitulated. There is a photo...

49-year-old Bur-Komorowski, haggard, in a baggy civilian overcoat, with his head beaten, shakes hands with the dapper SS Obergruppenführer von dem Bach-Zalewski, who led the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising. The imposing von dem Bach smiles contentedly and benevolently.

Not counting the losses of the Soviet troops and the Polish Army, the adventure of the AK cost the Poles up to 200 thousand dead and thrown into concentration camps, as well as Warsaw, which the Germans methodically turned into ruins over several months. But who is responsible for this? First of

all, of course, General Komorowski, his deputy colonel (later General) Khruschchel (Khruszel) and the underground leadership of the Home Army. They, as people who are knowledgeable in military affairs and who are inside the situation, should have understood that Churchill, Roosevelt, Mikolajczyk and the company are pushing them to criminal recklessness. The London Poles and their London

patrons led by Churchill.

Other specific culprits can be named, but in the final analysis, the tragedy of Warsaw must be blamed on bourgeois politicking, the desire of the propertied strata in Poland to preserve after the war pre-war privileges, anti-Sovietism and anti-communism.

Thomas Mann around the same time called anti-communism the greatest stupidity of the 20th century, but even then it (anti-communism) was one of the greatest crimes of the century.

And the Warsaw tragedy is also on his account.

And in order to see this in more detail, I will further - at the end of the topic - give a number of excerpts from archival documents, without particularly commenting on

them. From the report of Major General Molotkov, representative of the General Staff of the Red Army, to Marshal Zhukov dated September 19, 1944:

"I report: 1. A

document was found in the western part of Prague - an order of the Chief Commandant of the Armed Forces in the country (Poland)



General Bur. The document is printed in Polish, the format is a sheet (advertisement, order) for sticking on the walls of houses ....

I report verbatim his ending: "... the Bolsheviks in front of Warsaw. They declare that they are friends of the Polish people. This is an insidious lie... The Bolshevik enemy will face the same merciless struggle that shook the German occupier. Actions in favor of Russia are treason to the motherland ... The Commandant of the Home Army ordered to suppress any attempts to support the Soviets. The Germans are fleeing. To the fight against the Soviets ... "

Leaflet defaced. No date available. The font is large ... The leaflet states that the great and independent Poland will soon rise ... with America and England ... Therefore, I ask for your decision on the report on the merits of Comrade Stalin ... "

***(Resolution Zhukov: "Shtemenko. Report the telegram of Comrade Molotkov to Comrade Semyonov. Zharov.")***

From the report of the intelligence officer of the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front "Oleg", who left the central region of Warsaw on the night of October 1-2, 1944:

"... September 21 of this year. landed in the central region of the mountains. Warsaw at st. Gozha. As it turned out, detachments of the People's Army were operating in this area ...

(...)

On September 22, he was received by General Skakovsky (**from AL.-SK**). Skakovsky promised me full cooperation in the work...

Following this, I was sent to the command of the central insurgent sector - to the headquarters of General Monter (**Colonel Anthony Khrustsel (Khrushchel, Chrusciel), commander of the Warsaw district of the AK. - S.K.) ...**

The first question from Monter, after I introduced myself as an officer of the Red Army, who arrived for

communication was: "Do you have the authority to resolve political issues?" After my negative answer, Monter said disappointedly: "You didn't come as a political representative? It's a pity. Then we have little to talk about..."

The scout "Oleg" was Lieutenant Ivan Andreevich Kolos. He survived and left memories after the war, but in this case I am quoting an official document - his very sensible and detailed report, stored in the Central Archive of the RF Ministry of Defense. And the fact that even in the situation of the failure of the uprising, "Monter" Chruszel was worried about "political" issues, makes the political and human face of the leadership of the Home Army simply disgusting. "Oleg" noted the unfriendly and

suspicious attitude of "Monter" towards him as a representative of the Red Army. Khruszel told Kolos: "We only need ammunition and weapons. We do not ask for food, as they are delivered by England and America. It is characteristic that at the conversation between Khrustsel and Kolos,

as Oleg reported, there was a certain "man in civilian clothes who actually led the meeting" - "Monter" "did not give a single answer without first consulting with this person."

And so I think - and in what language did Khruszel consult with this "civilian": in Polish, in English or in "American"?

By the way, this "Monter" presented his "strategic plan" to Lieutenant Kolos, in which he suggested that the Red Army immediately take Warsaw with roundabout blows from the flanks, and not storm it head-on. And the staff members of the AK expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that the Red Army was still not advancing.

Stalin in Moscow, at meetings with Zhukov and Rokossovsky, and without crunches understood the significance of flank attacks, which were proposed by Zhukov and Rokossovsky. But offered not immediately. Immediately, both marshals proposed to take a strategic pause and go on the defensive due to the exhaustion of the troops. Which is

what was done. I continue to quote the report of Ivan Kolos:

“... By the time I arrived in Warsaw, famine reigned in the city. The soldiers received as food: hot water in the morning, hot coffee surrogate in the afternoon and evening. There was no bread or cereals. The civilian population received no food. At the same time, various unbridled food speculation took place in the city. At the bazaar (?! - **S.K.**) you could buy everything, including lard and bread. The sale was exclusively for gold and dollars. It was known that the largest manufacturers and landlords located in the city had large stocks of food, guarded by armed guards. The City Government, led by the London government, did not take any measures to regulate the supply of the population. Hundreds of people died every day from hunger and disease...”

And in this situation, "Bur", "Fitter" and "Surgeon" (nickname of Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Weber) issued daily bulletins, where - as Oleg wrote - "the effectiveness of the Anglo-American aircraft dropping food and equipment to the rebels was stated."

“Oleg” noted that on September 14 “a demonstrative (**what an exact word!** - S. / S.) flight of 80 heavy aircraft was organized, which dropped a large amount of cargo from a height of up to 3 thousand meters, of which at least 95% fell to the Germans ”.

It would be interesting to know - and how many of these cargoes did not get into the cargo compartments of the "Fortresses" at all in order to safely, without any parachutes and hype, "land" on the black markets of Italy "liberated" by the allies? After all, to whom war is a stepmother, and to whom is business! Here are some more lines from Oleg's summary report. He's worth it, and I'm far from finished quoting him:

“... General Bor (**as in the text. - S.K.**) acted as the official leader (the real name is Count Bora's personality is purely con-~~spiratorial~~ <sup>Kspiratorisk</sup>). None of the soldiers and officers saw him,

only Monter and some colonels had access to it. All personal signs were kept secret, so that no one could say whether Bor was in Warsaw or not.

General Skakovsky (*from the Army of the People. - S.K.*) was never received by Bor.

On behalf of Bor, his adjutant General Gutek spoke ... "

This Gutek held official press conferences (!!), while, as Kolos reported, the leadership of the AK in Warsaw carried out open anti-Soviet propaganda among the rebels and the population.

"The slogan "Creating" a second miracle on the Vistula was put forward, which should not let the Russians into Warsaw," wrote Lieutenant Kolos. - AK propaganda claimed that the Red Army would carry out a massive export of Poles from Poland to Siberia and the settlement of Polish regions by Russians. Katyn was repeatedly mentioned ... "

Wrote Kolos and this is what:

"During the initial period of the uprising, the Soviet Union and the Red Army were subjected to numerous attacks for that they do not assist the rebels, unlike England and America. After Soviet aviation began to drop cargo over Warsaw, the leaders of the AK continued to assert that the cargo being dropped was of British origin, which were delivered to Moscow and transported from there by Soviet aircraft. Reactionary political organizations singled out special propagandists who bypassed the soldiers and the population, inciting them against the Red Army ... "

The above fragments of the report of Lieutenant Kolos - "Oleg" well show that the organizers of the Warsaw adventure planned in advance for Stalin and Russia the role of "whipping boys".

By itself, the Warsaw Uprising did not have the slightest chance of success. Warsaw could be liberated - sooner or later

- only by the Red Army, which really happened in January 1945. The meanness of the

calculation of the West was that in any case Russians would be presented as the culprits for the death of Warsaw.

If Stalin had succumbed to provocations and allowed Russia to be drawn into joint actions with the Allies, allowing shuttle flights, then the Allied planes would periodically fly over Warsaw, drop (it's not a pity - everything is "covered") from a great height "sheaves" of parachutes, the main "harvest" would have been collected by the Germans, but the Russians in the leaflets and propaganda of the AK would still be presented as guilty of all the troubles of Warsaw. Like, they don't want to help out the Polish capital without launching an offensive. Although no allied "shows" would have had a real impact on the fate of

Warsaw, there would have been plenty of noise around them. Even penguins in Antarctica would know about them!

So it could be. Well,  
how did the West, Mikolajczyk and the leadership of the AK represent  
We know the situation after Stalin's **refusal** to the Poles and the whole  
world . Let's return for the penultimate time to the report of Lieutenant "Oleg":

"As a liaison officer of the Red Army, I was treated with restraint at the headquarters of the AK. There were cases of refusal to my requests... The

reactionary elements, and in the first place, the militant underground organization of the AK, the so-called PKB, pursued a pronounced nationalist policy. The entire Ukrainian population remaining in the city was slaughtered or shot. The PKB forces also destroyed the remnants of the Jews, whom the Germans did not have time to destroy.

The PKB conducted special raids on Russian prisoners of war who had escaped from German captivity, trying to capture hostages for a subsequent exchange with the Red Army. For example, the AK held as hostages Lieutenant Colonel Nikolai Rumyantsev, Major Nikolai Gorodetsky and Professor of Medicine Alexander Danilovich Ershov.

Representatives of the AK tried to shoot Major Volkov ... officers and soldiers of the 9th regiment of the 1st Polish army were killed, who went to the center after the defeat of the Chernyakovsky section by the Germans ... "

The leadership of the AK showed itself in Warsaw with great villainy, and petty dirty tricks, and vile hypocrisy. "Oleg" wrote in October 1944:

"The official propaganda of the AK, taking into account the changes in the general mood of the population and soldiers, was soon forced to restructure its agitation and moved from open slander against the Soviet Union to indirect slander ... Only in recent days an article appeared in one of the bulletins under the heading "Thanks to Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin ". This was the first official recognition of the participation of the Red Army in helping Warsaw ... "

On October 3, 1944, a member of the Military Council of the 1st Belorussian Front, Lieutenant General Telegin, spoke by direct wire with the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army. Here is a snippet of that conversation:

"- Lieutenant-General Shikin is at the apparatus. -  
Lieutenant General Telegin is at the apparatus. Hello Comrade Shikin. I pass on information. situation in  
Warsaw. During 3.10 radio  
communication with the central region  
supported ... extremely unstable ...

The data we have, as well as reports from the London radio, give the right to assume that yesterday at 22.00 the central region also capitulated. Captain "Oleg", a scout from the front headquarters, who left the central region yesterday, and a scout, radio operator "Victoria"

delivered to us..."

Here I interrupt the quotation and give another fragment of the conversation:

"- Tov. Telegin, captain "Oleg" ... this is the same officer.

Who was abandoned by you in area No. 1 - or is it another officer? - Yes,

"Oleg" is our officer, abandoned in the central region along with radio operators, the person is trustworthy ... - What is the name of

the captain "Oleg"? "Oleg is our intelligence agent, I can only give the last name in code, if there is a need for that, I have everything."

Discussing the capitulation in Warsaw on October 2 with General Shikin, General Telegin expressed an opinion that is not without interest for our topic:

"... It is absolutely indisputable that the issue of surrender was resolved by the leadership of the AK on September 27-28 and therefore Bur's telegram **[to the command of the 1st Belorussian Front dated September 30, 1944 - S.K.]** and Mikolaichik's request on it about our measures to save the rebels was certainly a political stunt. All the evidence suggests that the leadership of the AK has already entered into full contact **(with the Germans. - S.K.)** and, delaying time, was only bargaining for some benefits for themselves.

That's for sure, that's for sure!

On October 3, 1944, the representative of the General Staff of the KA at the 1st Army of the Polish Army, Major General Molotkov, sent Marshal Zhukov and Colonel General Shtemenko a report based on the results of a survey of officers of the People's Army and the Home Army who participated in the Warsaw Uprising. From this extensive report, which Stalin, Molotov, Antonov and Shtemenko got acquainted with, I will cite only one passage - and much has already been said:

“AK put forward the slogan “The German is defeated, there remains a stronger enemy - the Bolsheviks.” The bulletins of General Boer, ignoring reality, continued to assert that only Anglo-American aviation effectively helps the rebels **(from a height of four kilometers. - S.K.)**, regarding the actions of Polish and Soviet aviation **(which widely used drops from an extremely low altitude from night bombers Po-2. - S.K.)**, as weak and not of particular importance. Stubbornly carried out propaganda against the Polish troops. The officers were intimidated by the fact that Berling would allegedly shoot them or send them to

a concentration camp (from the testimony of lieutenant "Zenon"). However, the personnel of the operating units went through a significant evolution. In the light of recent events, it became clear to the officers and soldiers of the AK that

the uprising of General Boer had an exclusively political, demonstrative character. “It was not a military uprising” (From the testimony of an AK officer, Lieutenant Sigmund) ... ”

Unfortunately, the price of insight was the death of tens of thousands and the suffering of hundreds of thousands of deceived Varsovians and the ruined Warsaw.

I don't understand one thing - why everything that I am talking about today could not be told to Soviet official propaganda, or at least to Soviet historians, if not immediately after the war (then there was a lot of scrupulousness in the Polish question), then - in the eighties, when in Poland began to rise a wave of anti-Soviet?

After all, the West, Churchill, Mikolajczyk, Londoners, “Akovtsy” would have been presented in the true light, and this should not have affected the feelings of the layers of Polish society loyal to the USSR. And not loyal? Well, well, that's why they are not

loyal, they cannot be persuaded, especially when anti-Sovietism is paid for by the “greens”. But these non-loyal ones would certainly have tucked their **tail** .

After all, they would have been beaten in the forehead - with facts!



Plus - logical arguments arising from the "killer" facts. However, nothing

similar was done to clarify the situation with the Warsaw Uprising in the USSR (not to mention the Yeltsinoid "Rossiyanin"). Which also once again leads to quite definite reflections. Here is how the Warsaw situation is described in the

biography of Bur Komorowski by the compiler of the reference book "Who was who in the Second World War. Allies of the USSR» K.Zalessky. I note that the very fact that the biography of one of **the permanent opponents** of the USSR was included in the "Russian" reference book on **the allies** of the USSR speaks for itself. So, Zalessky writes:

“... Having reserves for only a few days of fighting, Komorowski hoped that the uprising would be supported by the Red Army, but the Soviet troops unexpectedly stopped on the approaches to Warsaw and gave the Germans the opportunity to drown the AK uprising in blood ... Having exhausted all means of resistance and never waited for the Soviet offensive (**then, actually, still Red. - S.K.**) Army, Komorovsky on October 2 signed the conditions of honorable (**yup! - S.K.**) surrender.

In order to put an end to this "Boer", I will inform you that after the inglorious surrender, he was sent to a camp in Colditz, in the spring of 1945 he was liberated by American troops, left for London, from May 28, 1945 he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Polish (emigrant) troops in the West, in 1947-1949 he was listed as prime minister of the Polish "government in exile" and in 1966, at the age of 72, he died in England near Birmingham. The fate of his peer and **accomplice**

Khrushchel turned out to be similar, with the only difference being that Khrushchel-Khruszel died six years earlier than his "commander in chief". I cannot say: "Peace be upon

them," for they did not even bring a sword into the world, but dirt and blood. 1944 was

ending. On the eve of the onset of winter, on November 28, Marshal Stalin and General Antonov signed the Stavka directive on

preparation and conduct of the Warsaw-Poznan operation with the task of capturing the Piotrków, Żytkin, Łódź line no later than the eleventh or twelfth day of the offensive and further developing the offensive in the general direction of Poznań.

On December 14, 1944, the German offensive began in the Ardennes. The western front almost collapsed, while the eastern one stood motionless, lying low.

“Towards the close of the year, on December 25, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief approved the plan for the Warsaw-Poznań offensive operation presented by the new commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, Marshal Zhukov. On January

14, 1945, Soviet troops launched a powerful offensive in Poland. The reader already knows that the advance had to be made two weeks earlier than expected due to the failures of the allies in the West.

The weather failed, but it was impossible to wait, and the offensive was launched in extremely unfavorable weather conditions - low cloud cover, fog. This completely ruled out the work of aviation and limited artillery observation to a hundred meters.

But in the main areas of the alleged breakthrough, a huge artillery density of 220-230 barrels of 76 mm caliber and above per one kilometer of the front was created. This meant that if all the guns were placed in one row (which, of course, does not really happen), then there would be almost no space between them. And so - for more than ten kilometers! However, even under adverse conditions, the offensive

developed successfully. On January 17, 1945, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, Marshal Zhukov, sent a combat report from the Active Army to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, where he reported:

“As a result of a deep roundabout maneuver of the Warsaw enemy grouping with mobile troops, coverage of the combined arms armies from the north and south and a simultaneous attack by the 1st Army of the Polish Army, supported by massive air strikes, the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front on 17.1.45 captured the capital of the Polish Republic, the city of Warsaw ... ”

On the same day, January 17, 1945, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union Joseph Stalin ordered the commander of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front:

"The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, having made a swift roundabout maneuver west of Warsaw, occupied the city of Zhirardow, cut the roads to Sokhachev, crossed the Vistula north of Warsaw and, thus cutting off Warsaw from the west, today, January 17, by a combined attack from the north, west and south captured the capital of our allied Poland, the city of Warsaw - the most important strategic center of German defense on the Vistula River. In the battles for capturing the city of

Warsaw, troops distinguished themselves ... **(there was a listing**

**of formations and units.** - S. / S.) In commemoration of the victory, the formations and units that distinguished themselves most in the battles for capturing the city of Warsaw should be presented for assignment of the name "Warsaw" and to awarding orders. Today, January

17, at 7 p.m., the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, on behalf of the Motherland, salutes the valiant troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, including the 1st Polish Army, which captured the city of Warsaw, with twenty-four artillery volleys from three hundred and twenty-four guns. For excellent military

operations, I express gratitude to the troops under your command, including the troops of the 1st Polish Army, who participated in the battles for the liberation of Warsaw. Eternal glory to

the heroes who fell in the battles for freedom and independence of our Motherland and our allied Poland!

Death to the German invaders!

**Supreme Commander**

**Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Stalin.**

The second anti-Soviet "miracle on the Vistula" did not work. And it would hardly be legitimate to talk about our capture of Warsaw, ***which took place***, as a miracle. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief preferred an accurate calculation to any miracles. And he was, of course, right.

## How we attacked and how we defended in 1945

The fact that the Red Army advanced powerfully in 1945 cannot be attributed to myths in any way - even such connoisseurs of "living history" as Svanidze and Lev Lurie cannot deny this.

However, the **way** it attacked, today, through the efforts of various kinds of "defenders" of historical truth, is largely mythologized in the sense that the Red Army advanced mediocre, crushed not with skill, but with a mass of troops, with excessive losses, etc. In other words, in 1945 In the year she allegedly fought not according to the Suvorov precepts of Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov, but according to the "Suvorov" slanders of "Suvorov" - Rezun. In accordance with the same myths, the Soviet commanders at the final stage of the war, and especially during the Berlin operation, behaved like bazaar traders, bickering with each other, etc. for the right to be the first to report to Moscow about the capture of Berlin ...

Without paying much attention to these myths, it can be recalled that by the time the Red Army troops entered the state border of the USSR, Germany had a very large military potential.

At the end of March 1944, the Wehrmacht had 9365 thousand soldiers and officers, 124 thousand guns and mortars, 12.4 thousand tanks and assault guns, 5.7 thousand combat

aircraft ... And by the beginning of 1945, the German army on all fronts totaled 5.6 million Human. Of these, on the Soviet-German front - 3.7 million people with the highest combat capability, armed with 52.6 thousand guns and mortars, 8.1 thousand tanks and assault guns, 4.1 thousand combat aircraft.

The main loss of Wehrmacht personnel and weapons for 1944 year fell on the Eastern Front.

The reader could do the arithmetic calculations himself, but they will not give a general picture of the losses of the Wehrmacht from the power of Russian weapons, since the decline was made up in 1944 by the call of new conscripts and the still growing - in 1944 - reproduction of new equipment.

Yes, on June 6, 1944, the Allies landed in Normandy and the Second Front was opened in Western Europe. The Germans began to suffer losses and retreat not only under the powerful ten Stalinist blows of 1944, but also under allied blows.

However, on June 23, 1944, Operation Bagration began - the Belarusian operation of the 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts.

On July 13, the Lvov-Sandomierz operation of the 1st Ukrainian Front began. And a

strange and revealing pattern quickly emerged. From the middle of the summer of 1944, the Germans surrendered territory to the Allies without much fighting, withdrawing people and equipment from the attack on the Western Front, but stubbornly resisted on the Eastern Front.

The allies fought neither shaky nor rolls, and we kept increasing the scope of the offensive and by the middle of 1944 we approached the Vistula, still grinding the enemy's manpower and equipment. Only by the autumn of 1944 did the Eastern Front stabilize in the main directions. And

the reader knows that the front has stabilized in force the need for the Red Army strategic pause.

By the beginning of 1945, the United States and Britain had a total of 5.2 million people on the German front (3.7 million in the United States and 1.5 million in England), with an overwhelming advantage in strategic bomber aviation. They were opposed by less than 2 million Germans, but the Allies did not achieve much success in 1944 - if we compare their potential and results. Moreover, both in

1944 and in 1945, the Allies often let the Polish "cannon" fodder in front of them from those Polish units that were formed in England, as well as in 1941-1942 in the USSR, but left our territory in the midst **of The battle of Stalingrad**, not wanting to fight the Germans, but wanting to wipe their asses in the English Middle East.

I will talk about this in more detail later, but now I will report that the Polish units of General Anders formed in the USSR played a decisive role in the Allied victory in Italy near Cassino in 1944 and then suffered such heavy losses that Anders,

having died in London in 1970, he bequeathed to bury himself in Italy at the site of those battles.

The USSR in 1945 had troops on the Soviet-German front consisting of: 6.7 million people, 107.3 thousand guns and mortars, 12.1 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, 14.7 thousand combat aircraft. Superiority in manpower and technology was

evident, but it was not necessary to speak of it as overwhelming - after all, we had to advance, and the ratio in all indicators was not even two to one in our favor.

The success of the Red Army could be ensured in such conditions not by a "shaft", but only by a maneuver! That is, a skillful concentration of breakthrough forces in the main directions without excessive (and who can say in advance - where are the limits of this "excessive"!)

Weakening of the flanks.

It also meant a lot to ensure the secrecy of the transfer of troops and building up our group.

Without the soldier's and officer's military skills and without the commander's ability to plan and manage the combat process, nothing of the sort would have been possible. However, the Red Army coped with all the difficult tasks of preparing and conducting a successful offensive simply brilliantly, and by the first days of February 1945 it became clear to everyone - both to the direct enemy in Berlin and to "sworn friends" in London and overseas.

Later - in the section "Who liberated Europe - Russians or Yankees?" I will cite part of the official recording of the meeting of the heads of government on February 4, 1945 at 5 pm in the Livadia Palace at the Crimean (Yalta) Conference, namely the place where Roosevelt asks "someone to report on the situation on the Soviet-German front." Stalin then replied that he could propose

that the report be made by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of the Army Antonov. And from the report of the chief of the Soviet General Staff,

a picture of impressive German resistance on all fronts emerged. One can only wonder how strong the Germans were in the winter of 1945!

They were strong and therefore very dangerous. Victory over them was not only possible, but already inevitable. However, it was clear that someone else, and **the Russians**, would have to pay for

it in full. Even in

1945. The Germans were not going to surrender **to us** with entire armies. They were ready to make such gifts only to allies in the West.

And they

did. English military historian General Fuller - I'm still on him I will refer to - in his essay on the Second World War, he was surprised:

“It is strange that in the situation that developed as a result of the invasion of France, on the Russian-Polish front (***I mean the Polish section of the Soviet German front. - S.K.***) From mid-August 1944 to mid-January 1945, there was no nothing important”.

It is clear that by writing this, Fuller wanted to indirectly **kick** Stalin for his alleged "inaction" near Warsaw. Like, the allies tried so hard, tried so hard, distracted Hitler in the West so much that the Russians in the East could move in the fall of 1944 ... Take Warsaw there, help Bura-Komorovsky, install Mikolajczyk in Poland and do something else there on trifles , like taking, say, some kind of Koenigsberg. However, this is a dangerous business - to try to cast a shadow

on a clear day. Fuller - as a military theorist - could not help but know that from the moment the allies landed in Normandy in June 1944 until mid-August 1944, there were still some changes on the "Russian-Polish" front. A trifle, of course, is “only” the strategic Belarusian operation, which liberated Belarus and advanced the “Russian-Polish” front to the west by more than 500 kilometers.

After all this, it was not a sin to take a break and nothing more "important" temporarily not to do.

This is something Fuller "didn't notice." As a result, in an attempt to discredit Stalin and the Russians, Fuller gave grounds to doubt not only his own objectivity (this has never smelled in the works of Western historians), but also his professionalism.



However, the Fullers also have a certain conscience, because further the English general admitted:

"... Whatever the reasons - political (**he bit again. - S.K.**) or related to the work of the rear - the Russians used the respite to regroup their armies."

And here there is nothing to argue with. The essence of the operational, and even rather strategic, pause in the actions of the five Soviet fronts was precisely the need for a respite and regrouping for a new offensive.

The Soviet winter offensive of 1945 began on January 12 and by January 15 had unfolded on the front from the Neman to the Carpathians, stretching 700 kilometers. I already wrote about it, but it's nice to repeat it.

So!

Troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front under the command of General of the Army Chernyakhovsky advanced on Koenigsberg. (February 17, 38-year-old Ivan Chernyakhovsky was mortally wounded and replaced by Marshal Vasilevsky.) The troops of the 2nd

Belorussian Front under the command of Marshal Rokossovsky, moving along the northern bank of the Vistula, cut off East Prussia from the central regions of Germany. The troops of the 1st Belorussian Front

under the command of Marshal Zhukov captured Warsaw in order to liberate it, and advanced south of the Vistula to Poznan. Troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front under the command

of Marshal

Konev went to Czestochowa and Breslau (Wroclaw).

Troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front under the command of General Petrov's armies in the Carpathians broke through to Nowy Targ.

The main blow was delivered by a group of troops of Rokossovsky, Zhukov and Konev on the Ostroleka-Krakow front, 300 kilometers wide.

By February 1, 1945 - the allies were just conferring when to attack - the Soviet troops advanced up to 500 kilometers in the direction of the main attack. For 18 days of the offensive. The average rate of progress is 25-30 kilometers per day.

There was an offensive on the southern face of the Soviet-German front. Comparing the long-term stable situation on the "Russian-Polish" section of the Soviet-German front with the situation on the "Danube" front, Fuller thought "profoundly":

“If this long pause (*in Poland. - S.K.*) occurred due to supply difficulties, then why was it different on the Danube front? The offensive on this front continued, despite the fact that communications there were longer.

But the answer is obvious. On the "Danube" front, the operational situation was more successful for us, and the enemy was weaker there: in addition to the Germans, the Hungarians were close to demoralization. That is, in the German front, Hungarian "holes" were formed every now and then.

As early as September 24, 1944, the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front reached the border of Hungary - then allies of Germany. And during the fighting in Hungary, the Red Army carried out three offensive and one defensive operation.

Offensive are: - Debrecen operation on October 6-28, during which a third of the Hungarian territory is occupied;

- Budapest operation October 29 - February 13, 1945, during which Budapest, the capital of Hungary, was taken, and almost two hundred thousand Germans were defeated; - The

Vienna operation, which began on March 16, 1945, during which by April 4 the entire territory of Hungary was liberated from German occupation (occupation because on January 20, 1945 an armistice agreement was signed in Moscow between the USSR, Great Britain and the USA, on the one hand, and Hungary on the other. After that, the Germans introduced an open occupation regime, especially since the former ally turned into an enemy - under the Moscow Agreement, Hungary undertook to put up at least eight infantry divisions to participate in the war with Germany). Such was the case with our offensive at the

beginning of 1945. As for the aforementioned defensive operation of the Red Army on

territory of Hungary, it turned out to be our last major defensive operation in that war. And now I will tell you more

about this operation. In early March 1945, the

German command decided to launch a counteroffensive against the 3rd Ukrainian Front in the area of Lake Balaton. The goal is to retain the western part of Hungary with its oil fields and eliminate the threat to the industrial regions of Austria and South Germany. Having broken through the Soviet front, the Germans also hoped to change the strategic situation and drag out the war. The offensive began on the night of March 6, 1945 with three blows

in converging directions.

The main blow was delivered by the 6th Army and the 6th SS Panzer Army as part of two tank corps between the lakes Velence and Balaton in a southeasterly direction. The

2nd Panzer Army rushed to the east, to Kaposvár. Army "E" was advancing from the right bank of the Drava River to the northeast, towards the 6th Panzer

Army. The general plan was to dismember the Soviet defense, encircle and destroy our troops west of the Danube with the mastery of the entire western coast of the Danube and the acquisition of bridgeheads on its eastern bank. Actually,

if everything ended successfully for the Germans, they would have mastered the entire seductive "triangle" bounded by Lake Balaton and the Danube and Drava rivers. In a small area

between the lakes Velence and Balaton, the Germans threw a huge mass of tanks at us in a strip of 12-15 kilometers.

I already wrote that the Balaton defensive operation has always remained in the shadows. Perhaps for the reason that then the Red Army only once in 1945 had to fight a heavy defensive battle. And in vain we push the Balaton battles into the background so much - they deserve the loudest glory already because to survive in an **unexpectedly** critical situation, and not just survive, but immediately strike back a crushing blow, can only be troops whose valor and military skills are impeccable! As, by the way, and the top leadership of these troops.

Shortly before the strike in the Balaton area against the Russians, the Germans just as unexpectedly struck at the allies in the Ardennes area. With the participation of the same 6th SS Panzer Army at the forefront. The Anglo-Saxons from the German blow rolled back **head over heels**. We have resisted.

The battles in the zone of the future German offensive were not easy for us even before. In a fairly typical combat report of the Ukrainian Front to the Supreme command 3rd Commander of January 24, 1945, it was stated, in particular:

"1. The enemy in the area from the lake. Velence to the river. Danube from 22.30 23.1.45 after a powerful hour-long artillery preparation in groups of 10-12 tanks and assault guns with infantry, continuously attacked the battle formations of the 5th Guards. kk (**guards cavalry corps. - S.K.**) on the entire front of the corps. Concentrating on a narrow front - Kapolash-

Nisk, Gebelyarashi - up to 100 armored units at 1.30 24.1.45 resumed the offensive in the north. - East direction, inflicting the main blow on Barachka. The fighting was extremely fierce, as a result of which the enemy, suffering heavy losses in

equipment and manpower, broke through the first line of defense of the 5th Guards. kk, crushed his battle formations and pushed him from 2.5 to 5 km. A group of up to 10 tanks broke through to the south. outskirts of Barachka, where it is destroyed by our units ... "

However, all this turned out to be only "flowers". But what were the "berries". Already after everything was finished in the Balaton area, the same commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front Tolbukhin, a member of the Military Council of the Front Zheltov and the Chief of Staff of the Front Ivanov reported to Stalin on March 23, 1945:

"1. Having failed in the January-February offensive battles, the enemy by 6.3.45, as now confirmed by prisoners and documents, concentrated the 6th SS Panzer Army in the Szekesfehervar area, consisting of: eleven panzer divisions (1,3,6,23 TD, 1 TD SS Adolf

Hitler", 2 TD SS "Reich", 3 TD SS "Dead Head", 5 TD SS "Viking", 9 TD SS "Hohenstaufen", 12 TD SS "Hitler Youth", 2 TD / in [Hungarian] /), three infantry divisions (44.356 infantry division and 25 infantry division /v/), two cavalry brigades (3rd and 4th infantry brigade) with artillery reinforcements (403-1 artillery corps, 303rd brigade of assault guns, 17th mine brigade, 85, 511, 959 ap RGK, 105, 809, 502nd artillery divisions of the RGK, 219, 1335 divisions of assault guns, 504th SS division, 1222 ptd) with a total of 800 tanks and 35 °C (self-propelled artillery mounts. - S.K.) . In addition, during the operation, the enemy brought out 750 tanks and SU to replenish losses from the depths, of which 350 were Tiger and Royal Typhus, 240 Panther, 160 medium, 670 armored personnel carriers, 1700 guns, mortars - 780, machine guns - 7200, manpower up to 150,000.

South of the lake Balaton from the direction of Nagykanizsa - three infantry divisions (118 lgshch, 71 mshch, 1 year **[mountain rifle division. - S. / S.]**), one motorized division (16 md SS "Reichsführer"), one brigade of assault guns (261) with a total up to 100 tanks and SU, 60 armored personnel carriers, 342 guns, up to 40,000 manpower.

South of the river Drava - four infantry divisions (11th infantry division **[airfield division. - CK]**, 104th lpd **[light infantry division. - S.K.]**, 264th and 297th infantry divisions), one cavalry division (1st Cossack), two police regiments , 2nd and 606th, 15 tanks and SU, up to 300 guns, over 35,000 soldiers and officers.

On the morning of 6.3.45, after a powerful artillery preparation, he simultaneously went on the offensive in all directions ... "

Some may find this quote too long. But I brought only the seventh part of the combat report of the front alone! But Stalin had only seven of them in the West, plus the Far East, plus the fleets, yes plus, yes plus ... And you had to get acquainted with everything, comprehend everything daily, put it in your head ... But after all, decisions had to be made. Daily!

This is all about what to talk about there: Stalin, of course, led the fronts - as Khrushchev later reported - "according to the globe" and according to the map folded by the "accordion", which - as Khrushchev later reported - got "from - for the tops of the boot "... However, I digress. The

Balaton defensive

operation of the 3rd Ukrainian Front was fleeting - from March 6 to March 15, 1945, but it was very difficult for us.

On the sixth day of the fighting - March 12, the Military Council of the front found it necessary to appeal to the personnel "in connection with the enemy's counteroffensive in a southerly direction along the river. Danube, undertaken on March 6, 1945.

I cannot reproduce this address in its entirety; in a conventional book it would take more than two pages. But I can say that the appeal of Stalin's generals to Stalin's soldiers can be considered an example of the appeal of a competent leadership to a completely conscious mass - this document is so smart, informative, convincing and ... And, of course, emotionally and morally impressive. At

the same time, there is no transfusion from empty to empty, everything is concentrated and tense, just as the situation was tense. What a striking contrast compared to the current "popular" helpless chatter of high-ranking Yeltsinoids...

I will cite only the beginning of the appeal, those of his lines that show the seriousness of the situation, and the very end:

**“Warriors of the 3rd Ukrainian Front!**

Infantrymen, gunners, self-propelled gunners, tankers, horsemen, pilots, privates, sergeants, officers and generals! Today is the sixth

day of fighting. Again, each of you is participating in the greatest battle with the tank hordes of the Nazis. Again, your will to win, the greatest hatred for the enemy, unparalleled stamina, perseverance and military skill became an insurmountable obstacle in the way of the fascist hordes ...

... The enemy did not reconcile with the fact of his defeat in the battle for Budapest (...).

Ten tank and six infantry divisions - such is the fist gathered by the Nazis to strike south along the river. Danube... ...Why did he decide to do this? Take

a look at the map and you will see  
how deep

we to vital political and economic

centers of Nazi Germany ... (...). We have

already taken the Hungarian coal basin in the Pécs region from the enemy. We are already close to the Hungarian oil in the Nagykanizsa area ... We threaten the communications of the Yugoslav and Italian enemy groups ...

... The enemy thought in two or three days to break our resistance, break through the front and disorganize our troops. However, for six days now, and the enemy's success is negligible, equal to the loss of the battle. During these days of hot battles, we have seriously

exhausted the enemy.....Thus, a few more days of the greatest stamina and perseverance, and the enemy's plan will collapse like a house of cards. Fighting friends! In your hands is powerful Soviet technology that can break the  
stubbornness of  
the enemy...

Here we must drive him to the grave!.. (...) More  
stamina! Higher vigilance! Be in  
constant readiness to deliver a mortal blow to the enemy!

With the name of the great Stalin forward for the Motherland, to another victory over the enemy!

### ***Death to the German bandits!***

By the way, the name of Stalin was mentioned in the appeal once - in end.

The northwestern shore of Lake Balaton is a golden resort area. Now, here, the thunderous masses of Tigers and Ferdinands were thrown into a decisive breakthrough. The 4th SS Panzer Corps on the Oshi-Balaton front had up to 560 tanks alone, that is, 80-

90 tanks and assault guns for every kilometer in the center of the proposed breakthrough.

One "Tiger", and even "Ferdinand" at 12 meters!

Our 1st Guards fortified area could put up against this steel wave on the same kilometer ... four heavy machine guns, four anti-tank rifles and two guns. In terms of manpower, we were inferior there ten times, in artillery - four times, and in terms of tanks...

Hero of the Soviet Union, General Biryukov, who fought on Balaton, reporting these figures, ends like this:

"And you can't even compare tanks - there's nothing with it" ...

This was the situation at the tip of the German strike in March 1945 (forty-fifth, reader!)

Actually, to be completely accurate, the Germans managed to ensure at the beginning of the Balaton operation a little more than a twofold overall superiority in tanks. However, this was, firstly, at that time a very serious superiority - after all, we were already used to the fact that we were advancing and winning, and suddenly ...

Secondly, in some areas we were faced with a fact the balance of power, which General Biryukov wrote about.

It is interesting to once again compare the psychological and combat reaction of the allies in December 1944 in the Ardennes and the Soviet soldiers in March 1945

at Balaton. There was a war, and in a war everything is unclear until it is over. It is in 2010 that we know that the war ended with the complete collapse of the Reich on May 9, 1945. And in March 1945, it was only clear that the Reich was in a difficult situation, but still very strong. The Red Army had not even begun to prepare for the assault on Koenigsberg.

The allies, under the blows of the 6th SS Panzer Army, rolled so that the Western Front could collapse. And then Churchill asked for help from Stalin.

Soviet troops, under the blows of the same 6th SS Panzer Army, which, thanks to the lethargy of the allies, could be transferred by Hitler to the Eastern Front, withstood, ten days after the start of the German offensive, they switched to their own on March 16



offensive and, having introduced our 6th Panzer Army into the 14-kilometer breakthrough (what a coincidence!), quickly expanded the breakthrough to 90 kilometers and

deepened it to 55 kilometers. We not only defeated a powerful German strike force, but also created the conditions for an early transition to a counteroffensive in the Vienna

direction. The Englishman Fuller, without hesitation, wrote about the Balaton epic (I'm not afraid of this word) in his book this:

“While the offensive actions of Konev and Zhukov were drawing to a close, operations on the Danube entered the third and final phase. This phase began in the third week of February with the offensive of the Germans and Hungarians against the Russians on the line of the river Gron and between the Drava and Lake Balaton. These actions were so promising that General Frisner received to reinforce the 6th Panzer Army, which had recently participated in the Ardennes offensive. On March 3, Frisner launched a powerful counterattack, supported by strong aircraft, between lakes Balaton and Velence. Advancing on Gersheg-Falva, he approached the Danube at a distance of several miles. Here, as in the battle in the Ardennes, his tanks were without fuel, and by March 15 those of them that could still move were driven back to their original positions.

This is all.

All!

Fuller's readers might indeed think that Frisner at Balaton simply did not have enough gas for his tanks. And the Russians? Well, yes, they took advantage of it. What can I say - lucky Russian clumsy once again ... And as a

final illustration to the theme of Balaton, I

I will give the following information ...

On April 7, 1945, Stalin sent another message to President Roosevelt, where he reported unsightly things. In February 1945, the Americans allegedly handed over to us "the most important information" about

that in March two serious German counterattacks are expected from Pomerania to Thorn and from the Moravska Ostrava region to Lodz. Stalin further wrote:

"In fact, however, it turned out that the main blow Germans was preparing and was carried out not in the above areas, but in a completely different area, namely in Lake Balaton, southwest of Budapest.

Stalin pointed out that the Germans had collected up to 35 divisions in the area, including 11 tank divisions, and that it was "one of the most serious blows during the war, with such a concentration of tank strength."

"Marshal Tolbukhin," wrote Marshal Stalin, "managed to avoid disaster and then utterly defeat the Germans, among other things, because my informants revealed, albeit with some delay, this plan for the main attack of the Germans and immediately warned Marshal Tolbukhin about it."

Stalin added:

"Thus, I had the opportunity to once again verify the accuracy and awareness of Soviet informants."

Well, as a result of the Balaton epic - undeservedly forgotten by us - Stalin and the whole country had the opportunity to once again be convinced of the training, dedication and stamina of our troops, who in 1945 were able to attack equally successfully, if necessary - to hold their lines, and then - keep coming! And could it be otherwise?

Now, a few words about

the Berlin operation. In the preface of the compilers to the volume of the "Russian Archive", which contains documents about the battle for Berlin, it is said:

"It was on the eve of the decisive assault on Berlin between the marshals of the G.K. Zhukov and I.S. Horse turned to nothing

unjustified competition for the right to be the first to report to I.V. Stalin about the breakthrough of the troops of his own front to Berlin ... (Doc. No. 48,50, 51,109,110) ... (Doc. No. 44,45,111,112). in fact, the command of the fronts demanded that the troops go forward, regardless of any losses, whether in manpower or equipment "...

The comment is very strange, but quite typical for the "historians" of the era of Brezhnev-Yeltsinism. All, sorry, ***the sloppiness*** of the thinking of this "epoch" is quite visible here, and the Soviet soldiers who stormed Berlin seem to the bearers of such "thinking" to be some kind of pawns, which, according to their "lordly" arbitrariness, were thrown into the fire of battle by the ruthless "Stalin's satraps". The Yeltsinids bred by Brezhnevism did not know from science that at that time

***the entire Active Army***, or rather, ***everything alive and bright*** in this Army, lived with one thing: "Give me Berlin!"

Lived, alas, yes - often dying for it ... And so that the reader can better understand the truth of those days, I will cite - each time in full due to their militant and ardent brevity - a number of documents arbitrarily interpreted by the latest publishers from volume 15 [4 (5)] of the Russian archive" "The Great Patriotic War: The Battle for Berlin". M., TERRA, 1995). So.

**No.**

**44.** Combat order of the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front to the commander of the 9th tank corps dated April 18, 1945 (24.00) 9th guards. Tk acts very badly and indecisively. I reprimand you for bad actions. By the end of the day on April 19, 1945, the corps, under your responsibility, will reach the Freudenberg area at any cost. Bring the execution to me personally.

***Zhukov***

**No.**

**45.** Combat order of the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front to the commander of the 11th tank corps dated

April 18, 1945 (24.00) You personally and your staff, headed by the chief of staff, are working poorly and indecisively in the ongoing operation. I very

sternly warn you of incomplete compliance and demand more courageous and organized action. At any price 19.4 go to the area of Werder, Betorshagen. Bring the execution to me personally.

***Zhukov***

**No.**

**50** Combat Order of the Commander of the 1st Belorussian Front The commander of the 2nd Guards Tank Army dated April 20, 1945 (9:50 pm) The 2nd Guards Tank Army is entrusted with a historic task: to be the first to break into Berlin and hoist the Banner of Victory. I personally instruct you to organize the execution.

Send one of the best brigades from each corps to Berlin and set them the task of breaking through to the outskirts of Berlin no later than 4 am on April 21, 1945 and immediately reporting to Comrade Stalin and announcements in the press.

***Zhukov***

**No.**

**51.** Combat order of the commander of the 3rd shock army to the commander of the 9th tank corps dated April 21, 1945.

You are badly fulfilling not only my orders, but also the orders of Comrade. Zhukov. Order

the brigade commanders to lead their brigades on the head tanks and lead them into an attack on Berlin, otherwise you will not win either the honor or the glory of your corps.

You will then tell the children about panzerfausts.

***Kuznetsov***

By the way, the 9th Tank Corps, so harshly assessed by Zhukov and Kuznetsov, was commanded by Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces Kirichenko, and the 11th Tank Corps was commanded by Major General of the Tank Forces Yushuk. I will acquaint the reader with the level of their

combat qualifications later - in the section where we will talk about the supposedly "incompetent" Soviet command.

Now I will continue to acquaint the reader with archival documents related to the Berlin operation and cited by the publishers of the Russian Archive.

#### **No. 110.**

Combat order of the commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army to the commanders of the 6th, 7th tank and 9th mechanized corps dated April 20, 1945 (23.50). The troops of the right neighbor (***Marshal Zhukov, neighbor of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Marshal Konev. - S.K.***) are located 10 km east of Berlin. I order: by all means, by the morning of April 21, 1945, break into Berlin. Task according to my order of April 19, 1945.

The beginning of the attack on Berlin at 01.00 on April 21, 1945

#### ***Rybalko***

#### **No. 112.**

Combat order from the commander of the 4th Guards Tank Army to the commander of the 10th Tank Corps dated April 21, 1945 (13.45). I confirm my verbal order: bypassing

Luckenwalde, continue the rapid offensive in the direction of Bergholz - Rebrücke, Stopsdorf, Zehlendorf ... On April 21, 1945, capture the southwestern part of Berlin. I demand special decisiveness and swiftness of action.

#### ***Lelyushenko***

The malicious "democrats" - "intellectuals" may notice - they say, if everyone near Berlin was so eager to take it as soon as possible, then why were there tough

orders? But here I can hardly explain anything *to the intellectuals* . Noting, by

the way, that the swiftness of the offensive most often **reduces** the total losses, I will only say one thing: war is war.

These are not the current "role-playing games" where slackers who are carried away by "shootouts" pretend to be Rambo. This is a difficult and terrible daily bloody process - psychologically dynamic, with ups and downs in the fighting spirit, with failures and hitches even in a favorable situation.

In a war, even on the eve of its victorious end, people die until the very last minute of hostilities. And to die - at such and such moments - oh, how you don't want to.

And who would want to?

And you still need to fight, but you need to go forward, but you need to die. And then a tough, even if not always fair, order from a superior allows the inferiors to find new forces for a new leap forward. And the higher

military leaders know this, because the commander of the army near Berlin is a former commander near Zaporozhye, a former division commander on the Kursk Bulge and a former regiment commander near Stalingrad. And the

commanders of the fronts are the "non-commissioned officers" with the "Egories" of the First World War and the dashing red banner

commanders of the Civil War. Yes, not all generals and military leaders were then completely pure in their thoughts - someone really wanted to show off once again in front of Stalin and the country. As you know: "Soldiers surrender cities, generals take them."

But the point was not that Zhukov wanted to enter Berlin before Konev, or Konev before Zhukov. The point was that all the best soldiers of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts were then imbued with the same spirit of excitement and competition.

All of them - retreating from Brest, Lvov, Minsk, Odessa, Kiev, Smolensk, Rostov, Kharkov, Riga and Narva, in April 1945

years came to Berlin to take it and end the war.  
They took him. And  
they finished it.

## "Eustace"-Harriman - "Alex"-Molotov

Shortly before the start of the Moscow Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, which took place from October 19 to 30, 1943, the British Ambassador to Moscow, Archibald Clark Kerr, sent a letter to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Molotov, to which he attached a copy of the document that had been sent to the Soviet government for the first time July 1, 1943, - "Suggested principles to guide the cessation of hostilities with European member countries

axes".

Before the cessation of hostilities was still far away, and the allies of such actions in Europe then, in fact, did not begin. In any case, seriously.

So the document was drawn up by the British, as they say, "for growth." I cannot name the

reason for such advance care. It is possible that the Britons were afraid that the USSR, having reached its borders in 1939, might at some point agree to peace negotiations with the Germans, and this would greatly confuse the plans of world cosmopolitans. However, by the end of 1943, Germany managed to commit so many crimes on the territory of the USSR that we would need very weighty guarantees that this German "Drang nach Osten" would be the last. It is unlikely that Hitler would have been able to give such guarantees, but the treacherous Britons, themselves incapable of an honest policy, were inclined to assume treachery in others too - you judge by yourself. And the British could be afraid that Stalin would somehow try to negotiate with the Germans unilaterally - fortunately, the Allies did not actually wage war with the Germans at that time.

The English document also contained the following provisions:

"I. The conditions imposed on any country - a member of the axis, should be presented as a single (***emphasis in all the documents cited below are mine. - S.K.***) exhaustive covering document,

All



United Nations at war with this country...

...IV. If there is neither an enemy government nor a commander-in-chief with whom the United Nations can or is willing to deal, military resistance will presumably be ended by a series of local capitulations...

V. The direction of the implementation of any truce should be entrusted to an inter-allied truce commission, chaired in turn by representatives of the United States, the USSR and the United Kingdom ... "

As we can see, considering the still future, that is, hypothetical situation, the Britons themselves put forward the principle of necessarily **joint and coordinated** actions that ensure all types of capitulations, including local capitulations.

A year and a half has passed. In 1945, it became clear that things were heading towards the defeat of Germany, although she was still very strong and resisted fiercely. It was also clear that the Soviet Union, on the contrary, was strengthening and strengthening its positions, both military and political. His influence in Europe grew and strengthened, and after the Victory was to increase and strengthen even more.

Nevertheless, the question of the initiative of surrender by the Germans still retained a hypothetical character - the Germans were not going to enter into negotiations with the allies either in terms of general surrender or any local capitulations.

And in the afternoon of February 5, 1945, at a meeting of heads of government during the Crimean (Yalta) Conference, Churchill said:

"Suppose that Hitler or Himmler come forward with a proposal for surrender. It is clear that the Allies will answer them that they will not negotiate with them as war criminals ... It is more likely that Hitler will try to hide or be killed in a coup in Germany and there will be another government that will offer surrender. 6 In this case, we will immediately

should consult with each other about whether we can talk to these people in Germany. If we think we can, then they will need to present terms of surrender. If we consider that this group of people is unworthy of negotiating, then we will continue the war and occupy the whole country ... "

There were no objections from Roosevelt, and even more so Stalin did not object to Churchill.

And a month after this statement in Switzerland, SS Obergruppenführer (Colonel General) Karl Wolf came into contact with US representatives. Then it was a big secret,

known to few. Today, everyone knows this story - thanks to both the black-and-white and now "colorized" version of the television series "Seventeen Moments

spring."

Everyone knows that "Eustace"-Stirlitz received from his Moscow boss "Alex" an extremely difficult and dangerous task - to find out if the Germans are conducting any separate negotiations with the allies behind the back of the USSR? Everyone remembers the vicissitudes of completing this task and those who were somehow connected with him: the cunning Schellenberg - Tabakov, the ingenuous unexpected colleague of Stirlitz - Pastor Schlag - Plyatt, the tenacious Muller - Bronevoy, the radio operator Kat and others, including Allen Dulles - Shalevich and his negotiating partner - the brilliant Wolf - Lanovoy ... As a result of the joint

intellectual activity of Yulian Semyonov and Maxim Maksimovich Isaev, all the intrigues of Himmler, Wolf and Allen Dulles were exposed, information was transferred to Moscow and Comrade Stalin, in a letter to President Roosevelt, spoke warmly about those of his informants, which "have been checked by us more than once in

practice". All this looks really exciting, but - as often happens with Semyonov-Landres - it is very much in conflict with the facts. And these are the facts. On March 12,

1945, the US

Ambassador to Moscow, Averell Harriman, **officially** informed the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR in a letter

Vyacheslav Molotov that on March 9 German General Karl Wolf and Dolman and Zimmer, accompanying him, arrived in Bern to discuss, together with representatives of the armies of the United States and Great Britain, the question of the surrender of the German armed forces in Northern Italy, and that Field Marshal Alexander was instructed to send his officers to Bern to meet these people. That is, the English document of the autumn of

1943 seemed to work - the Germans made contact with the allies, and they immediately informed the Russians about this. At the same time, Harriman actually played the role of "Eustace". The completeness of the same situation was owned by the Moscow "Alex", which in this case could be considered Molotov.

So, "Eustace"-Harriman asked about the point of view of the Soviet government on this issue. And on the same day, "Alex"-Molotov informed him that we had no objection to negotiations with General Wolf in Bern, so that officers representing the Soviet Military Command would take part in them. As a digression from the

strictly documented story, I will inform you that although Allen Dulles, a Swiss resident of the US Office of Strategic Services, did not appear in the Eustace-Harriman information, unlike the Eustace-Stirlitz information, he had something to do with the situation. A number of authors attribute to Dulles, who has long settled in

Bern, almost the initiative in the negotiations and, in any case, active participation in them.

There is a discrepancy in the date of the first contact. Churchill in his memoirs reports that Karl Wolff, "the commander of the SS troops in Italy," established contact with American intelligence as early as February 1945. Someone places the date of Wolf's first contact with the Allies, arranged through Pope Pius XII, as March 6, 1945. But Dulles is always mentioned, and then Alexander's staff officers. Moreover, despite the fact that

the whole collision of March 1945 was later called the "Bern Incident", the place of the first personal meeting between Dulles and Wolf, some authors (the same Churchill, for example) for some reason call Zurich, and not Bern, well mastered by Dulles. Perhaps it was so - intelligence is always a delicate matter,

and in the tricks of Dulles, who first appeared in Bern in 1916, the devil himself could break his leg if he (the devil) did not have the appropriate form of admission.

However, the role of Dulles in one way or another could only be auxiliary, and not the main one, already because Wolff was not discussed intelligence issues and not the prospects for this or that special operation, but military issues: either the surrender of the Germans in Northern Italy, or - it is possible - actually passing them through the Allied front for transfer to the Eastern Front. In such negotiations, only staff military officers could play key roles, and not the master of the "cloak and dagger" Dulles, who knew little about military affairs. Churchill names the British and

American Chiefs of Staff in Caserta, General Airy and General Lemnitzer, who, according to him, went secretly to Switzerland on March 15, 1945, and met with Wolf on March 19.

Both the circumstances of the meetings and negotiations and their chronology differ in different sources, which is not surprising. Firstly, as already mentioned, tricks and tricks were not easy, and they needed to be covered. Secondly, it would be useful for the reader, perhaps, to know that when working with historical sources, it often turns out like this: the original documentary or other historical information is available in only one open source - not always accurate. And all the other "sources" are just an uncritical reproduction of the original source by the authors of the books. And here it is easy to confuse even without malicious intent.

However, we can confidently assume that there were very specific negotiations in Bern with a discussion of very specific mutual conditions, and not just Wolf's "gatherings" with the allies on the topic of the desirability of de German surrender, as Roosevelt later claimed in messages to Stalin, and Churchill in memoirs. And the discussions were clearly

not easy. Churchill later relayed his conversation on the "Bern" topic with General Eisenhower and wrote that the latter allegedly stated that he "feared that if the Russians were involved in the discussion of the question of the surrender of the armed forces under the command of Kesselring

**(Wolf represented him in Bern, and by no means the SS. - S. / S.),** then the problem that he **(Eisenhower. - S. / S.)** himself could have settled within one hour, perhaps, would have dragged on for three four weeks."

The statement is both arrogant and false. For some reason, the allies, even ignoring the Russians, could not resolve this problem within one hour, or even three or four weeks - if you believe Churchill that the beginning of contact should be attributed to February 1945 of

the year. In fact, the Allies did not "settle" this problem at all! No, these were negotiations, and not just a discussion of some common virtualities - as two Anglo-Saxon thirds of the "Big Three" stated. If everything was like this, two busy senior allied staff officers would not have slurped jelly in Switzerland in wartime, after all.

It seems that Wolf demanded the passage of troops, the Anglo-Saxons - capitulation, and in the end the parties did not come to terms.

Let us return, however, from assumptions to exact facts. On March 12, 1945, Moscow expressed a desire to take part in negotiations with Wolf together with the allies. And on March 16,

"Eustace"-Harriman conveyed to the "Center", that is, to the NKID of the USSR, that the US government was denying the Soviet representatives the right to participate in the negotiations in Bern.

On the same day, a response telegram was sent to the US Embassy in Moscow and further to Washington from the Soviet "Center", that is, from the USSR People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. "Alex"-Molotov informed "Eustace"-Harriman that the US refusal "was completely unexpected and incomprehensible for the Soviet government from the point of view of allied relations between our countries."

In view of this, we did not give our consent to the negotiations in Bern and insisted that the negotiations already begun should be terminated.

We also insisted that the possibility of conducting separate negotiations by one or two Allied Powers without the participation of a third Allied Power should be ruled out altogether.

On March 21, 1945, "Eustace"-Harriman responded with a new letter, in which he claimed that "the Soviet government is wrong

imagines the purpose of the contact in Bern between the German General Wolf and the representatives of Field Marshal Alexander. On March 22, 1945, Molotov replied:

“... in this case, there is not a misunderstanding about the purpose of the contact and not a misunderstanding, but something worse ... in Bern, for two weeks, behind the back of the Soviet Union, which bears the brunt of the war against Germany, negotiations are underway with representatives of the German military command, with on the one hand, and representatives of the British and American command, on the other. The Soviet government considers this completely unacceptable ... ”

In Semyonov's book, this text is presented as a result of messages sent to Moscow by "Eustace"-Stirlitz, but, as we see, Moscow was informed - had to be informed - by "Eustace"-Harriman. And then

the "artillery" of the largest caliber had to mutually enter into the matter - on March 25, 1945, Stalin received another personal and strictly secret message from President Roosevelt - a very lengthy one - where Roosevelt verbosely and confusedly tried to explain the inexplicable - his refusal to participate in the negotiations of our representatives . Stalin would not have been Stalin if he

had not dismantled Roosevelt's "arguments" "by the bones", and, I guess, not without some deeply hidden, but undeniable irony. And Stalin left nothing of these "arguments".

His lengthy reply, also entirely devoted to the negotiations in Bern, was dated March 29, 1945, and began  
So:

“I dealt with the question that you put before me in a letter dated March 25 of this year, and found that the Soviet government could not give a different answer after it was denied the participation of Soviet representatives in the negotiations in Bern with the Germans ...

Not only am I not against, but, on the contrary, I am entirely in favor of ... hastening the

surrender ... But I agree to negotiate with the enemy on such a matter only if these negotiations do not lead to easing the position of the enemy, if it is excluded for the Germans the ability to maneuver and use negotiations to transfer their troops ... to the Soviet front ... For your information, I must inform you that the Germans

have already used negotiations with the Allied command and managed to transfer three divisions from Northern Italy to the Soviet front during this period ... "

Roosevelt immediately soared! Already on April 1, 1945, he, taking on the functions of "Eustace", sent Stalin another lengthy message, where he especially emphasized that "there can be no question of negotiating with the Germans in such a way that this would allow them to transfer somewhere with their forces from the Italian front. Roosevelt

told Stalin that his de (Stalin's) "information about the time of the transfer of German troops from Italy are erroneous.

Stalin answered on April 3, 1945 with dignity and to the point. He wrote:

"You claim that there have been no negotiations yet **(Roosevelt, in his message of April 1, claimed that there were only contacts, but not negotiations. - S.K.)**. It must be assumed that you were not fully informed. As for my military colleagues, based on the data they have, they have no doubt that there were negotiations and they

ended with agreements with the Germans ...

I think my colleagues are close to the truth..."

Unfortunately, I cannot give these mutual messages here in full, but the interested reader himself can familiarize himself with them in Soviet editions of Stalin's correspondence with Roosevelt and Churchill (for example, an incomplete edition of 1957,

containing, however, the entire "Stirlitz" plot, was published by Politizdat in a mass circulation of 150,000 copies).

Nevertheless, I can unequivocally state that Roosevelt's reproaches regarding the dishonesty of Stalin's informants, expressed in Roosevelt's next message to Stalin on April 5, do not refer to information about the negotiations in Bern (as Semyonov presented), but to information regarding the transfer of German troops from Italy to the Soviet-German front. Roosevelt did write at the end of his April 5th message:

"Frankly, I can't help but feel the utmost indignation towards your informants, whoever they may be, for such a vile, misrepresentation of my actions or the actions of my trusted subordinates."

But he was referring to Stalin's statements about the transfer of troops from Italy, and I do not exclude that Roosevelt personally was sincere in his indignation, but Stalin and his informants had nothing to do with it. Roosevelt has nothing left to live - he will soon **be removed** due to the exhaustion of his usefulness for the Golden cosmopolitan elite of the world. And tricks with the Germans were carried out, most likely, really behind Roosevelt's back. And Stalin's informants, apparently, were Swiss informants like Rudolf Ressler - "Lucy", but by no means "Semyonovsky" Stirlitz. It was about

them that Stalin wrote Roosevelt in an answer dated April 7, 1945:

"As for my informants, I assure you they are very honest and modest people who perform their duties carefully and do not intend to offend anyone. These people have been repeatedly tested by us in practice."

Stalin went on to give an example of clear disinformation about the redeployment of German troops received by the Soviet General Staff from General Marshall. The allies indicated one direction of the German strike, but in reality they struck in the area of Lake Balaton - I already spoke about this collision and once again I remind you that Stalin wrote to Roosevelt on April 7, 1945 that the commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front



Marshal Tolbukhin managed to avoid disaster and utterly defeat the Germans in the area of Lake Balaton, thanks, among other things, to the intelligence information of Stalin's informants. "Thus," Stalin wrote on this occasion, "I had the opportunity to once again be convinced of the accuracy and awareness of Soviet informants." The last point in the "Bern Incident" was put almost simultaneously with the death of Roosevelt. April 13, 1945 Stalin received the last message

President, where he wrote:

"Thank you for your sincere explanation of the Soviet point of view regarding the Berne incident, which, as it now seems, has faded and receded into the past without bringing any benefit.

In any case, there should be no mutual distrust, and minor (*yup! - S.K.*) misunderstandings of this nature should not arise in the future. I am sure that when our armies establish contact in Germany and unite in a fully coordinated offensive, the Nazi armies will disintegrate.

And on the same day, April 13, Stalin sent condolences to the new US President Harry Truman "on the occasion of the untimely death of President Roosevelt."

"Eustaces" did their job, "Eustaces" could be removed. And the Berne incident by mid-April 1945 really faded and became a thing of the past - from day to day the beginning of the assault on Berlin by the forces of three Russian fronts was expected. This incident is a thing of the past, however,

contrary to Roosevelt's assurances, it has already brought the benefit that today this incident, with a careful analysis of it, well highlights the honesty and nobility of Stalin and petty intrigue towards the Russian ally of the Anglo-Saxons.

And this real story of the "seventeen moments of spring" in March-April 1945 is at least no less interesting and instructive than

the story of Maxim Maksimovich Stirlitz, "Eustace" and the SS Standartenführer, invented by Yulian Semyonov.

## About “honest” Poles, about “kind” Poles, about “grateful” Poles and a little about “brave” and “kind” Czechs

On the topic of "honesty", "kindness" and "nobility" of the Poles, I have already spoken and will say more. At the same time, I am not going to apologize to anyone for the harshness of expressions when assessing not one of the Poles, but the entire nation as a whole. However, not for the sake of curtsy, but for the sake of accuracy, I will tell you that I remember the innovations of Copernicus, I consider Chopin one of the greatest composers of the world, I read and read the Sienkiewicz Trilogy (although I remember how he unworthily “healed” and did not publish Gorky’s answers to his questionnaire during the period World War I) and Lem’s fantasy, to this day I am fascinated by the talent and beauty of Beata Tyszkiewicz, Barbara Brylskaya and Paula Raksa, and I can immediately start watching again after the next viewing both Four Tankmen and a Dog and the never-fading TV series More Bet than life" with Captain Kloss performed by the charming Stanislav Mikulsky.

I will also warn the reader that I do not intend, after I have said a few words about it now, to touch upon the "problem of Katyn" in my book. This “problem” can exist either in very ignorant, or in very stupid, or in very vile brains due to its complete artificiality - if we mean, of course, not the execution of the Poles by the Germans in 1941, but that “dummy” that special the envoy of the "president" "Rossiyanin" R. Pihoya, chairman of the committee for archives, presented Lech Walesa in October 1992. We are talking about an “extract” from the “minutes” of the “meeting of the Politburo of

the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks” allegedly dated March 5, 1940

No. 13. The authors of this concoction could not resist using the landmark date “March 5” (the day Stalin died ) and numbers of the "protocol", but these are trifles. As for the essence of the “problem”, Yuri Mukhin analyzed it in detail in his “Katyn Detective” and “Anti-Russian meanness”. In addition, I warmly recommend to the interested reader a brilliant, filled with

specific information in the book of Vladislav Nikolaevich Shved "The Secret of Katyn" (M.: Algorithm, 2007. - 544 p.).

So, that's all with Katyn, and now - about the "honest" Poles, about "good" Poles and "grateful" Poles.

A little, just a little! After all, if I get carried away, then I will have to put aside work on this book and write another one that is not included in my plans. Although it's a pity. As

a preliminary "information for reflection" I will cite some information from the report of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria to the chairman of the GKO I.V. Stalin dated March 14, 1942 on the formation and moral and political state of the Polish army of Anders, created in the USSR.

However, in the beginning - about that army. After the collapse of rotten bourgeois Poland in 1939, many Polish citizens, including military personnel, were interned on the territory of the USSR. With the outbreak of our war, an agreement was concluded between the London government in exile and the government of the USSR on July 30, 1941, restoring Soviet-Polish diplomatic relations. It laid the legal basis for the formation of the Polish army on the territory of the Soviet Union.

On August 6, 1941, General Vladislav Anders, from a family of Baltic landowners, who graduated from the Page Corps in St. Petersburg, was appointed commander of the army, a former officer at first in the tsarist army, then in the Polish corps Dowbor-Musnitsky, the German army and, finally, the Polish army. By

March 1, 1942, there were 3,090 officers, 16,202 sub-officers and 40,708 soldiers in the army, in total - about 60 thousand people. However, they did not rush to the German front. On the contrary, already in November 1941, the then Polish Prime Minister Sikorsky, during his visit to Moscow, started talking about the withdrawal of Anders' army to Iran - at the disposal of the British command in the Middle East. It is clear that the initiative came from England - she has always been inclined to fight by proxy.

Stalin then told Sikorsky bluntly: "If the Poles do not want to fight here, then let them say directly: yes or no ... I know: where the army is formed, it remains there ... We can do without you. Can

give everyone away. We'll handle it ourselves. We will recapture Poland and then we will give it back to you. But

what will people say to this..." Comrade Stalin was naive—he judged by himself. What for generals Sikorsky, Anders, Komorowski and other Mikolajchiks is a kind of vague concept of "people"? It is **they, the gentry pans**, the people! And those whose opinion Stalin spoke about are not people, but **cattle**.

So why reckon with cattle? However, perhaps the nation that exalts Mikolajczyk and Valens above itself

deserves such an assessment? Anders formed an army in Russia, pre-designating it (the army) for the British. The Poles did not want to fight the Germans, but they made plans for an armed breakthrough into Iran if the Soviet leadership refused to let them go there. And this despite the fact that Anders himself, among his officers, was forced to admit: "No other state would do for us what the Soviet state did for us ..."

And what? By August 1942, we allocated 181,500,000 rubles for the formation of Anders' army, plus property and services - another 5,517,348 rubles. Not Putin's "rubles", but full-fledged Stalin's rubles even in 1942! Nevertheless, the Poles

did not want to fight. As a result, on August 31, 1942, the evacuation protocol was signed. The Germans at that time had already broken through to Stalingrad, where the Battle of Stalingrad began on July 17. By

September 1, 1942, the evacuation was completed - about 80 thousand military personnel and more than 37 thousand members of their families left the USSR. Only a few officers, led by Colonel Berling, refused to leave and remained in the USSR. If you

remember **at what hour** the Poles of General Anders left the Russian land, then it is impossible not to admit that the heirs of Colonels Kmitsitsa and Volodyevsky "supported" their honor then to glory. Colonel Beurling, half a year before Anders's departure, stated:

"I remain true to my convictions to beat the Germans at any opportunity, and if necessary, then from under the banner of the white eagle I will go under the red banners and beat the Germans in a cap with a star."

But here are other opinions of the "grateful" Polish "zholnezhov" - I finally got to the information from Beria's report to Stalin dated March 14, 1942.

***General Volkovitsky:***

"Poland's clash with the USSR after the defeat fascist Germany, I consider it inevitable ... ".

***Colonel Dombrovsky:***

"I will calm down only when the Bolshevik general on my estate works with a wheelbarrow twice as much as I worked in the Soviet camp."

***Captain Mirsky:***

"*I* never ask Soviet power ... and I will have to take revenge."

***Lieutenant Kozlovsky:***

"We'll go to the front when England sees fit."

***Lieutenant Zelitsky:***

"The eastern borders will be the same as in 1939."

***Soldier Vzhitz:***

"America is with us!.. Above your head! Poland will be from sea to sea!! (***“From sea to sea” is from the Baltic to the Black Sea, that is, to the Black Sea waters off the Ukrainian coast of the Soviet Union. - S.K.)***”.

All statements are taken, I remind you, from Beria's report to Stalin dated March 14, 1942 (***forty-second!***) Years.

These are the words of the Poles of the 1942 model.

Here are their cases.

From the minutes of the meeting of the mixed Soviet-Polish commission on the formation of the Polish army of March 28, 1942:

"March 21, 1942, in Yangi-Yul (**Uzbek SSR. - S.K.**), a Polish soldier killed a 9-year-old child with a rifle shot. On March 20, 1942, in Yangi-Yul, a group of Polish soldiers arbitrarily cut down 4 poles and ruined the radio transmission line ...".

And these are not renegades. These are combat soldiers of the regular army in the conditions of the

deep rear. From the report of the Commissioner of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the command of

the Red Army to Stalin and Molotov, relating to March 1942: "... The command of the 7th infantry division (**Polish division. - S.K.**) took an unacceptable tone in relation to local Soviet bodies. Colonel Gelgud, Chief of Staff of the Division February 14 of this year. demanded from the chairman of the district executive committee in the mountains. Kermine (**Uzbek SSR. - S.K.**) immediate repair of bridges, roads, threatening in case of failure to comply with "responsibility under the laws of war" (this **is not near Stalingrad, but near Tashkent. - S.K.**). The division commander, General Shishko-Bogush ... arbitrarily occupied the building of the operating school at the Kermine

station for an epidemic hospital. In the Jalal-Abad region (**Kyrgyz SSR. - S.K.**), soldiers of the 5th Infantry Division on the Telman and Voroshilov collective farm arbitrarily occupied the premises of clubs and stables, cut off and took away 132

pillars that strengthened the dam. In the collective farm named after Stalin, the Poles cut down 350 fruit bushes. 13 cubic meters of boards, 12 cubic meters of special wood, 2 boxes of glass and 700 kg of hay were stolen from the goods yard of the railway station. From the fields of the collective farm. On October 10, Polish soldiers

arbitrarily took away 20 wagons of straw ... "At the same time, the last report noted that Polish officers "are completely unaware of the experience of the war of 1941-1942 and do not plan a battle to the entire depth of the enemy's defense, preparing

only an attack of the forefront of defense." This is almost a year after the start of the formation of the army. From the information of the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Vyshinsky dated July 17, 194

“Parts of the Polish army, located in the city of Jalal Abad, Kirghiz SSR, conducted field tactical exercises in April 1942, as a result of which the wheat crop belonging to the Kolkhoz named after. Dimitrov.

... sowing on an area of 1.5 hectares is trampled, pitted trenches and destroyed by explosions of hand grenades ... ”

This is the memory that Anders' army left behind on Soviet soil. Looking ahead, I can say that in foreign lands, when she felt impunity, she behaved no better. We will see it again! The Poles of Anders left, but after some

time the formation of a new Polish army began in the USSR, one of the organizers of which was Colonel Berling. And although later this army on the Soviet German front, even liberating Poland, did not always fight staunchly, it really fought shoulder to shoulder with the Red Army, and it was these Poles who saved the honor of Poland - to some extent.

Up to some because even here the feeling of gratitude did not always appear and not to the extent that it should have.

Since the formation of Polish military formations on the territory of the USSR by the beginning of 1945, only the costs of the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense for the Polish Army amounted to four hundred thirty-two million five hundred sixty-nine thousand fifty-nine rubles. At current prices, this is at least ten billion rubles.

From October to December 1944, according to orders for the Polish Committee of National Liberation, as reported on January 2, 1945 by the head of the Red Army Logistics, General of the Army Khrulev to Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Mikoyan, Poland was sent: 34,245 tons of coal, 2,853 tons of kerosene and oil (out of 8,000 tons planned and later delivered), 11,500 tons of flour, 100 tons of cotton, 600,000 spools of thread, 1,540 tons of soap, 6,000 tons of salt, 60 tons of tea, 15 million boxes of matches. This

was torn off by the country, the entire European part of which lay in ruins. A country where salt, soap and matches were in acute shortage. And here is gratitude

to her sons, who did not spare their lives and strength for the expulsion of the Germans from Poland. April 24, 1945 chief



Colonel Litvyak, head of the political department of the 2nd Guards Tank Army of the Guard, reported to the head of the political department of the 1st

Belorussian Front: "The formations received instructions to provide soldiers and officers who distinguished themselves in the battles for the liberation of Poland to

the Polish orders and medals. Due to the fact that it is allowed to present only a few military personnel for the awards of the Polish government, for example, for the 12th Guards Tank Corps - 4 (**four. - S.K.**) people, there are sentiments among the officers that the Polish government is very stingy with the awards of soldiers and formations of the army, which did so much for the liberation of Polish territory from the German occup

On the one hand, it is understandable! If the Poles would be generous and decide to award Virtuti Military crosses to everyone who is worthy in the Red Army, then in Poland there would not be enough decent award metal for so many awards deserved by Soviet soldiers and officers! But they could borrow from us. Moreover,

in 1944-1945, we threw on the scales, where the future of Poland was decided, not only the lives of six hundred thousand Soviet citizens, but also all the new political influence that the USSR was gaining as a result of its Victory. And the Poles felt themselves the winners. On the Internet, you can find downright nightmarish stories

about how the Poles acted with the Germans in the territories that, according to Stalin's calculations, were supposed to move away from Germany to Poland and therefore were immediately transferred by us under the control of the Poles. However, I always prefer to use sources that are as reliable as possible.

Here, for example, is a "picture from nature" - maybe not so heartbreaking, but completely documentary. On April 4, 1945, a member of the Military Council of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Lieutenant-General Krainyukov, reported to Moscow to the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Secretary of the Central Committee Shcherbakov, about the political situation in the occupied

territory in the zone of front troops. Krainyukov's report included the following lines

“The Germans especially don't like the Poles. This hostility towards the Poles is most acute in those German regions that have been transferred to Poland ...

The Germans declare: “It is better for us to be under Russian occupation all the time than to be under the rule of the Poles, since the Poles do not know how to govern and do not know how to work.”

The relationship between the Germans and the Poles is also aggravated because the Polish authorities, as soon as they took over the German regions from the Red Army, immediately forbade the Germans to speak their native language and serve in the church, and also introduced bodily

punishment for disobedience.

This took place in the cities of Beuthen, Gleiwitz and Hindenburg ...

"Perhaps today the Poles are the" brothers "of the Germans in the" combat "North Atlantic Alliance, and they are not very willing to remember how they flogged in 1945" the "German bishlo", which turned into "honors" Poles from all-powerful masters to **cattle** only because the foot of a Soviet infantryman set foot on the land where the Poles arranged executions for the Germans. But it was. They don't "remember". But it doesn't stop us from remembering! An interesting entry

can also be found in the diary of the 1st Secretary Embassy of the USSR in Yugoslavia dated May 5, 1945 V. Sakharov:

“The Poles are especially outrageous (Tito rudely called them “bastards”), who in Monfalcone drop the Yugoslav banners, tear off the stars from the caps of the Yugoslav fighters and repair other outrages.”

Here, however, explanations are required. Sakharov had in mind the behavior of Anders' Poles in the disputed zone of Trieste. Now Italian, the port city of Trieste with the area adjacent to it, in which a predominantly Slavic population lived, was formerly part of Austria-Hungary. In 1919, this zone went to Italy, during the Second World War it was occupied by the Germans and on April 30, 1945, was liberated by the partisans of Marshal Joseph Broz Tito.

But soon Trieste was occupied by the Anglo-American troops - it was a very strategically tasty place, and the Anglo-Saxons reluctantly withdrew their troops from the Trieste zone only in 1954. And

what about the Poles?

Yes, despite the fact that by 1945 the British command on the European fronts had up to 150 thousand or more Poles at its disposal, including the Anders army, which evaded the fight against the Germans on the Soviet-German front, but was forced to play the role of a living body armor for the English "Tommies".

Such is the peculiar "patriotism" of the "noble" Polish nation.

In other words, Polish blood, saturated with bacilli of anti-Sovietism and Russophobia, was shed in the battles for Italy much more generously than Polish blood, saturated with bacilli of anti-Sovietism and Russophobia, was shed in the battles for Poland. I mean the anti-German actions of the Craiova Army subordinate to London, which allegedly "fought" the Germans in the territory of occupied Poland. Actually,

in the latter case, everything was limited to losses mainly in the Warsaw adventure. Yes, and there, along with the "Akovtsy", many Poles from the People's Army, loyal to the Russians, perished.

There were so many Polish units among the front-line units of the British army that one would like to ask: "Who fought - fought "without fools" - in the English army, the British or the Poles?" Of course, there were many more Englishmen in the British army than Poles. But it is interesting to know - what was the ratio in the front lines? It is easier to answer the

question: "Who fought for British interests, which were answered only by anti-Russian, anti-Soviet, bourgeois Poland, in Poland itself?" Here the answer is obvious:

"In Poland, the purely Polish Craiova Army fought for British interests." She sluggishly, episodically carried out operations against the Germans, but revived after the Germans were expelled from Poland by the Red Army with the help of the Polish Army and the People's Army. Now the

"Akovtsy" were actively shooting at the soldiers of the Red Army. And except for those Germans who died from the bullets of AK fighters in

Warsaw, it is unlikely that the total number of "Swabians" destroyed by AK in 1940-1945 will greatly exceed the total number of "Muscovites" destroyed by AK in 1944-1945.

And this fact will hang **on the entire** Polish people as a shameful stain until the Poles collectively confess the sin of unworthy Russophobia and ask collectively - once and for all times - forgiveness for their behavior from the memory of our soldiers who fell for Poland, and also for their descendants.

Katyn - on the

Germans. Warsaw - by the British

and the Yankees. **So what are the Russians**

**guilty of before the Poles?** I have already written quite a bit about the Warsaw Uprising and have gotten a little too carried away with the topic of the "grateful" Poles, although I will have to return to it again in the section on Stalin, the "destroyer

of the Polish state." However, I will still add something to the topic "Warsaw and Stalin" by citing a recording of the conversation between Mikolajczyk and Stalin, which

took place on August 9, 1944 in Moscow. The authenticity of Stalin's words cannot be called into question by the Poles simply because they were taken not from Soviet archives, but from a recording made by a representative of the Polish government in exile and transmitted to London by telephone on August 30, 1944.

The quotations below are extensive, but I do not want to cut them off or put them in my own words, for I am convinced that for those who seek the truth, **a document** is always preferable **to a paraphrase**.

So:

**"Marshal Stalin:** What kind of help do you need?

**S. Mikolajczyk:** Warsaw needs weapons. The Germans are not so strong to push the Poles out of their positions... The fight flares up...

**Marshal Stalin:** All these actions in Warsaw seem unrealistic. It could have been different if our troops were approaching Warsaw, but, unfortunately, this did not happen. I expected that we would enter Warsaw on August 6th. But we didn't succeed. On August 4, the

Germans threw four tank divisions into the Prague region (**part of Warsaw on the right bank of the Vistula. - S.K.**). Therefore, we failed to take Prague, and we were forced to make a detour

maneuver near the Vistula near Pilica. As a result of this maneuver, we managed to advance on a front 25 km wide and 30 km deep. Yesterday the Germans launched a strong counterattack in this area with infantry and two tank divisions. Therefore, our attack on Warsaw faced 5 new divisions from the German side, 3 of which are still in the Prague area. I have no doubt that we will overcome these difficulties, but for these purposes we must regroup our forces and bring in artillery. All this takes time...”

Where is the deceit here? Where are the dodges? Stalin explains everything clearly, clearly and truthfully. And just as

truthfully he explains further: “I am very sorry for your people who have risen so early in Warsaw and are fighting with rifles against German tanks, artillery and aircraft. I was in Warsaw and I know its narrow streets of the old city well (***before 1917, Stalin traveled a lot around Europe on party business. - S.K.***) and therefore I believe with confidence that the retention of the old city from a strategic point of view is not very important. What will we achieve by providing air assistance? We can thus deliver a certain number of rifles and machine guns, but not artillery. Finally, will weapons dropped from aircraft fall into the hands of the Poles without loss? It would be easier to drop weapons in more remote areas, say Radom or Kielce, but to do this in a city with a dangerous concentration of German forces is an extremely difficult task. However, it might work. We must try. What can be reset and when?

What does Mikolajczyk say?

He answers Stalin: “I understand your doubts, but today it’s too late to hesitate, because fighting is going on in Warsaw (***provoked by Mikolajczyk and Bur-Komorowski. - S.K.***) ...” Further on the

Polish entry: “**Marshal**

**Stalin:** Our planes can land? **S. Mikolajczyk:** No, they can only drop their weapons from air.

**Marshal Stalin:** It's easy. **S.**

**Mikolajczyk:** I ask you to instruct Marshal Rokossovsky. Marshal

Stalin: How can contacts be established? Encryption is necessary, since the ether is full of various kinds of signals. I

I can assure you that for our part we will do everything in our power to help Warsaw. To whom can we address all this? And then Mikolajczyk, arguing a minute ago that "as soon as direct contacts are established between the Polish forces in Warsaw and the Red Army, it will be possible to agree on signals", instead of immediately agreeing with Stalin on direct contact of the Soviet command in Poland with Headquarters Bur Komorovsky, begins to vaguely refer to a certain "Captain Kalugin" - a figure more than suspicious and representing no one. That is: "Bast on the cola, start over." On the same day, August 9, 1944, the "commander-in-chief" of the Polish government in

exile, General Sosnkovsky, through the head of the army section of the British military mission in Moscow, Colonel Brinkman, sent "Marshal Stalin" from London to Moscow **instructions** for Soviet troops **in Poland** to drop cargo **over Warsaw**. This is how the Mikolajchiks and the Bur-Komorovskys got a strangely crooked "radio bridge" instead of a straight one. Need comments? Stalin spoke with Mikołajczyk even before he

received all the information and understood how vilely the Londoners and Churchill acted towards Warsaw,

towards Russia and

towards Stalin. Realizing this, Stalin sharply dissociated himself from the provocateurs. So why is he to blame here? Mikołajczyk and Churchill, in the name of their political interests, were not

afraid to start shedding the blood of ordinary Poles. What, Stalin had to add to these rivers

of Polish blood also additional - to those that had already been shed - seas of blood of Soviet people? To add without success for the cause, but to secure emigrant claims to power? Are you asking too much of the Russians, gentlemen?

\*\*\*

Now - a little about the "brave" and "kind" Czechs.

I will not regret indignation and skepticism in relation to them, too, because in terms of historical gratitude, the Czechs - especially after the disruption of the pro-Western Czech adventure of 1967 by the Warsaw Pact troops - did not go far from the Poles. The Czechs also began to talk about "Russian occupiers" and desecrate monuments to Soviet soldiers.

Of course, in 1967 it was the "democratized" youths who did this, and not the gray-haired Praguers, who in 1945 met the young tankers Rybalko and Lelyushenko with songs. But the youths were the children and grandchildren of

those Praguers. Today, the youths of 1967 have already turned gray, and now they have their own grandchildren. And these grandchildren are also not very grateful to the

Russians for their tank rush to Prague in 1945. Should we lose sight of this circumstance for us, the children

and grandchildren of those who made this throw? At the same time, people who do not know real history well or know it well, but who prefer "bucks" to the truth, tell fables about poor "Czechoslovaks" (a nationality that never existed in nature), from whom the villain Hitler took away the Sudetenland (entirely populated in 1938 Germans), about the plight of the Czechs in the Third Reich and other things like that ...

But here is some "information for reflection" from the memorandum of the head of the 7th department of the political department of the 7th Guards Army, Major Kozlov, which he sent on June 7, 1945 to the head of the 7th department of the 1st Ukrainian Front. First quote:

"The population of Czechoslovakia curses the German nation and will never forget all the atrocities that caused

Germans ... However, along with the mostly friendly attitude of the population of Czechoslovakia towards the troops of the Red Army, there are some displeasures ... "

However, further lines of the memorandum suggested that Major Kozlov used the word "separate" rather for reasons, in modern terms, of political correctness.

(however, I would like someone to explain to me the meaning of the last interesting concept).

Here is what Major Kozlov wrote further:

"The population of the [western] regions of Czechoslovakia differs sharply in its behavior from the population of the previous regions. If hot battles raged in the eastern part of Czechoslovakia, as a result of which there was great destruction of villages and cities, and the population sat in basements before the arrival of the Red Army, then the western part did not experience this ... The population, therefore, did not experience all the horrors of the war ... "

But after all, before the hostilities, there was, like, a zone of "Nazi atrocities"? And how did the "freedom-loving" Czechs react to them in the mountainous, that is, convenient for partisan actions and inconvenient for the actions of the regular army of the Czech Republic? Well, Major Kozlov wrote

about this:

"There are various parties in this territory: communist, social-democratic, people's socialist, people's.

None of the democratic parties carried out underground work directed against the Germans. Each party, including the communist one, throughout the entire period of the occupation of the Czech Republic was expecting the arrival of the Red Army, but itself did not show any active actions directed against the German enslavers ... "

Those who, at least **from the basements**, but with their own eyes saw how the Russians shed blood and died for their freedom, at least for several decades were imbued with gratitude to the Russians.

Those whom the Russians deprived of the opportunity to lick an American army boot instead of a German boot could not forgive the Russians even

then. What I mean by writing the last phrase will become clearer to the reader when we get to the section on the last battles



Red Army in the Czech Republic, ending with the liberation of Prague.

In the meantime - about one more people, "innocently" "victim" from the "Russian barbarians".

## About how Russians “raped” German women

This section will probably be one of the most extensive, which is understandable. Question: "What was the typical pattern of behavior of Soviet soldiers and officers in Germany in 1945?" today becomes the most important for the reasons that I have already mentioned

at the very beginning of the book.

Liberator or rapist? Hero or

Marauder? The

Germans are told: a rapist and a marauder.

“Russians” today are being pushed into the minds of about the same thing. For example, in a film shot by one of the domestic (?) TV channels, a veteran's memories of how he was looking for a "girl" for his lieutenant on his orders are presented in close-up. And nothing - passes. And there is nothing to cover! Sergei

Kremlev did not take Berlin, he was not in the project at that time, but the veteran, hung with numerous badges and even military awards - here he is. And confirms: "They raped." What can I say? Uh-huh, it was the case. I just would like to know

why this veteran ,

who doesn't really understand what he is **blurting out**, was not only put in front of a TV camera, but also started recording on satellite ether orbits? It is also significant how often German women were raped and who raped them.

Outbursts of violence happen in everyday life, and even war is a daily mass violence organized on an interstate scale. Therefore, cases of this or that individual violence during the war cannot but become more frequent. The whole question is in the scale, causes and attitude of the authorities and society to such excesses. Let's try to figure it out, but first - a series

preliminary considerations and some information ...

Even in the most vile and dirty years of the Cold War in the West, the topic of rape of German women by Russians was not particularly exaggerated. I think, including because if someone touched her widely

**then** - in the fifties, and even in the sixties, the embassies of England, France, the USA, the FRG in Moscow could be under siege by outraged former front-line soldiers - without any efforts of the Agitprop of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In the war, everything happened - who, if not who did not go through the war, knows this. But two million raped? Our fathers and grandfathers would not have tolerated such a slander on themselves, on their fallen and living comrades. But

children and grandchildren calmly demolish everything. But for this we (more precisely vanky, not remembering kinship) will still pay back.

Well, actually! If the current generations were not in Germany in 1945, then these generations must know their fathers and grandfathers, who returned from there and honestly lived their lives until their death in the Soviet Union! So? Those who fought, won, returned home and rebuilt the State, were they completely or in large numbers rapists and scoundrels? After all, this is the male part of our people, our grandfathers or fathers! We

lived with them and thanks to them. Thanks, including, in the truest sense of the word - conceived by them. But are we the descendants of total rapists? Ah, Russia! Yes, the current abominations have become possible only today. And, starting from 1992, from the

Berlin Festival,

"documentary" and "feature" films appear, where it is alleged that in Germany and Poland 2 million (who is more?) women were raped by Russians; that either 100 or 130 thousand German women were raped in Berlin alone, of which 10 thousand committed suicide ... The German journalist Martha Hiller, who died in 2001 at the age of ninety, publishes a "diary of April 1945" with "records" about how the Russians raped and raped her - repeatedly. Some teenage

girls were allegedly raped a hundred times. It is not clear at the same time - how could they safely live up to the filming of the 90s? Since these same years, other provocations have also begun. The English historian Anthony Beevor writes about two million in total, and about one hundred and thirty thousand in Berlin, etc. Previously Beevor on this issue

German authors Helke Sander and Barbara Yohr took up the task in the book *Liberators and Liberated*, published in Berlin in 1992.

The "logic" of the assessments is incomparable. So, there is a certain document from a children's clinic in Berlin, where in 1945 the fathers of 12 out of 237 born were recorded as Russians (5%), and in 1946 -

20 out of 567 (3.5%). And the "calculations" begin ... First, 5% of the total number of those born in Berlin in 1945-1946 is calculated - 1156 out of 23,124 babies. The number 1156 is multiplied by 10 (they say, 9 German women out of 10, having become pregnant from a barbarian, had abortions, and the tenth gave birth), and then by another 5 (assuming that only every fifth raped woman became pregnant). The final "figure" is 60,000 raped Berlin residents out of 600,000 women of childbearing age who then lived in Berlin.

The resulting percentage of allegedly raped - 10% in Berlin, extends to the whole of Germany, resulting in the notorious two million. All this is reminiscent of a fairy tale

about a greedy innkeeper who, ten years later, demanded a thousand thalers from a poor man who forgot to pay for a couple of boiled eggs. Like, if a cockerel and a hen were hatched from these two eggs, and if they gave offspring, and it, in turn, would also multiply, and then - in turn - too, then just ten years later all this bird crowd it would cost crazy money. The impudent "forgot" at the same time that nothing could hatch from the eggs he boiled. So fake? Of course, but with one clarification - an extremely

brazen fake, which

follows even from the Berlin document of 1945-1946. In it, out of 32 newborns whose mothers were recorded as Russian fathers, only 9 (nine) indicated "Russian (rape)".

At the same time, one should also take into account that in 1945 and 1946 it was much more convenient for a German woman (and even more so for a girl) who had sinned and not escaped pregnancy to attribute everything to Russian violence than to a clever seducer who "persuaded" the fallen in their native German language.

But even if we accept the records of all nine German women as reliable, then the total number of raped people still decreases to 560

thousand (9/32 (2 million = 0.56 million). Taking the international coefficient of "democratic" lies as 10, we get a figure of 56 thousand raped, which, judging by objective data, is also overestimated at times, but closer to reality.

Dr. Goebbels took care of the "ideological justification" for millions of figures. Not yet burned in a gasoline flame, he said this: "In individual villages and cities, all German women from 10 to 70 years old were subjected to countless rapes. It seems that this is done by order from above, since one can see an obvious system in the behavior of the Soviet soldiery.

There really was a system in the behavior of our troops on the territory of Germany, and it was determined, for example, by the Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command to the commanders of the troops and members of the Military Councils of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts on changing the attitude towards German prisoners of war and the civilian population of April 20, 1945. It was perhaps the last, but by no means the first document of its

kind. Stalin and Antonov demanded "better treatment of the Germans." The directive explained: "Hard treatment of the Germans makes them afraid and makes them stubbornly resist without surrendering. The civilian population, fearing revenge, organizes itself into gangs. Such position is not favorable to us ... "

The directive ordered in the regions of Germany to the west of the Oder-Neisse line (that is, in those areas that Stalin did not intend to transfer to Poland) "to create German administrations, and to put German burgomasters in the cities," and not to persecute ordinary Nazis.

The third and last point in the directive was: "3. Improving attitudes towards the Germans should not lead to a decrease in vigilance and familiarity with the Germans. On April

22, 1945, the Military Council of the 1st Belorussian Front, on the basis of the Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, issued its extensive directive VS / 00384, where, by the way, the suppression of cruel violence, including against women, was not even mentioned. And not because such violence was allowed, but because it was not significant, massive.

The most massive and subject to suppression phenomenon was "the seizure from the remaining Germans of their personal property, livestock,

food, illegal self-procurement of food and meat, unauthorized collection of household property abandoned by the Germans, etc.

And the temptations, it must be said, were great: in the settlements occupied by the troops, there were a lot of things left behind by the Germans who had left, from personal belongings to livestock and poultry. And a lot of things got lost one way or another. For example, in Upper Silesia - by Poles who lived here for a long time (in the village of Rudelak, there were 48 Polish households for 22 German households), as well as liberated foreign workers and Soviet citizens driven into the Reich. Nevertheless, the highest Soviet command, starting with the Supreme Commander, not only did not orient our troops towards permissiveness, but, on the contrary, prohibited it, not to mention violence. Already on April 4, 1945, a member of the Military Council of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Lieutenant-General Krainyukov, informed the head of the Glavpur of the Red Army Shcherbakov: "In the second half of March, front troops were busy on

10 cities on the territory of Germany ...

Most were German population... on one's own evacuated or forcibly driven away by the German authorities into the depths of Germany ...

Military commandants were appointed in all occupied cities, who introduce a strict occupation regime for the German population, establish strict military order for the Red Army soldiers ... The military councils of the armies are waging a resolute struggle against

looting and rape of German women." Then, on April 4, Krainyukov reported to Moscow that:

"The issue of food supply for workers, hospitals, orphanages and nursing homes (***I draw attention to the nature of the list! - S.K.***), as well as the urban German population, remains still unresolved .

The German population of a number of cities, such as Beuten, Gleiwitz, Grünberg and others, is starving, some swell up and die of starvation. Of course,

this can not but affect the mood German population and its relation to the Red Army..."

However, after the winter that had just ended, in the conditions of a dynamic offensive and tension of forces, it was not easy for the Red Army itself. So, in the spring of 1945, 3,600 fighters could not go to the front from Lvov hospitals for half a month due to lack of uniforms. Young fighters from the replenishment of the 1st Ukrainian Front could be found in active units "in poor shoes, without gymnasts and underwear, in various jackets instead of overcoats." A month before the victorious end of the

war! And these data are from a reliable source, from the report of the head of the political department of the 1st Ukrainian Front dated April 7, 1945. In order for the reader to better

understand the situation of those days - sometimes variegated, as in a kaleidoscope - I will give other examples for illustration, curious, but also completely reliable. Despite the absolute documentation - they are taken from the report of the head of the political department of the 8th Guards Army, Major General Skosyrev to the head of the Political Directorate of the 1st Belorussian Front dated April 25, 1945 - they look implausible. However, here is a direct quote: "In the settlements of Wilhelmshaven and Ransdorf

**(suburbs of Berlin. - S.K.)** there are restaurants where alcoholic drinks, beer and snacks are sold. Moreover, restaurant owners are willing to sell all this to our soldiers and officers for occupation stamps. On April 22, some soldiers and officers went to restaurants and bought alcoholic drinks and snacks. Some of them acted cautiously - in one of the restaurants in Ransdorf, tankers, before drinking wine, asked the owner to drink it first. But some servicemen are clearly doing the wrong thing, scattering occupation stamps. For example, a liter of beer costs 1 mark, while individual servicemen pay 10–20 marks each, and one officer paid a banknote worth 100 marks for a liter of beer. Head of the political department of the 28th Guards. ck **(Guards Rifle Corps. - S.K.)**, Colonel Borodin ordered the owners of Ransdorf's restaurants to close the restaurants for a while until the battle is over ... "And laughter, and sin!

Today it seems so fantastic that some rogues from history are presented in their "works" as really former mythical table conversations at the same table of German tankers from "Tigers" and Soviet from "Thirty-fours" and "ISs". Like, they jumped into the same restaurant, intercepted a glass of beer and almost clinked glasses with each other at the same time. Really something similar, if it

could be, then, of course, only ***spaced apart in time*** - if the quarter with the restaurant passed from hand to hand. That is, first our beer is drunk, then the Germans. Or vice versa. But, of course, not at the same time.

However, it was not for nothing that the Supreme Commander in his directive of April 20, 1945 emphasized that "improvement of attitude towards the Germans should not lead to a decrease in vigilance and familiarity with the Germans." And here Comrade Stalin turned out to be far-sighted! This is where it suits - for a liter of beer to overpay the shameless Fritz

a hundred times! Disorder! Let us return, however, to the "raped", or rather, for the time being, to those factors that an objective researcher cannot ignore. On April 7, 1945, the head of the political department of the 1st Ukrainian Front of the Guard, Major General Yashchechkin, signed his report to the head of the Main Political Department of the Red Army AS Shcherbakov on political and educational work with new replenishment from among Soviet citizens released from captivity and captivity. A careful reading of this document alone allows us to look at the problem of rape of German women by our servicemen with a completely sober look and see a lot from the right angle. General Yashchechkin reported: "During the

fighting in Germany, formations and parts of the front several times made up for their combat losses in people at the expense of Soviet citizens of military age released from German captivity. On March 20, more than 40,000 people were sent to the units ...

Of the 100 new recruits who entered the 36th Plastunsky regiment of the formation, where Lieutenant Colonel Petrashin was the head of the political department, were in Germany: up to 1 year - 5, from 1 year to 2 years - 55, from 2 to 3 years - 34 and more 3 years - 6 people.



The new replenishment from among the Soviet citizens released from German captivity is significantly littered with hostile elements. Among him, many German spies, saboteurs, Vlasovites, people who served in the German army and institutions were identified. Most of these people were specially left or sent by the German command for espionage and sabotage activities. In the compound where the head of the political department, Major General Voronov, revealed 11 traitors to the Motherland among the new replenishment, including three former Soviet servicemen who voluntarily defected to the side of the enemy, two Gestapo agents and one Volkssturmovets - Bekker Boris Grigoryevich, a native and resident of the city of Stalingrad , born in 1912, accepted German citizenship in 1942, joined the punitive detachment of Germans, actively participated in executions and beatings ... In 1943, Becker voluntarily evacuated to Germany, where he worked at a military factory. He joined Volksipurm, underwent special training and was left by the Germans in our rear to fight the Red Army...

There was no time to promote young fighters in reserve regiments, since the combat situation urgently required the rapid introduction of replenishment into battle ... "Yashechkin also cited interesting specific examples:

"The Red Army soldier Grishko spread a provocative rumor among the fighters that allegedly "the Germans launched 3,000 tanks in the Berlin direction, crushed the troops of Marshal Zhukov and occupied more than 3,000 settlements. Therefore, we (***the 1st Ukrainian Front of Marshal Konev. - S.K.***) stopped here "...

The Red Army soldier Voronkin, in a conversation with soldiers at the construction of the defense, said: "In 1941 they betrayed us and now they will betray us, so we are digging these pits in vain. The Germans were better for me. I made the fatal mistake of not going deep into Germany. As soon as the fighting begins, it will be possible

to escape. The Red Army soldier Bersonev, having come to the unit, asked: "Is there a car in the company? And then when the Germans go on the offensive, you won't run away from them on foot "..."

This was said in 1945, not in 1941! Such sentiments were not massive, but they were. Really were! Indeed, not only Matrosov and Talalikhin served in the Active Army, but also ordinary self-seekers. The norm was

an ordinary person - not rushing forward, but going on the attack, not throwing weapons in battle and fighting according to the principle: "Do not ask for anything, do not refuse anything."

However, there were deviations from the norm! In the formation where the head of the political department was Colonel Korolev, the commander of a separate anti-tank fighter battalion of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Lieutenant Latrugin, shot three fighters of the new replenishment in a combat situation for fleeing from the battlefield. In 1945! They threw rifles,

destroyed documents and deserted not only in 1941, but also in 1945! In April 1945, the deputy head of the political department of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, Colonel Katugin, informed the head of the GlavPU of the Red Army (as well as the secretary of the Central Committee and the Moscow City Committee) AC Shcherbakov about emergency incidents along the front in March 1945.

Compared with February, the number of emergency situations in formations and units of the front decreased from 216

to 197, namely: Desertion - 115 cases of self-mutilation - 52 cases Counter-revolutionary agitation - 7 cases Terrorist acts against officers - 2 cases Looting and violence - 21 cases. The question is - if some

Bersonev or Voronkin, mentioned in the report of General Yashchechkin, would have turned up an opportunity to "feel the woman", would they use it or not? And even if they, moreover, deserted? Even among the forty thousand, not very politically and morally stable

new reinforcements of the 1st Ukrainian Front, the Bersonevs and Voronkins were an insignificant minority. But if at least five out of a hundred were such, then only this new replenishment of only one front gave **two thousand** potential or real rapists! Only on one front and only from unstable replenishment. And in the composition of one 1st Ukrainian Front there were hundreds of thousands of people. In total, three fronts participating in the Berlin

operations, included (together with the rear) two and a half million people.

This is only on the Berlin direction! Estimate ... If at least one out of a hundred "men with a gun" turned out to be an unrestrained scoundrel, this gives **twenty-five thousand** potential or real rapists in addition to those two that have already been mentioned. And if the same rapist is taken apart by the hunt, and he goes to violence again? What if one more time?

Sooner or later, of course, he will be wrapped up and handed over to the tribunal. But

statistics, he, sort of rubbish, has already increased.

After all, gentlemen, good "democrats", these are the laws of large numbers! Even in the most chivalrous army there will always be a handful (one in a hundred and even one in five - is that a lot?) scoundrels. Plus - hundreds of thousands of civilian men

taken to Germany and now repatriating to their homeland (in reality, often uncontrollably and unorganized wandering along the roads of the collapsing Reich). And many of them, oh, how hard they suffered from the Germans! And the nerves are shattered, and the dense instincts are awakened ...

Plus - let's not forget, German terrorists from the Werewolf dressed in Soviet military uniforms. By this reckless raping of all German women within reach was imputed to a direct, so to speak, official duty by the very nature and meaning of their activities. Moreover, they were also obliged to mutilate them - for persuasiveness and the required psychological effect. I will tell you something about this later. And if some young German woman from the town through which the Soviet military unit passed was pinned down in the corner by a German deserter, did she shout

about it at all corners or blame everything on the

"Russian barbarians"? However, the main part of the rapes was committed, as I understand it, by ordinary soldiers and officers who could not restrain themselves. But were there so many of these cases? According to official data from the political department of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, on the territory of Austria they

was allowed by our military personnel no more than twenty-one for the month of March 1945. There were, of course, many more of them, but even if we consider that only one case out of ten became known, the real figure is about two hundred cases. Let's

make allowance for the fact that in Austria the fierceness of the fighting was low compared to Germany itself, and the likelihood of Russian violence there was objectively lower. Taking a completely correct coefficient of 5, we get up to one thousand rapes in Germany itself per month. Of course,

even a few thousand cases is already a mass phenomenon. Moreover - several tens of thousands of cases. However, taking into account everything, one has to be surprised not that in Germany in 1945 there were quite massive (at the level of several thousand) rapes of German women by Russians, but that there were so few of

them. Here are two situations that are not directly related to the topic, but firmly. During the Vistula-Oder operation, an Il-2 attack pilot V.V. was shot down near the Polish village of Vetkovice. Shishkin. Sitting on the forced next to the German trenches, Shishkin and his air gunner AB Khrenov immediately took the fight. With the fire of onboard machine guns, they destroyed more than fifty soldiers, and when the cartridges ran out, they fired back from pistols. Khrenov was killed, the seriously wounded Shishkin was taken prisoner. The anger of the Germans was understandable - this Russian and his comrade had just laid down half of a full-fledged company! It would not be surprising if Shishkin was shot immediately. However, it turned out disgusting: Shishkin's eyes were gouged out, his tongue was cut off, his feet were burned to

the bone, and a five-pointed star was carved on his back. Such, alas, is civilization... The revenge of a soldier - no matter what the enemy does - must be directed at the armed enemy. Did he take everything from you? Fight, fight without fear! But don't bully him. And

what should our fighters have felt after recapturing Shishkin's corpse from the Germans? Someone could break loose - in response. But women and children are sacred. And the Red Army - taken as a whole as a historical, social and moral phenomenon - fought like that! I will turn once again to the memoirs of the twice Her

"At the end of April, the command post of the tank army of General Bogdanov, which we covered, moved to the area of the city of Neuruppin. They moved in a small column. Ahead of the T-34, followed by an armored personnel carrier, where we were located with the chief of staff of the army, Lieutenant General Radzievsky (during the ***Berlin operation, Alexei Ivanovich Radzievsky was still a major general. - S.K.***), followed by staff vehicles and at the end of the column four more tank. Radzievsky and I rode, leaning out of the hatch and looking around.

We entered some village and moved along a narrow street ... Suddenly, from one house ... an elderly woman ran out. She held her right hand behind her back. Having caught up with our armored personnel carrier, the woman swung and threw a grenade. The grenade fell on the other side of the road into a ditch and exploded without causing us any harm. The commander of the car, cursing briefly, raised his machine gun. At the same moment, a boy of seven or eight years old ran up to the woman and clung to her, clasping her with both arms. No shot was fired. Without slowing down, we drove past. The

whole episode took no more than ten seconds. Having told about this episode, Savitsky gives interesting thoughts, comparing the

combat morale of Russians and Germans: environment and deal with it. Like any good soldier - and the bad ones did not last until April 45th -

the instinct of self-defense worked in the commander of our car. A second later, consciousness turned on, which prompted: there is no more danger. There is only a German fanatic and an innocent child next to her. And simple pity prevailed. Simple, but not accessible to everyone. It is not difficult to guess how a German soldier would act in such a case ... "

It was really easy to guess what Savitsky himself further and wrote:

"With the rarest exception, the reaction of the Nazis was unequivocal: punishment. Merciless and inevitable. Death to all indiscriminately - the elderly, women, children. But the German soldier, after instinct, also included consciousness. How else? But turned on only to

find a way to avenge the fear he just

experienced..."

Savitsky's conclusions about the Germans are tragically confirmed by many situations of that war. Including - and fanaticism in relation to the attack pilot Shishkin. The same one who, after a forced landing, together with his air gunner Khrenov, laid down fifty Germans and was brutally tortured by them for this. Savitsky correctly wrote that simple human pity is not available to

everyone. In the German army, as a rule, it was an exception, but even in the Red Army, it was not an immutable norm **for everyone**. This is all the more true when we talk about human decency - a quality rarer than pity. After all, war calls not only heroes, but also villains. Let's turn to the documents.

Let's say you can bring such an amazing at first glance, but, alas, not such an amazing example in times of upheaval.

On May 30, 1944, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasilevsky signed order No. 0150, beginning like this:

"There are statements from local Soviet organizations and NKVD bodies about atrocities committed by individual servicemen in the front line, armed robberies, thefts from the civilian population and murders ..."

The order listed four specific group crimes for February 1944: three robberies of local residents and one theft. Not much, but real. And this is on its own territory. In total - 11 scoundrels, whose criminal manifestations were revealed. Another example ... On April 29, 1945, the head of the political department

of the 8th Guards Army, Major General Skosyrev, reported to the head of the Political Directorate of the 1st Belorussian Front:

“In Berlin, in the location of formations and units engaged in hostilities, cases of exceptionally bad behavior by military personnel are still observed. As before, such facts are noted primarily among artillerymen, self-propelled gunners and other servicemen of special units. Some servicemen have gone so far as to turn into bandits...”

Note that this is not an assessment of Goebbels, but of a combat Soviet general, given in real time. But this is an assessment of the behavior of renegades, and not of the average Soviet soldier. The same Skosyrev in the same report reported on April 29, 1945:

“Today, a member of the Military Council of the Guards, Major General Pronin held a meeting of military commandants...

The general opinion of all commandants is that the German population, in connection with the appointment of commandants and burgomasters, began to feel better and more confident. The commandants have great authority

among the population... The military commandants note that in recent days the number of cases of hoarding, rape of women and other immoral phenomena on the part of military personnel has sharply decreased. 2-3 cases are registered in each locality, while earlier the number of cases of immoral phenomena was much higher.”

I draw attention to the word "immoral", which means - contrary to morality! But morality is different, for example, this: "Lust, whiskey and robbery are a reward for a soldier." This was said by

the "red-cheeked major" Yankee writer John Dos Passos, and he quoted his words in an article in Life magazine dated January 7, 1946. Another

Yankee in Time magazine, November 12, 1945 confessed:

“Many normal American families would be horrified if they knew how completely

insensitivity to everything human, our guys behaved here.

And why, you ask? Is it that uninvited guests came to their homeland, raping and destroying everything and everything? Associated Press reports dated September 12, 1945 read:

"Both our army and the British army ... have contributed their share in robbery and rape ... Although these crimes are not characteristic of our troops, however, their percentage is large enough to give our army a sinister reputation, so we too (emphasis mine. - **C.K.**) can be considered an army of rapists."

I don't know what was meant here by "too" - "also like German army" or "also like the Russian army"?

I think it's more accurate to assume that the Yankees meant the latter. Then this US "too" is incomparable! It has everything! And the fact that a mote in the Russian eye was equated with a log in their own, and the fact that even then the Western media began to reduce the image of the Victorious Warrior to the image of an anarchist savage. On May 2, 1945,

the military prosecutor of the 1st Belorussian Front, Major General of Justice JI. Yachenin reported to the Military Council of the front on the situation in the front line. He wrote honestly: "In relation

to the German population ... certainly a significant change has been achieved. The facts of aimless and unjustified executions of Germans, looting and rape of German women have significantly decreased, however ... a number of such cases are still recorded. If the executions of Germans ...

are almost not observed at all, and cases of robbery are isolated, then violence against women still takes place: the junk work, which consists in walking ... through junk (allocations are mine everywhere. - S.K. ) apartments , collecting all sorts of things and objects, etc."

Yachenin gave a number of examples - ugly, and then wrote:

"I consider it necessary to emphasize a number of points: 1.... individual commanders are complacent that a certain turning point has been reached, completely forgetting that



that only part of the violence, robberies and other outrages committed by their subordinates reach their attention ... 2. Violence, and

especially robberies and theft, are widely practiced by the repatriated, following the points of repatriation, and especially the Italians, the Dutch and even the Germans. At the same time, all these outrages are being blamed on our servicemen. There are cases when the

Germans engage in provocation, claiming rape, when it did not take place. I myself have established two such cases.

No less interesting is the fact that our people sometimes, without verification, report to the authorities about the violence and murders that have taken place, while when checking this turns out to be a hoax."

We must not forget that the task of the military prosecutor Yachenin was to open up and analyze shortcomings and crimes, and not write a vivid essay in the Red Star. Therefore, his report speaks not of the good, but of the bad. However, in life, and not in the prosecutor's documents, something good prevailed. Good!

After all,  
a new type of army really came to Germany -  
an army of comrade-in-arms, imbued with camaraderie and...

And the spirit, damn it, humanism!

Humanism - in spite of everything, in spite of everything that the Germans have done in Russia. After all, the winter and spring violence of 1945 by Russians against Germans - really former, but by no means massive - were not least generated by the total violence of the Germans against Russians from 1941 to 1944! As well as the fierce resistance of the Germans.

In Austria, for example, the scale of violence on the part of the Red Army was immediately much less than in Germany. Not to mention Hungary, Romania, and even more so - about Bulgaria, Poland, Yugoslavia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia ... The deputy head

of the political department of the 3rd Ukrainian Front in April 1945 reported to Moscow:

“As our troops moved deeper into Austria, the population, seeing the correct attitude towards them from the vast majority of our soldiers and officers, grew bolder ... Residents began to fearlessly appear on the streets and greet our troops ... Amalia Siegbert from the village of Munichdorf said:

“I am surprised that that the Russians treat the Austrian population so politely. We didn't expect this at all. The Germans said that the Russians raped all the women and killed the children or took them to Siberia. Now we see that the Germans were telling lies”... (...) Cases of looting and other illegal actions against

attitude towards the population has almost completely ceased.

On the situation in Prague, the commander of the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Marshal Konev, reported on May 12, 1945 to the Supreme Commander as follows:

“On May 11, 1945, I was personally in Prague... I must report that the population of Czechoslovakia, and especially the city of Prague, greeted the troops of the Red Army very enthusiastically... Spontaneous rallies spring up in the

streets. (...) Our troops in Prague are behaving well. There are no cases of looting, violence and resentment of the population, which stands out sharply in comparison with the behavior of the troops during the capture of cities in Germany, especially in the first period.

I repeat, any major social upheaval—and a major war, a shock even greater than a major revolution—is associated with excessive violence. Moreover, excessive, unjustified violence comes mainly from the “marginal”, anti-social strata of society. In September 1944, there were cases of robbery and even rape (“even” - from General Antonov's telegram to the commander of the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front) on the territory of even (this “even” is already mine, the author of this book) Bulgaria.

The General Staff of the Red Army demanded "urgently take measures to stop the cases of looting, robbery and violence, bringing the perpetrators to severe responsibility." Bulgaria, by the

way, in that war, although passive, was actually an ally of Germany. Well, let's say, in Yugoslavia, women everywhere came out to our troops in festive clothes. Yes, our political reports of that time got, however, an unsightly case - two some villainous colonels in October 1944, in a drunken state, tried to rape two Yugoslav partisans.

But the family is not without its black sheep. Moreover, this fact has also become the subject of proceedings at the level of the General Staff of the Red Army.

It is enough to compare Stalin's dry directive on Germany, the very emotional appeal to the troops of the Military Council of the 3rd Ukrainian Front with calls to be loyal to the Austrians and the almost poetic memo-appeal of the command of the 3rd Ukrainian Front in connection with the entry into the territory of Yugoslavia in order to understand - to different peoples, the soldiers of the Red Army and the attitude was immediately different - who deserved what. The measure of guilt or sympathy for a foreign people was also determined by our attitude towards it. However, even in the midst of the fighting, the Red Army was not cruel even to the civilian population of the Reich

- if we keep in mind both the directives of the command and the general nature of the behavior of the absolute majority of **military** personnel - with the exception of that insignificant morally defective part of them, which was already mentioned earlier.

All the more humane and benign was **the state** policy of the Soviet Union towards the Germans. In Berlin alone, by **the beginning of June** 1945, 94 hospitals for adults, 6 hospitals for children, 12 maternity hospitals, 11 private hospitals, 14 outpatient clinics, 8 gardens, 2 nurseries, one dairy kitchen, 10 ambulance stations, 179 pharmacies ... But in our country half the country lay in ruins. Shortly before his death, General of the Army Ivan Tretiak, Hero of the Soviet Union, said something that I cannot cite in a truncated form. And he said this:

"It would be hypocrisy to deny that cases of rape and other forms of cruelty took place on German soil. But the attempt, following Goebbels, to present the Red Army as a "horde of thugs and marauders" does not correspond to historical truth and is blasphemous in relation to the memory of the liberators. In 1945, I was a regiment

commander (***the 93rd Guards Rifle Regiment of the 29th Guards Division - S.K.***). What to hide, we were very angry at the Germans. The Nazis burned my house and four other neighboring houses. Relatives and friends were killed (***the village of Malaya Popovka, Khorolsky district, Poltava region. - S.K.***). In the regiment, perhaps, there was not a single fighter whose hands would not itch to avenge relatives and friends. But there was an order from Stalin, and we carried it out. After all, then the army was much more disciplined than now. To be honest, I wanted revenge. But I would have given to the tribunal anyone who would give vent to this feeling and would dissolve his hands.

There was not a single case of violence in my regiment ( this ***can be believed, given the combat reputation and commanding qualities of the regiment commander. - S.K.***). Although, of course, in such a huge military grouping, which entered Germany in 1945, anything happened. The men had not seen women for several years. Someone did not resist. But today, many recognize that sexual relations between our fighters and German women were by no means always of a violent nature. There was also mutual interest (***which is also understandable - after all, many German women have not been blessed with male attention for a long time. - S.K.***

Another thing is incomprehensible: why do numerous foreign and Russian guardians for the "purity of front-line morals" do not raise the question of the terrible and most cruel violence by the Germans, which the peoples of the USSR were subjected to during the war years? And it is absolutely wild that the libel of Beevor, translated into Russian, is published in Russia. This is not pluralism, but the filthiest cynicism, because the vast majority of the slandered can no longer answer liars."

Yes, to protect our fallen in that war and all those who left us six and a half decades after the war, their descendants are indebted.

Protected!

On February 4, 1945, US President Roosevelt told Stalin in Livadia that "he was struck by the senseless and merciless

destruction caused by the Germans in the Crimea. Following is the recording of the conversation:

“Stalin replies that the Nazis have no morals. They hate what is created by the hand of man. They are just sadists. Roosevelt

declares that he agrees with Marshal Stalin, that the destruction caused by the Germans is the result of their sadism ... In general, Marshal Stalin will find him, Roosevelt, now much more bloodthirsty towards the Germans than in Tehran (at a conference in 1943. - **S. TO.**).

Stalin replies that we have all become more bloodthirsty now. The Germans shed too much honest blood."

But Roosevelt saw only the Crimea, where only Sevastopol and Kerch were truly in ruins. He did not see Stalingrad, did not see tens of thousands of ashes on the site of villages and villages ... And yet, even the sights of the Crimea liberated from the Germans made the American president "more bloodthirsty towards the Germans." What, then, must Stalin have felt? And what about the subordinates of the Supreme? And what about the people headed by Stalin? After all, they experienced **and experienced** the grief and devastation of a total war in 1945, and not the interlocutor of Dos Passos - the "red-cheeked major" from a prosperous overseas power, who only profited from the war!

And yet, the absolute majority of the armed part of the Soviet people who came to Germany restrained themselves. Who was restrained by the age-old Russian ability to forgive the unforgivable, who - by inner nobility, who - just a tough order.

Units did not hold back. However, units in millions add up to thousands. Does anyone have the right to blame the whole nation for them, who **was forced** to send millions of their worthy and not very worthy (war does not choose) sons to those foreign lands from where war, death, devastation, grief came to their native land?

At the end of the section, I will present one more document. After meeting him, I thought for a long time - whether to give it completely? Won't reading it tire an impatient reader - after all, this is not a "cool" text, designed to attract a potential buyer - a lover of dashing in expressions and plot. But I will quote this document in full - according to pp. 211-212 of

volume 15 (4-5) of the publication of the Institute of Military History of the RF Ministry of Defense "Russian Archive: The Great Patriotic War: Battle for Berlin (Red Army in defeated Germany)", signed for printing on 18.04. 95 and published - in contrast to the mass circulation of anti-Soviet libels - with a circulation of only one and a half thousand copies.

***“Report of the head of the 7th department of the political department of the 2nd Belorussian Front to the head of the 7th department of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army about the killing of citizens of German nationality by the fascist***

April 2, 1945 ( dated from the incoming stamp of the 7th Directorate of GlavPURKKA.

**-S.K.)** from the city of Danzig) in the forest in a separate barn, three German families from the village of Sübitz were found, 16 people in total, and

exactly:

1. Frida Buchenen (age unknown)
2. Hubert - her son, 7 years old
3. Heinz - her son, 6 years old
4. Morbin - her son, 5 years old
5. Harry - her son, 2.5 years old
6. Schwartz Erwin - 37 years old
7. Erika Schwartz, his wife - 39 years old
8. Peter - their son, 6 years old
9. Karin - their son, 5 years old
10. Wolfgang - their son, 2.5 years old

11. Lera Berta - 39  
years old 12. Bruno - her  
son, 7 years old 13. Herbert  
- her son, 14 years  
old 14. Liniyal - 40 years old  
15. Gisella - her daughter, 15 years old 16.

Eiverelakh Emgen - her niece, 2 years old . Of these,  
Lere Bruno, Lere Herbert, Linyal, Gizella and Averyelach  
Emgen were dead, because their throats were cut, and the  
remaining 12 people had veins opened on both hands, but at  
the time

of discovery they were still alive. When providing them  
with medical care, they refused help, declaring: "It is better to  
die than to live with the Russians."

By the evening of March 12, 1945, 11 people had died:  
seven children and four

women. The investigation established that the murder of  
these persons was committed by Schwartz Erwin, born in  
1908, a native of the village. Zubitz, a German by nationality,  
a member of the National Socialist Party since 1933, 7th  
grade education, married, worked as an aircraft mechanic at  
the airport in Gdynia.

During interrogation, he testified: "By the arrival of the  
Russian troops at my place of residence, I saw that all the  
property was lost and, being convinced of my fascist party, I  
began to act as best I could against the Russian troops.  
Therefore, on March 12, 1945, he opened the veins in his  
arms to his wife and three children in order to destroy them.  
After the murder of my family, I suggested [to do the same] to  
the neighbors, who brought their families to the barn and, with  
my help, opened their veins, and then I opened my own veins.  
I committed the murder of 15 people in order to let the rest of  
the Germans know and spread the rumor that

all this was done by Russian soldiers. The surviving  
women confirmed that they agreed to the killing as a result of  
agitation by Erwin Schwartz, who opened the veins with a  
safety razor blade and also cut the throats of 4 people.

One of the women who survived, Frida Bohenen, testified that she did not want to cut her hands, but when Schwartz forcibly opened her veins, she lost consciousness and did not see what was being done to her

children. Further, Frida Bohenen testified that Schwartz told her that when the Red Army came, they would rape and drive the Germans to Siberia, so there was no way to live on.

meaning.

Schwartz was actively assisted in spreading provocative propaganda by Lera Bertha, who died after opening her veins. On the

same day, a German woman Lere Margarita, 18 years old, with signs of strangulation on her neck, was found in a hut near the village of Zubitz in a forest in a hut. Leray stated that the Red Army soldiers strangled her and tried to rape her.

In relation to this statement by Lere Bohenen, Frida testified that Lere Margarita is the daughter of Berthe Lere and that her strangulation marks are the result of her suicide attempt. Despite the medical

assistance provided, Erwin Schwartz died on March 15, 1945 from

blood loss, and also  
all the other faces found in the shed also died.

Head of the 7th Department of the PU 2 BF Lieutenant Colonel ZABASHTANSKY.

No comments are required here, but I will say that this terrible incident was not isolated then. So, in the offensive zone of the 1st Ukrainian Front in the village of Mednits, 58 women and teenagers were found who cut their veins in their arms. What is fanaticism? I think no! This is

the fear of retribution,  
dressed up in  
fanaticism. And retribution - as the explanatory dictionaries of the Russian language tell us, is -

retribution for what they have done.

No, it was not love for the motherland and not conviction that moved those Germans who killed their own children with their own hands and in the ranks



"Werwolf" raped their own women in order to increase the Germans' fear of the Russians.

They were driven by fear - generated by them and destroyed them. It was then in Germany a kind of pestilence - from top to bottom. Its peak and concentrated expression was the killing by Joseph Goebbels and Magda Goebbels of all six of their children before their own suicide.

Here is the truth about the nature of the violence against the Germans in 1945. Having created violence four years ago, they continued to rape that year. But now - themselves, since they lost the opportunity to rape other peoples in 1945. I had

already decided that I had finished with this topic, but, sorting through my library, I remembered the diaries of Sergeant Alexander Rodin. In 2000, the IPO Profizdat published this amazing document of the era, impressive in its artlessness and authenticity, with a circulation of one thousand copies. The book "Three thousand kilometers in the saddle" was written on the basis of the front-line diaries of Rodin himself and his friend in the artillery battery, Sergeant Nikolai Nesterov, and I will give here a few extracts from it. "While

in Germany," writes A. Rodin, "we recalled how ruthlessly the Germans bombed us during the years of defeat, fired at us, methodically destroyed us, how we dreamed someday to take revenge ... "destroy the enemy in his own lair." And here we are in

the "lair" ... .. I must

say that the concept of "civilians" in relation to the Germans could not fit then in our minds: almost someone in each of their families fought, killed ours ... But we, unlike the

Nazis , they didn't kill civilian Germans, they didn't commit atrocities! .. ..

In the first days after crossing the German border, no guidelines from political agencies ... were received; later, very soon, they appeared, and any manifestation of an incorrect attitude towards the German population was ironically suppressed. However, our battalion commander Gavrilenko did not need instructions. Seeing a soldier carrying some kind of "trophy" property, he said: "Go put it in its place, otherwise I will shoot you, son of a bitch, for looting"! .. We argued almost around the clock ...

...We argue. We argue to the point of hoarseness, but when it comes down to it, even the most desperate "extremists" act in a completely different way from what they

themselves call for." And how did these ordinary Russian people act? And like this ... Bridgehead on the left bank of the Oder. In the house where the Maxim machine gun is installed, a zealous squadron, who grabbed schnapps, found a wounded German in bed and set out to shoot him. Women's screams, children's crying ... Next - a direct diary entry:

"And now our" formidable avengers "attack on the squadron, reassure women and children. I took the hand of a little girl, I wanted to caress. She trembled as if in a spasm. It became scary. Accustomed to death, killing and risking being killed myself, I can't understand how it is possible to kill a living, unarmed, moreover, person by simply pulling the trigger ... "But the batteries found an abandoned

crying baby in an empty house and handed it over to the German woman, the mistress of the house where they stopped, ordering to feed the foundling. Again direct entry:

"We joke among ourselves whether a new Hitler will grow out of a baby. Suddenly, his mother appears - young, thin, with a face swollen from tears. She speaks quickly, swallowing down tears: she left her Wolfgang in someone's care, but he went away somewhere, and a Russian soldier entered the house, she was told, and carried away the child. She thought - he carried him to kill ... She cries, laughs, thanks "...

Rodin recalls that in those days his comrade Berezhko noticed how

That:

"You know, senior sergeant, I used to think that in the war people they are going wild, but now it seems to me that they are softening in the war, they are being cleansed ...

What can I say? **People**, yes, they are being cleansed. The freaks **are on** the rampage. But then they are **the degenerates** of the human race, an insignificant minority, unworthy of being called people.

The book Motherland can be quoted and quoted. This is not a general assessment, but a snapshot, but the snapshot is "from nature". However, I have other tasks. However, I cannot

refrain from introducing the reader to another honest, cited by A. Rodin, "photo" of the era, customs and the true appearance of the then Russian people. Shortly after the war, part of

Rodin was stationed in Budapest for some time, and the guys - although they were, as Rodin himself recalled, "young, physically healthy and had a natural attraction to women", more out of curiosity than out of need - once went into a public house. Having bought a ticket, Rodin, like his comrades,

secluded himself with a young woman, who, as he writes, "without any, as they say," acceleration "began to portray (highlighting **here and below A. Rodin**. - S. / S. ) inexpressible, ardent love ... "" Not then, not at that moment, - Rodin admits, - and later, after

leaving, a disgusting, shameful feeling of lies and falsehood arose, a picture of obvious, frank pretense did not go out of my head

women...

It is interesting that such an unpleasant aftertaste from visiting a brothel remained not only with me, a youngster, who was also brought up on, so to speak, "principles" such as "do not give a kiss without love", but also with most of our soldiers with whom I had to talk ... "

Could this majority, having such internal moral attitudes, rape anyone to the right and left at all - even Germans, even Ethiopians? Alexander Rodin, continuing the topic,

also gave another example, with which I will end my topic. In the same Budapest, he met a beautiful Magyar woman who knew Russian, and when she asked if he liked it in Budapest, he replied that he liked it, only brothels were embarrassing. - But why? the girl asked. - Because it is unnatural, wild, a woman takes

money and after that he immediately begins to "love" ...

The Magyar woman thought for a while, then nodded in agreement and said:

- You are right. Taking money **in advance** is ugly ... I don't know if the reader will agree that this half-funny, half-sad, non-fictional dialogue between a Russian "barbarian" and a "civilized" European is very suitable for

complete the topic of how the Russians "raped two million German."

However, perhaps someone will shrug their shoulders in bewilderment - they say, what did the author mean here? Well, I can explain

**once again...** In the unpretentious and ingenuous worldly dialogue cited above, two moralities are clearly reflected: the ugly, capitalism-corrupted "morality" in quotation marks of a European (in this case, a European), corrupted so much that he, aptly speaking, is debauchery no longer considers debauchery, and the morality of a normal, mentally and spiritually healthy young Soviet guy - not very intellectually developed, but humanly completely formed by a spiritually healthy, new Soviet society. In other words, if we talk about the mass of soldiers who came to Europe and Germany as part of the Soviet troops, then **for the most part** (I beg your pardon for the pun) they were brought up in the spirit of a very high public morality. And already

by virtue of his social and national upbringing, **the typical** soldier of the Red Army was organically incapable of violence against the defenseless. Especially over women.

## About the "talentless" Vasily Stalin in the battles near Berlin and not only there

In February 1945, the 286th Fighter Aviation Division of the 16th Air Army, operating in the Berlin direction, received a new commander. Young, energetic, but not quite ordinary. Firstly, he was very young - young even for the war

in which Ivan Chernyakhovsky in three years went from colonel to general of the army and commander of the front, and which, very likely, would have ended as a marshal, if not for a German fragment that cut off his life in the winter of 1945. The new commander of the 286th IAD ended this war as a colonel. However, he also

started it as a colonel. It happens in war, too. Especially when your last name is on a special account and under special control. The surname of the young division commander was Stalin. Name and patronymic - Vasily Iosifovich.

Year of birth - 1921. Place of birth - Moscow.

Last military rank - lieutenant general of aviation, 1947

year.

Stalin's son is now slandered in Russia just like his father. In the best case, the son is served as a narrow-minded shirt-guy and a generous drinker, with whom his father could not do anything, but he nevertheless provided some kind of career. But, they say, if it weren't for the father, this "mediocrity" would never have received a squadron under

command. And this is also one of the unscrupulous myths. And since a significant part of it refers to 1945, I decided to touch in my book also on the personality and fate of the unusual "Berlin" commander. And in order to better understand what and why, you have to start from afar.

Actually, from the

beginning. From the autumn of 1923 until the spring of 1927, Vasily Stalin lived in an orphanage. Stalin's adopted son Artyom Sergeev also lived there,

Timur and Tatyana Frunze, the son of the People's Commissar of Justice of Kursk - Evgeny, the children of the People's Commissar of Food Tsyurupa. In total - 25

children of party leaders. Plus - 25

homeless children from the street. Artyom Sergeev has the best memories of this house. Just like all of his other students. An interesting example...

Dr. Natanson did vaccinations for children. And the children decided that when they grow up, Natanson will be killed. So these vaccinations "got" them, which no one wanted to do.

But they changed doctors. And the new doctor said that not everyone would be vaccinated, but only those who wanted to join

the army. And here, not only the boys, but also the girls ran to the injections in a race. With a cry: "And I

have an injection!"

They are asked: -

Why do you need an injection? - But I want to join the

army! I will be a Red Army soldier... Like this. It is unlikely that not only the current "Russian" kids, but also many adults will fully understand what is written above. But it was. And in such

an atmosphere, Stalin's son was brought up. The author of the biographical guide "Empire of Stalin" Konstantin Zalessky claims that after the death of his mother, Vasily Stalin "was brought up by the head of security N.S.

Vlasik. This, of course, is nonsense! Firstly, the foundations of character are laid in very early childhood, and Vasya had it in a very sensible "orphanage", going through which was a boon for the development of an outst

Secondly, then Vasily studied at a normal school, and he was brought up by school and teachers - unlike Vladimir Putin, who is proud that he was brought up by the Leningrad street. There is a known case when the mathematics teacher Martyshin wrote to Stalin about the shortcomings of his son, and the father answered, recommending that he be stricter with Vasily.

Thirdly, the son was brought up by the father himself - not with notations, but by personal example, although he could also make a harsh reprimand. Stalin brought up his son and his named brother Artyom Sergeev and every

conversations in the course of home life ... After all, Stalin had it too. And Stalin spoke to the boys as if they were adults. And he touched on a variety of topics. For example, in 1930, after Repin's death, he spoke to them about Repin.

In addition, the grandson was raised by his maternal grandfather, Sergei Yakovlevich Alliluyev.

And everyone was brought up well. Here is the situation described by Artyom Sergeev. After the death of Nadezhda Alliluyeva, Artyom and Vasily caught crucian carp at her dacha in Zubalovo on her

birthday. Vasily

says: - We will send it to our father, he loves carp. Artyom

asks: - You will take the

fish yourself. No, my father didn't

call me. It doesn't look like a capricious offspring of an omnipotent "tyrant", doesn't it

whether?

Then Vasily took a bucket with a lid, put the fish in it, sealed the bucket and said: "That's the

order. Caution won't hurt. That is, Vasily Stalin,

already a teenager, fully understood what self-discipline was - when it was really

*vital* .

Zalesky writes that Vasily was supposedly "a capricious, weak-willed, weak person." But here is a photo - a boy jumps from the high side of the longboat. Let a weak and weak-willed person try to do this. Since childhood, Vasily was fond of equestrian sports and loved to jump from a parachute tower - also classes are not for the weak-willed. The main thing is - where did Konstantin Zalesky see weak-willed combat pilots ?!

Before the war - after the end of the Lipetsk courses, Vasily was appointed to a group of pilot inspectors, with the outbreak of war he was a squadron commander in a fighter regiment, and then - for some time - the head of the inspection of the Red

Army Air Force. There is a front-line group photograph taken near Stalingrad in the summer of 1942 of the pilots of the 434th Fighter Aviation Regiment, commanded by the Hero of the Soviet Union (since May 5, 1942) Ivan Kleshchev. Autumn steppe, under the shock - nineteen

man, seventh from the right - Kleshchev, and to his left - Vasily Stalin.  
The 434th IAP

was subordinate to the Air Force inspection. Kleshchev commanded them, but supervised, so to speak, from July 13, 1942, Vasily Stalin. At the end of October 1942, the 434th IAP was renamed the 32nd Guards, and on December 31, 1942, Kleshchev died in a plane crash. Vasily became the

regiment commander. Konstantin

Zalessky writes about him: "In January 1943, he was transferred to the Active Army and appointed commander of the 32nd Guards Fighter Regiment. On May 26, 1943, by order of his father, he was removed from the post of regimental commander "for drunkenness and revelry." But it wasn't like

that. More precisely - not quite so. The 32nd GVIAP Vasily Stalin was transferred to the Kalinin Front, and in March 1943 he became part of the aviation group of the High Command Reserve under the command of General Sergei

Ignatievich Rudenko. Officially, Guards Colonel Vasily Stalin made 27 sorties during the entire war, but, most likely, their number was large. Although the flight book is a strict document, some single sorties by the regiment commander might not have been recorded - for a number of reasons.

On March 5, 1943, in the battle over Semkina Gorushka, Stalin shot down one aircraft - FV-190. To some, this may seem like a small victory, but after all, Stalin always flew out in a group, as a regiment commander, and his first task was not to shoot down enemy aircraft, and not to lose control of the battle. This is first. Secondly,

one must know Stalin's character. In air combat, you don't always understand who shot down, and pilots sometimes wrote down personal victories, almost throwing on their fingers who should count the next one. Is it necessary to prove much that Stalin would rather give the plane he shot down to **his** subordinates than take at least one **from them** for himself?

I think this one personally shot down plane of Vasily Stalin shows and proves very well what kind of person he was and how he cherished the honor of the name. And his, and - even more - his

father. Vasily could fall under evil influence, but this is in everyday life, in peacetime. He could commit a serious sin - he is his, like us



see, and done. But - not in battle, not when his military honor would be called into question! Actually, already

when everything was long gone, fellow soldier Vasily Stalin, combat pilot Fedor Prokopenko recalled: "Vasily shot down four planes ... In one battle, I personally saw how he set fire to the Fokker ... Somehow I helped him out - they could have shot him down ... »

Prokopenko during the war made 126 sorties, had 9 personal victories. He is sometimes mistakenly presented as a Hero of the Soviet Union, but this is not so. Prokopenko had the Order of Lenin and two Orders of the Red

Banner. In an official document of 1945, Vasily Stalin lists two downed aircraft. At the same time, not all ordinary combatant pilots during the war could boast of at least one personally shot down aircraft. By the way, commanding

the 32nd regiment, Stalin could die - and with a guarantee, on the precisely designated day of March 2, 1943. On that day, during a pre-flight inspection of the Yak-9 command aircraft, an aircraft technician discovered a stuck awl in the connection of the first thrust from the tail of the depth rudders, which jammed the control. The last flight was on February 26, after which the aircraft was put to check the landing gear and gas tanks. If not

for the thoroughness of the senior technician-lieutenant Povarenkin, everything could end badly. And this is how Stalin was removed from

the regiment ... On March 23, 1943, the regiment was supposed to fly to the Malino airfield near Moscow for understaffing with people and equipment. But when the regiment landed on the way at an intermediate airfield, an emergency occurred. Stalin, four Heroes of the Soviet Union - Lieutenant Colonel Vlasov, captains Baklan, Kotov, Garanin, flight commander Shishkin and armaments engineer of the regiment engineer-captain Razin went to the Selizharovka River to jam fish with grenades and rockets.

When throwing the last PC, Captain Razin made a mistake - he hastened to turn the "windmill". Result: one person was killed, one seriously injured, one

lightly. Vasily himself was seriously wounded - a large fragment of the PC hit the left foot, damaged the bone. The second fragment easily grazed the left cheek.

On April 4, 1943, Vasily was taken to the Kremlin hospital, he was operated on under general anesthesia by Professor Ochkin, the one who operated on Kalinin three years later with stomach cancer, strangely "not noticed" by the therapists of the Kremlyovka. But this is by the way. Interestingly! Joseph Stalin did not immediately find out about the state of

emergency, but after learning, he ordered the commander of the regiment, Colonel Stalin V.I. removed from office with the wording: "For drunkenness and revelry." It is said harshly, but there's nothing to be done - so ordered the Supreme! He also ordered, without his order, no command posts to his son

give.

After the hospital, Vasily Stalin was appointed an ordinary pilot-instructor of the 193rd air regiment. Moreover, the long break in his combat biography - from April 1943 to January 1944 - was so great because the injury turned out to be difficult, with a complex heel injury. On January 16, 1944, he took up the duties of an inspector pilot for piloting techniques in the same 1st Guards Fighter Air Corps, in

which he fought before the emergency. That is, his former command did not seek to "fight off" him.

In the submission of Vasily Stalin for promotion to the post division commander, commander of the 1st GvIAK, General Beletsky wrote:

"As an inspector pilot since January 1944. During this time, he proved to be a very energetic, agile and proactive commander ...

Possesses excellent piloting technique  
loves the job...

Tactically literate, aviation combat work  
regiments and divisions can organize well. Knows how to  
work with people, but sometimes shows  
excessive vehemence, irascibility ... "

On May 18, 1944, Colonel Vasily Stalin took command of the 3rd Bryansk Guards Fighter Aviation Division.

By this time he had 3105 flight hours. For 23 years old - huge flight. And this alone made Vasily an experienced pilot.

Then they grew rapidly. Here are three photos of Artyom Sergeev: April 1943 - captain; June 1943 - major; October 1943 - lieutenant colonel, commander of an artillery regiment. And this

despite the fact that Sergeyev was surrounded in 1941, was captured, fled, and until September 1941 he commanded a partisan detachment in Belarus. Then, after being wounded, he was evacuated to the "mainland". Moreover, the participation of Stalin the father in the fate of the named son was zero - during the war, Artyom, while in battle, practically fell out of sight of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, which was quite understandable. Another

example... Yevgeny Savitsky, a brilliant air fighter and aerobatic pilot, became the commander of an air division at the age of 28, in 1938. In 1942 he was already a general and an air corps commander.

Vasily Stalin became a major general of aviation only in 1947 - after three performances that Joseph Stalin turned back.

It is sometimes argued that Vasily Stalin "did not have any commander's abilities. But this is, perhaps, simply a lie!

Whether Vasily Stalin was a competent commander of an air division can be judged by his 1944 report to the corps commander about actions under the threat of a division at the Slep'yanka airfield from a group of German troops breaking through to the west near Minsk. Stalin promptly ordered the evacuation of the

materiel, guards banners and secret documents of the headquarters to the northeastern outskirts of Minsk, instructed the chief of staff of the division to organize ground defense and prepare a night launch, and he himself flew on a U-2 to the Dokukovo airfield - to organize a night launch there too. Then he returned to Slep'yanka and in the morning led the division to attack the Germans breaking through, and after the attack he landed the division in Dokukovo, which brought it out from under attack. He acted quite competently, moreover, without having the skills to organize ground combat.

By the end of the summer of 1944, Stalin's division added the "Red Banner Order of Suvorov II degree" to the name "Bryansk". And since February 1945, as already mentioned, Vasily

Stalin commanded the 286th Fighter Air Division, which was part of the corps of General Savitsky.

The fact that Savitsky and Vasily were friends after the war was later recorded by memoirs (but not Savitsky) and photographs, where both were taken in an unambiguously informal setting. Alas, in one of the books about Vasily Stalin, I came across "memoirs", which are cited according to the issue of Moskovskaya Pravda on January 29, 1989 and are submitted on behalf of Air Marshal Savitsky:

"And then the order comes: appoint Vasily Stalin ... to my corps. I confess that I was somewhat timid: the son of such a father ... A despot and a clown, like his father (***emphasis mine. - S.K.***), during his lifetime he, in the end, remained in complete loneliness ... ".

Savitsky died, like Rudenko, in 1990 - April 6, 80 years old. So I could give an interview in 1989. However, I can't believe that the twice Hero of the Soviet Union, a former homeless child raised by the Soviet government to the height of a marshal, could say that about a military friend and, most importantly, about his Supreme Commander.

Chief Air Marshal Golovanov spoke very sharply about Vasily Stalin. Alexander Evgenievich is a respected figure by me, but, as I understand it, they were very different people from Vasily Stalin in terms of their psychological nature. Golovanov, who assessed his father with - I

would say - reverence and talked a lot with him, writes about his son as a "moral monster", who absorbed "so much bad that would be enough for a thousand scoundrels." This is clearly a biased and unfair assessment, and I don't know why it was given. In the war, Marshal Golovanov could not know Vasily. In general ... And after the war, they hardly intersected much.

Little truth has been written about Vasily Stalin. The more valuable is the testimony of his former army commander, Hero of the Soviet Union, Air Marshal Rudenko, who commanded the 16th Air Army at the end of the war. In his memoirs Wings of Victory, 1985 edition year he wrote:

“On the evening before the last assault, we organized listening to the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the radio ... And again we heard the familiar names of the commanders of distinguished aviation formations and units: E.Ya. Savitsky, A.Z. Karavatsky, B.K. Tokarev, I.V. Krupsky, G.O. Komarov, E.M. Beletsky, I.P. Skok, V.V. Sukhoryabov, Yu.M. Berkal, V.I. Stalin, K.I. Rasskazov, P.A. Kalinin, G.P. Turykin, P.F. Chupikov, A.G. Tips...

About many of the commanders mentioned in the order, I have already wrote...”

And then Sergei Ignatievich personally noted General Beletsky and Vasily Stalin. He wrote:

“Colonel V.I. Stalin arrived at our front a little earlier from 1 Jac. A graduate of the Kachinsky School, Vasily Iosifovich began the war as an inspector-pilot, near Stalingrad he commanded the 32nd Guards Aviation Regiment, then the 3rd Guards Division. During the battles near Berlin, he led the 286th Fighter Division. For successful actions, he was awarded two Orders of the Red Banner, Orders of Alexander Nevsky and Suvorov, I degree (***more precisely, II degree. - S.K.***), the Polish Cross of Grunwald ... ”

I think if Rudenko had had bad memories of Vasily Stalin, if he had not treated him with respect, he would hardly have remembered him many years after the war. Marshal Rudenko died in 1990, 86 years old.

And on July 20, 1945, Colonel General Rudenko signed an attestation for the commander of the 286th Fighter Aviation Nizhinsky Red Banner Order of Suvorov Guards Division, Colonel Stalin. In the certification it was said that Stalin flies

Po-2, UT-1, UT-2, I-15, I-5, I-153, Li-2, I-4, MiG-3, LaGG-3, Yak-1, Yak-7 and Yak-9, Hurricane, Il-2, Boston-3, DC-3, La-5, La-7.

Total flight time - 3145 hours 45 minutes, 27 official sorties, 2 aircraft shot down. Rudenko assessed Stalin quite adequately:

"Tov. Stalin has good organizational skills, as a pilot is prepared, he can transfer his combat experience to his subordinates ... In carrying out orders accurate"...

The named brother of Vasily, Artyom Sergeev, said that Vasily was power-hungry, but in material terms he was absolutely disinterested. And such a person cannot but be internally noble. And I think that he commanded both the division and the aviation of the Moscow Military District with initiative and competence. At the same time, most of Vasily Stalin's subordinates remember him precisely in this

key.

A good indicator here can be air parades, which were held annually in Tushino just at the time when Vasily Stalin was the district aviation commander. He organized them and led them himself. After Vasily was removed, the parades also came to naught. And this is the most difficult thing, and you need to be able to take on a lot. Vasily often took disabled pilots to staff positions. And when they were surprised at this, he correctly

answered that a combat pilot would master staff work, but a staff officer who did not understand the essence of flight work could break firewood. Vasily was clearly a good organizer with a quick response and, as they say, "launched a hedgehog by the scruff of many," and

this is unlikely to be liked by many. After all, we rarely like energetic people - few of the bosses are like Stalin Sr., who appreciated energy if it was combined with competence and

responsibility.

They say that Vasily drank a lot and even allegedly suffered from a chronic form of alcoholism. Anyone who writes like this knows very little what a chronic alcoholic is. Stalin spent many years in solitary confinement, and this is not a camp, you can't get secret alcohol here. Nevertheless, Vasily did not experience alcohol withdrawal.

I don't think he drank that much. In addition, judging by a number of memoirs, both Air Force commanders Novikov and Air Force commander Zhigarev drank a lot. They are not known for being alcoholics. Or the English journalist Alexander Werth recalled how Western diplomats got drunk at a reception hosted by the USSR People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in 1943 on the occasion of the anniversary of the October Revolution. The English ambassador got so drunk that he fell face down on the table into the dishes and cut himself w face.

After the death of his father, Vasily was soon arrested - back in the days of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Beria. However, I do not exclude that, by arresting Stalin's son, Beria

simply saved Vasily's life! This assumption of mine is confirmed by the fact that Vasily Stalin was arrested under Beria, but he continued to sit even after the arrest of Beria. If Vasily suspected Father Lavrenty Pavlovich as the murderer, then it would seem that it would be better - after the arrest of Beria, to release another "innocent victim" of his "arbitrariness", and yes, it's over.

And let Vasily, drunk, once again publicly send curses to the vile murderer. An, no! Stalin's son both "sat" under Beria, and continued to "sit" under Khrushchev. The question is - who did Vasily Stalin blame for the death of his father?

There are memories of a certain Stepan S., a former warden of the Vladimir prison, about how Vasily Stalin was brought to the prison in the spring of 1953. Not everything in these memoirs is reliable, but I am sure of one exact detail:

“Vasily impressed us with discipline,  
neatness.

He was absolutely closed, all the time about something.  
pondered...

They say that a person is a style. And there's a lot of truth in that. So, the post-war letters of Vasily Stalin - especially letters from imprisonment, reveal an active, systematically thinking nature, absolutely not swaggering and ... And

psychologically, in some ways, very similar to the young Stalin's father. In any case, a letter from Vasily Stalin to his daughter Lina dated 10

June 1956 in all its style can be confused with the letters of Joseph Stalin to his daughter Svetlana. An interesting detail: Vasily calls his daughter "mistress" - as his father called his sister Svetlana. And here is what

Vasily wrote to his wife on October 1, 1956: "Can these scoundrels understand that there is a hardest, most difficult struggle for existence, for life, for love. Will the wits, lovers of sensations, understand that not under all circumstances the form of this struggle is noble ... "

The son died on March 19, 1962 in Kazan. He couldn't win the fight that time. But he visited the Berlin sky and that fight - he won. As well as his comrades.



## Night attack on the Seelow Heights and the searchlights of Marshal Zhukov

The assault on the second line of defense of Berlin - the Seelow Heights is known both from memoirs and from a number of books and feature films, where panoramas of a night battle are continually cut by powerful beams of anti-aircraft searchlights, directed not into the sky, but along the earth's surface.

This is how Yulian Semyonov described it all in one of his "Stirlitzian" - the novel "Ordered to Survive":

"The concept of "crunch", applied, as a rule, to physical phenomena, can equally be projected onto what happened on April 16, 1945, when, after Zhukov's troops, including thousands (my emphasis. - **S.K.**.) searchlights, brought down on the positions of the German troops, fortified on the Oder redoubt, a hurricane of shells, mines and bombs. And here is what we read from Zhukov himself, in his "Memoirs and

thoughts":

"Preparing the operation, we all thought about what else to do in order to more stun and suppress the enemy. Thus was born the idea of a night attack using searchlights. It was decided to bring down

our blow two hours before dawn. One hundred and forty (**emphasis mine. - S. K.**) anti-aircraft searchlights were supposed to suddenly illuminate enemy positions and objects of attack.

And further:

"Thousands of multi-colored rockets soared into the air. At this signal, 140 (**more precisely, there were 143. - S.K.**) searchlights flashed, located every 200 meters. More than 100 billion candles illuminated the battlefield, blinding the enemy and snatching objects of attack from the darkness for our tanks and infantry. It was a picture of great impressive power, and, perhaps, in my whole life I do not remember such a feeling ...

... Hitler's troops were literally sunk in a continuous sea of fire and metal. An impenetrable wall of dust and smoke hung in the air, and in places even the powerful beams of anti-aircraft searchlights could not penetrate it.

Yulian Semyonov, as we see, was not only inaccurate, but fundamentally inaccurate. Thousands of spotlights and one hundred and forty-three are very different things. And in this seemingly small detail, it is well revealed how often we are slipped a myth instead of accurate information, assuring us, as Valentin Pikul liked to do, that "you can come up with

something cooler." But if the conflict with the spotlights of Marshal Zhukov was limited only to this amusing quantitative "puncture" of the creator of Stirlitz, that would be half the trouble.

The trouble is that different authors evaluate the idea in different ways. On the one hand, the searchlight attack was a completely new tactic, actually used in the history of wars once - near Berlin. To collect some statistics, therefore, it was not possible. On the other hand, that impenetrable wall of dust and smoke

that hung in the air above the battlefield and which even powerful beams of searchlights could not break through, gave grounds for asserting that Zhukov's whole idea was an ill-conceived marshal's trick - they say, it was smooth on paper, yes forgot about the ravines, and on them - to walk.

They said so too ... Like, Zhukov demonstrated the capabilities of searchlights at the training ground, when there were no impenetrable walls of smoke in the air. But in a real battle, there was no sense from searchlights.

Was it so or not? Was the success of the "searchlight" undertaking? Myth its success or not a

myth? Well, we have the opportunity to dwell on this a little, having got acquainted instead of conjectures with the document.

So, in the political report of the head of the political department of the 69th Army dated April 18, 1945, to the head of the Political Directorate of the 1st Belorussian Front "on some results and shortcomings of the first day of the battle on the Oder bridgehead" - a completely specific, honest and sensible document - it is reported that In conversations with the wounded, the following questions were posed:

1. Bringing the combat mission to the personnel. 2.

How was the artillery preparation. 3. The action

of searchlights at the time of the attack. 4.

Organization of interaction on the battlefield. 5.

Rewarding the wounded. 6.

Organization of evacuation from the battlefield of the wounded, care for them in

hospitals.

On the third point, "The action of the searchlights at the time of the attack," the head of the political department of the 69th Guards Army, Colonel Vishnevsky, reported:

"The vast majority of the wounded stated that the infantry unanimously went on the attack from the moment the artillery preparation was completed and the searchlights turned on.

Platoon commander of the 77th Guards. sd (***guards rifle division. - S.K.***) ml. Lieutenant Dmitriev said: "We went on the attack together, literally clinging to the explosions of our shells. There were few Germans in the first two trenches, they willingly surrendered. The enemy began to show strong resistance only from the 4th trench, before that there were no losses in the platoon. The offensive impulse of all the fighters was high.

The operation and effectiveness of searchlights during the attack and the battle in the depths of the enemy's defenses were contradictory by the wounded.

Some (most) claim that the light of the searchlights blinded the enemy, illuminating the area ahead, which made it possible to move forward and relatively quickly take possession of the enemy's three trenches. Tankers and self-propelled gunners, who,

using the light, moved with their tanks and self-propelled guns in night battle conditions, not blindly, speak especially well about the actions of searchlights. Another group of the wounded negatively evaluates

the operation and use of searchlights, which did not give much visibility ahead, due to the presence of a lot of smoke and

dust after artillery preparation, as well as pre-morning fog, which limited visibility.

Some of the wounded stated that it was the searchlight that made it possible for the enemy to concentrate his fire on the places where our troops were concentrated, which explains such heavy losses.

As you can see, the assessments differ with a preponderance in favor of Zhukov's idea. And she, judging by the testimonies of the participants in the real battle, was really not bad. Even if the searchlights did not penetrate the curtains of smoke and dust, they still provided decent illumination, and the fact that some of the wounded explained our large losses by the illumination of concentrations of their own troops should rather be attributed to the specifics of the psychological state of some of the wounded, depending on the nature and cause of the injury.

However, this is not all about Marshal Zhukov's searchlights. The discussion continued after the war. From April 9 to April 12, 1946, in Babelsberg, a suburb of Berlin, in the building of the headquarters of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany, under the leadership of General of the Army Sokolovsky, the first scientific conference was held to study the Berlin operation of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front. The speeches there were very specific and frank. Of course, as happens with generals, and even more so with

victorious generals, and even more so with victors in a serious war, the ambitions of the speakers sometimes manifested themselves clearly. However, "on the case" was

a lot has been said.

As for the searchlights, the opinions of the generals were divided. So, the chief of staff of the 1st Guards Tank Army of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Lieutenant General D.D. Bakhmetiev said:

"I would like, comrades, to dwell on spotlights...

In ... the Berlin operation, the searchlight could be applied once, but this principle could be introduced into the system it is forbidden..."

And then he compared the new tactic with another, very old one. Like, a certain "Chinese commander of ancient times" sent 5,000 sheep at night to the enemy with bunches of straw tied to them, which ensured the success of the night battle. But when the enemy, in turn, decided to use the same technique and after some time threw a sheep "troop" of 10,000 heads into the night "battle", they simply let him through their battle formations and then, as General Bakhmetyev put it, "Used for barbecue." Some people missed this comparison,

although there was a reason for it - methods like the "searchlight" can hardly be introduced into the statutory norm, although somewhere else they could come in handy.

Representative of the General Staff Major General Platonov was just for the spotlight:

"... The Marshal was preparing a strike at night using a large mass of searchlights. Practice has shown the viability of these measures ... The testimony of the prisoners, it was established that the enemy was misled - he was waiting for the attack in the morning. The night actions of our troops with the use of searchlights brought disorganization.

And the commander of the 8th Guards Army, Colonel-General V.I. Chuikov was categorical:

"I have some comments regarding the projectors. Here, Vasily Ivanovich Kazakov reported that from the moment of the transition to the attack, 14 million candles ( Chuikov's **so. - S.K.**) lit up and began to illuminate the path to victory for our infantry and tanks. The figure, of course, is astronomical, but we know perfectly well that after a 25-minute artillery raid of such power as it was on the bridgehead, nothing could be seen. Even if you light 14 trillion candles here, you still won't see anything, because the whole field is covered with a wall of dust, burning and everything you want. Vasily Ivanovich, when you and I were sitting here at this height of 81.5, when the searchlights were lit, which were 200-300 meters from us, we did not see them and could not

determine if they light up or not. I believe that if searchlights had been placed in passive areas, they would have been more useful there ... searchlight companies suffered losses. They burned a lot of candles, but the troops did not receive real help from this.

On the other hand, the combat commander of the 79th Rifle Berlin Corps, Lieutenant General S.N. Perevertkin expressed the opposite opinion:

“I will not dwell on all issues. Two words only about spotlights. Being 200 meters from the front line, in the second trench, I came to the deep conviction with my divisional and regimental commanders that the searchlights certainly played a role in the second attack. It is absolutely correct that 114 **[with Perevertkin so. - S.K.)** of millions of candles could not penetrate the thickness of the dust, but the searchlights standing behind illuminated the area for the tanks, which began to move from their starting position to the first enemy trench. The infantry felt more confident. The testimonies of the prisoners said that the Germans saw this light and believed that the Russians used some completely new weapon. Therefore, there was a certain result and effect from the use of searchlights. There were 12 searchlights in the corps zone.

In this essentially small, but widely known, details of the Battle of Berlin turned out to be well highlighted (as if under the rays of a searchlight), the details are far from small. For example,

the fact that the same event on the battlefield is introduced to different participants in the war at different levels in different ways. And if a soldier does not have to be able to look at the upcoming and ongoing battle through the eyes of a commander, then the commander must be able to look at the battle and through the eyes of a soldier.

At the same time, it's bad when some privates of that war, or, even worse, its modern interpreters, begin to discuss that war as commanders. Having the opportunity to judge what happened

only at the level of the edge of the trench (or in general at the level of a written or computer desk), they express "profound" strategic considerations and voluntarily or involuntarily give rise not to truth, but to myths. And

this is hardly what we all need.

## About the allegedly "talentless" Soviet command

At the first scientific conference I have already mentioned to study the Berlin operation of the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, which was held from April 9 to April 12, 1946 in the suburb of Berlin - Babelsberg, in the building of the headquarters of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany under the leadership of General of the Army Sokolovsky, about the skill planning and conducting modern battles said a lot.

But said by whom?

Among modern *interpreters* of the long-standing events of the Great Patriotic War, there are today enough those who are inclined to consider Soviet marshals and generals of the 1941-1945 model almost as a bunch of incompetent, illiterate cretins who can only ruthlessly throw a gray soldier's "cattle", intimidated by Stalin, the Gulag and the NKVD detachments, under German fire. So - recently ended fights discussed such mediocre cretins?

Butchers, not generals? No, as they say - sorry! It is enough to look at the photo of the meeting assembled by Marshal Zhukov on the eve of the Berlin operation to

understand - once, when, and by 1945, Soviet generals were quite masters of their craft. Another thing is that their business was not only difficult at all times, but in the spring of 1945 it was also *unprecedented*

difficult.

I repeat - unprecedented! Never before the spring of 1945 (yes, by the way, after that spring too) in such a short time period on such a small, in general, part of the planet, military operations of the scale that they acquired during Vistula-Oder and Berlin operations of the Red Army!

And all this had first to be thought out in the head and on the maps; it was necessary to arrange the troops in the right way and regroup them - first on the maps, and then on the earth's surface; prepare



orders; ensure future logistics and evacuation of the wounded; to establish interaction between military branches; to ensure the offensive spirit of the troops ... Having

prepared all this, it was necessary to move the troops of the three fronts into battle and then control this battle in real time, in an indefinitely dynamically changing environment and desperate enemy resistance. I would like to look at the great "strategist" "Suvorov"-

Rezun and his "Russian" "strategy deputies" like Mark Solonin in that situation.

"Everyone imagines himself a strategist, seeing the battle from the side," said Shota Rustaveli, not only a great poet, but also a good commander. But the rezun look at those battles not even from the side, but through the glasses

of inverted binoculars. Otherwise, they can't do it - otherwise their microscopic human scale against the background of those days will no longer even be microscopic, but

***nanotechnological,***

so to speak! Yes, there are cuts! I would like to look at the "great" Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley, Montgomery, MacArthur and other Anglo-Saxon military leaders, if they had to face the mass of troops and weapons in the West, with the level of defense and fierce resistance that they had to deal with in the spring of 1945 in the East to Marshals Rokossovsky, Zhukov, Konev and their comrades in general and soldier's shoulder straps! All those Ikeys and

Monty would be poor! If the reader finds

a photo of the meeting with Marshal Zhukov on the eve of the Berlin operation - this photo is quite well known and placed, in particular, in a number of editions of Zhukov's memoirs - then at the first glance it will immediately become clear how much the skill of our commanders in organizing major strategic operations has grown. From the space of a huge hall,

almost a hundred brilliant, almost without exception, guards generals looked at Zhukov and his closest assistants - infantrymen, artillerymen, tankers, sappers, signalmen, pilots, quartermasters ...

In front of them on the tables were deployed operational maps, and behind their shoulders were invisibly present hundreds of thousands of soldiers, thousands of tanks and aircraft, hundreds of pontoons and "amphibians", tens of thousands of artillery barrels ...

I don't think that such meetings were possible in any army of the world, when in one hall the efforts of the most powerful military force are simultaneously gathered into a fist, and this "fist" is retracted in a concentrated swing in order to fall on the enemy in the last blow on a single order.

I don't know for sure, but I think that neither von Bock, nor von Manstein, nor Guderian, nor von Rundstedt planned and worked out strategic operations in this way - collectively, together. And they were quite professional in their military affairs. It's just that the approaches of the Russian Soviet and the German Nazi military schools were different. By the way, how different were the final results

of the combat activities of these two schools! The Germans preserved the old Prussian traditions, which were

once very perceived by us as Tukhachevsky and Uborevichi. How, gentlemen, otherwise, sir? However, it was possible to fight in another way. Therefore, during the

war, the Russians formed a new - Stalinist - military leadership school, the pupils of which in April 1945 came through Europe to Berlin.

Vasily Danilovich Sokolovsky, who led the 1946 conference, in the battle for Moscow led - from July 1941 to January 1942 - the headquarters of the Western Front. In 1941 he was forty-four years old.

In May 1945, already a 48-year-old army general, he was deputy commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, Marshal Zhukov. He took part in planning the Vistula-Oder and Berlin operations. And a year later, in April 1946, Sokolovsky directed the

work of the generals' conference and there he compared the battles near Moscow and in Berlin. It was not only a smart and skilled military leader, but also a deep military-political analysis. However, I will talk about it much later - at the very end of the book.

Returning to the conference, I note that the discussions of past battles were frank. Different things were said, including about the combat work of aviation during the attack on Berlin and even earlier - even on the Vistula. And here is what, for example, the commander of the 8th Guards Army, General Chuikov, said:

"Comrades, let's still draw a conclusion for the future, how can we avoid, comrades, the bombing of our troops - this is a topical matter, and whoever is silent about it is doing a harmful deed."

Chuikov told a number of sad cases. "In Berlin," he reported, "the headquarters of the 4th Corps was heavily bombarded by our aviation, about 100 people were out of action."

No more funny facts were reported by the commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army, Colonel General M.E. Katukov:

"It was very bad for us when we ... having mastered Müncheberg, rushed into the forests and went with a jerk to the inter-lake space. Night fell, and then the nightmare began: waves of our bombers were coming and unloading their cargo on my headquarters, columns and battle formations of the 8th Guards Mechanized Corps and the 11th Guards Tank Corps, burning our tanks and vehicles, killing people. Because of this, we stopped the offensive for 4 hours, which developed very successfully ... In just one night, about 40 cars, 7 tanks were burned in my planes and over 60 people were killed. Why do we need these losses?

More than one such example can be cited - only from the generals' speeches only at the first conference in 1946 (then there was a second one under the leadership of Marshal Konev).

Taking such critical examples and uncritically, meanly informing the reader about them, the modern *interpreters* of that war are introducing dirty myths about the mediocrity of the Soviet generals into the mass consciousness.

Doing this - if you are a history sharper - is not difficult. A dozen facts similar to the above, and the mythical one is ready, but it seems

would be the thesis, supported by generals' certificates, that Soviet bomber aircraft during the Great Patriotic War hit not so much at the enemy as at their own.

And the reason, they say, is in mediocre aviation and, incidentally, ground command, which could not and did not skillfully coordinate the actions of various branches of the military.

If we analyze the situation as a whole, it becomes clear that the "thesis" just formulated is false and anti-historical, that the main reason for the then tragic "overlays" was the extremely dynamic situation near Berlin and the imperfection of the then

radio communications ...

The same General Katukov mentioned strips of phosphorescent paper with which the Germans marked their front line at night. A good idea, but here it is necessary to talk more about the miscalculations of those who develop the means of combat, so to speak, ergonomics, and not about the mediocrity of the generals. In addition, other examples from the same conference

can be cited, and they will be really typical (the fact that this is so is evident from the general analysis of the speeches of the generals). So, the representative of the General Staff, Major General Platonov,

speaking about the originality of the plan of the Berlin operation, he noted:

"In order to achieve tactical surprise and mislead the enemy, Marshal Zhukov ordered two days before the start of the offensive to carry out strong combat reconnaissance from each division of the first echelon with reinforced battalions with tanks and 2–3 artillery regiments supported by fire for each reconnaissance battalion."

And this move by Zhukov fully justified itself. Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the 1st Belorussian Front, Major General N.M. Trusov reported at the conference:

"The commander of the 56th Panzer Corps, General of Artillery Weidling, showed: "...

the fact that the Russians, after the actions of their reconnaissance detachments on 14.4, did not launch an offensive on 15.4, introduced our command into

delusion. When my chief of staff, Colonel von Duywiig, on my behalf, expressed the opinion to the chief of staff of the 11th SS Panzer Corps that it was impossible to change the 20th motorized division and the Müncheberg Panzer Division on the eve of the Russian offensive, the chief of staff of the 11th SS TK replied: "I, the commander of the corps I think that the Russians did not attack today, which means that they will launch an offensive only in a few days. "Other staff officers and the command of the 9th Army were of the same opinion ..."

Major General Trusov also reported this - somewhat unexpected - confirmation of the effectiveness of measures to deceive the enemy. On the eve of our offensive, the Swedish radio broadcast that the attack on Berlin would be carried out in deep sweeps from the north and south, and only holding operations would be carried out in the central sector. The frontal impact was unexpected

not only for the military commentators of the Swedish radio, but also for the German command. And it had very serious forces against the Soviet troops in the Berlin direction and the entire Soviet-German front.

Let me remind you that by the beginning of 1945, the German armed forces on the Soviet-German front numbered 3.7 million people; 52.6 thousand guns and mortars, 8.1 thousand tanks and assault guns, 4.1 thousand combat aircraft. The USSR

had troops on the Soviet-German front consisting of: 6.7 million people, 107.3 thousand guns and mortars, 12.1 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery installations, 14.7 thousand combat aircraft. Current ***anti-Soviet interpreters*** claim

that the Soviet command tended to overestimate unfounded enemy forces. But here is the German "classic" - Kurt von Tippelskirch, "History of the Second World War, chapter XII" The Struggle for the Reich", section 3 "Russian Breakthrough on the Vistula":

"The German General Staff of the Ground Forces estimated the superiority of the Russians in the infantry at a ratio of 11:1, in tanks-7:1, in artillery - 20:1. Superiority

Russians in aviation were also large enough to secure air supremacy. In general, the success of the German defense was almost impossible, even if we assume the extreme stubbornness of the troops and their skillful management. Only the scale of the impending catastrophe was unclear ... "

This was written after the war by an infantry general (the next rank is field marshal), who had commanded the Vistula Army Group since April 1945, the author of a monograph considered exemplary.

Moreover, he does not further stipulate that the figures of the OKH were not only exaggerated, but simply - for serious General Staff officers - ridiculous.

In the Army in the field, we then had only 11 million people, of which 6.7 million people opposed the Germans. And Tippelskirch's colleagues in the German General Staff estimated the forces opposing them at  $3.7 \times 11 = 40.7$  million people. I wonder if they were familiar with such a General Staff science as regional studies? By the beginning of 1945, the real overall balance of

forces was in our favor: in terms of people - 1.81: 1, in artillery - 2.04: 1, in tanks - 1.49: 1 and in aviation - 3.58: 1.

As you can see, before our offensive in 1945, even the 3:1 ratio necessary for guaranteed success in all major indicators, excluding aviation, was not ensured. But an excess of aviation, as we see, in conditions

of constant the changing, dynamic ground situation sometimes only got in the way.

Yes, in the breakthrough sectors the balance of forces was greater in our favor than the above general balance of forces. But after all, the art of the commander lies precisely in securing an overwhelming superiority over the enemy in the right place at the right time! In order for the reader to better

understand what the commander's bread was in that war, I will inform you that in order to ensure the secrecy of the Berlin operation, the commanders of the troops of the fronts allowed the commanders of the armies to acquaint them with the directive of the Headquarters on

offensive only by chiefs of staff, chiefs of operational departments of headquarters and artillery commanders.

The regimental commanders received the tasks **orally** (this is another myth about the supposedly bureaucratic style of the Red Army command) three days before the offensive.

14-15 days were allotted for preparation. The pace of advance was determined for combined-arms armies at 8-14 kilometers, for tank armies - 30-37 kilometers per day. The density of tanks in the breakthrough areas on the 1st Belorussian Front was set at 20-44 tanks and self-propelled guns per kilometer, and the density of artillery barrels was 300 guns and mortars per kilometer. Trunk three meters!

On April 16, 1945, at 3 o'clock Berlin time, aviation and artillery preparation began - the German defense was processed to a depth of 8 kilometers, and individual nodes of resistance - up to 10-12 kilometers. But it was not without overlays. That powerful reconnaissance in battle on April 14, which was only positively assessed by General Staff Officer Platonov, also had the result that the Germans withdrew their main forces to the second lane - to the Zeelovsky Heights, and the command of the 1st Belorussian Front overestimated the results of the battles of April 14-15 and didn't notice this digression. Mediocrity? Of

course not!

War! A modern

dynamic war, in which the one who was better prepared for any surprises, including the consequences of his own miscalculations and the initiative of the enemy, won. We were better prepared for all this in

1945. It is significant that the same aviation incidents

were discussed at a scientific conference in 1946 without strain, without hysteria, with understanding **and knowledge** of the complex nature of modern battles.

And the final result of the battle for Berlin was in our favor. Only in the zone of operations of the troops of Marshal Zhukov, the losses of the Germans in the period from April 16 to May 9, 1945 amounted to 218,691 people killed and 250,534 people wounded. It's just human losses.

The losses of the 1st Belorussian Front amounted to 179,490 people killed and

wounded. The total losses of our three fronts and the fleet forces interacting with them in the Berlin operation: 81,116 people irrevocably

(that is, the dead and those who died at the stages of sanitary evacuation), and in total - 361,367 people.

Where are those millions of our losses in the battle for Berlin, with which "democratic" anti-Soviet slanderers are fooling us today - born citizens of the USSR, by the way?

The standard losses of the attackers (and let's not forget the victors, too!) to the losses of the defenders, acceptable by military science, are taken equal to three to one. That is, with skillful

command, the irretrievable losses of the Red Army in the Berlin operation could reach (taking the losses of the Germans on only one front) no less than  $218,691 \times 3 = 656,073$  people.

And they were ten times - given the total losses of the Germans - smaller than military science allows. So

mediocre or brilliantly proved the command of the Red Army in 1945? Yes, you can provide other information. Here are three quotes:

1) "The offensive ... is developing unacceptably slowly ... the offensive may bog down." 2) "The 9th Guards Tank Corps is acting very poorly and indecisively..."

Who is this and when does he rate the combat operations of Soviet formations so low? And who are these stupid people who deserve such

assessments? The correct answer is as follows: on April 18, 1945, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, similarly assessed the actions of the commander of the 8th Guards Army Chuikov and the commanders of the 1st and 2nd Guards Tank Armies Katukov and Bogdanov, as well as the commander of the 11th Major General of the Panzer Troops Yushchuk and Commander of the 9th Panzer Corps, Lieutenant General of the Panzer Troops Kirichenko. The names of the last two generals, if the reader remembers,



figured in the "crushing" orders of Marshal Zhukov, issued during the Berlin operation and cited by me earlier.

So, were they incompetent?

Of course

not! Chuikov, Katukov and Bogdanov do not need special introductions at all - these are the famous commanders of the Great

Patriotic War. Lieutenant General of the Tank Forces, 43-year-old - in 1945 - a peasant son from near Cherkasy Ivan Kirichenko received the title of Hero of the Soviet Union on April 6, 1945 "for the skillful leadership of units and formations in breaking through the enemy's defenses on the left bank of the Vistula River and

reaching the river Oder. Ivan Ivanovich Yushuk, Belarusian, born in 1898, is more modestly noted in history, but he was a mature tank commander with a biography typical of a Soviet general of those years. Civil war, courses, academy, successive development of the steps of the service "ladder", command of a tank brigade, tank corps since 1943, severe wound, return to duty and battles for Poland and Germany.

"While in

command of the corps, he showed himself to be a highly cultured officer, well-versed in the art of managing a tank battle," his description says. The Order of Lenin, the

Three Red Banners, the Orders of Suvorov 1st and 2nd Class and Kutuzov 2nd Class, the Order of the Patriotic War 1st Class are a weighty confirmation of this combat characteristic.

But war is war, in which a rookie, a veteran, and an illustrious general are equally tested daily and severely ... The question is not to fail **in the**

**end**. And we did not fail in that war - unlike the Germans! And how were things with our allies there? In his report on February 4, 1945, at the Crimean

(Yalta) Conference, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of the Army Antonov, reported:

"...6. Offensive results:

a) By February 1, that is, in 18 days of the offensive, the Soviet troops advanced up to 500 kilometers in the direction of the main attack ... the average rate of advance was 25-30 kilometers. (...) e) 45 German divisions were defeated ... (...) 7. Probable actions of the enemy: a)

The Germans will defend Berlin ...

organizing defense here at the expense of retreating troops and reserves transferred from Germany, Western Europe and Italy (allocations here and below are mine . - **S.K.**) ... b) The Germans will probably cover the Vienna direction more firmly, strengthening

it at the expense of the troops operating in Italy. 8. The transfer of enemy troops: a) Already appeared on our front: from the central regions of

Germany - 9 divisions from the Western

European front - 6 divisions from Italy - 1

division ...

b) Are in the transfer: 4 tank

divisions 1 motorized

division. c) Probably, up to

30-35 divisions will be transferred (at the expense of the Western European front, Norway, Italy ...).

Antonov asked the allies to start their offensive as soon as possible and prevent further transfer of German troops to the Eastern Front from the Western and from Italy.

On February 8, 1945, the Allies began to advance, and the transfer of German troops from West to East continued. In such a situation, it was indeed easy for the allied generals to pass for talented commanders.

However, the Germans already knew their true value. The Germans preferred to withdraw from the front the troops opposing the Anglo-Saxon "talents" in order to somehow hold back the front, which was being broken through by the "mediocrity" from the command of the Red Army.

The last ... In his post-war memoirs, the former German ambassador to the USSR in 1929–1933, Herbert von Dirksen, admitted that “the creation of a new generation of military leaders capable of leading

such campaigns as they carried out in the war against Germany should be recognized as a feat accomplished by the Red Army "...

Dirksen, however, found this feat "almost inexplicable", surprised that it was accomplished, allegedly despite the purges in the Red Army in 1937-1938, and not understanding what the origins of this feat.

Well, even a very intelligent German did not understand that one of the reasons for Russia's success in that war was like these purges, which opened the way to high command positions for talented commanders of the already Soviet formation - as a social and personnel achievement of the Stalin era. After all,

it was Stalin who said: "Cadres decide everything."  
They decided everything.

## About Hitler allegedly "escaping" from Berlin

"Where is Hitler?" - this question, after the surrender of Germany and the cessation of hostilities, worried everyone, and especially the Western public, who were hungry for

cheap sensations. Skilled in producing cheap sensationalism, Western journalists met this demand in abundance, publishing one version after another and discovering the Fuhrer either in a secret cave in the Alps, or in Argentina, who arrived there by submarine, or in Paraguay or in some other Latin American country with which the Reich had good relations, then - with penguins in Antarctica, and even - in Russian

captivity. I could cite two or three such amusing (if the word is appropriate here) publications, but is it worth taking up space in the book and the reader's time? Suffice it to say that at least a dozen versions, rumors, conjectures and fabrications regarding the flight of the Fuhrer from Berlin on the eve of the fall of the capital of the Reich walked around the world.

Even when the situation began to clear up. Similar "versions" still circulate to this day, but now their source is either clinical madness, or ignorance, or outright "yellowness" of the authors of the "versions".

As for 1945, things really were like this. On April 23, 1945, at 19:35, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, Marshal Zhukov, ordered the commander of the 1st Tank Army, General Katukov, to allocate a special detachment to capture the German leadership in the Berlin airport area. Zhukov wrote:

"I have information that Hitler, Goebbels and Himmler are in Berlin. In case of escape, there are planes at the airport for them. Select a detachment of daredevils, 15-25 tanks with troops and order them to break through before dawn to the airport. Support the squad's advance with artillery fire.

### ***Zhukov".***

And on May 1, 1945, both Zhukov and Stalin were aware of the arrival at the command post of General Chuikov, the chief of the German General Staff of the ground forces, Krebs, with the news of Hitler's suicide. On May 2, 1945, the personal representative of Grand

Admiral Doenitz at Hitler's headquarters, Vice Admiral Foss, handed over to the commander of the 3rd Shock Army, Colonel General Kuznetsov, a statement in the postscript of which it was said:

**“PS** The Fuhrer spoke to me for the last time on April 30, 1945 at 2.30 pm, and in a speech that lasted about 10 minutes, he said goodbye to me. I knew that he gave the order to burn his corpse immediately after death. The same order was given by the Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels, who wanted to remain in the Reich Chancellery until the very end. He also did not want to leave the burning ship and be a burden to the breaking group. I saw Hitler's body in person!

As for the Foss statement itself, its essence is quite unexpected, and, for a number of reasons, I will quote its text a little later - in the next section.

The imperial office with the Fuhrer's bunker was also occupied by Soviet troops on May 2, 1945, and on the same day, in the evening, the charred corpses of a man and a woman were found in the garden of the office, which were quickly identified as the bodies of Goebbels and his wife Magda. The fact that it was they who were convinced and found in

in a separate room of the bunker are the corpses of all six Goebbels children.

On May 5, 1945, not far from the place where the corpses of the Reich Minister of Propaganda and his wife were found, two more charred corpses, covered with a layer of earth, were found in a bomb crater - Hitler and Eva Braun. A little later, the corpses of two poisoned dogs of

the Fuhrer and Eva were found there.

The first act on the discovery of the corpses of Hitler and Eva Braun was drawn up on May 5, 1945 and signed by Panasov, platoon commander of the SMERSH counterintelligence department of the 79th rifle corps, and three of his subordinates.

The second act - inspection of the burial site with the participation of Mengeshausen's identifier - was drawn up on May 13, 1945 and signed by a number of counterintelligence officers led by Lieutenant Colonel Klimenko, head of the SMERSH ROC of the 79th Rifle Corps.

The rumors did not subside in the meantime. Thus, shortly after the end of the war, Time magazine published an interview with Gerhard Herseggell, a stenographer at the Headquarters of the German High Command, which he gave to Time correspondent Percival Noth.

“As for the death of Hitler,” said Herzegtell, “I do not believe that we will ever find a witness who could tell us how it happened. But I do not believe that the Fuhrer remained in the bunker. I think he went out, perhaps several times, seeking death, which he completely resigned himself to, wanting to die under artillery fire ... ”

When Noth told Herseggell that, according to information he had received from US security officers, Hitler was killed by "Hauptsturmführer Günsche's personal adjutant", Herseggell answered:

“Günsche was a man of gigantic stature and very hot. He was able to do it if asked, or if he thought it was time to shoot the Fuhrer and then himself. But I don't believe that's how it happened. I sincerely believe that Hitler was looking for death ... ”

This interview on the “broken phone” was quite typical for that time. Only the Soviet Union had accurate information, and in our country the tasks of the mass media were then considered somewhat differently than in the West, where the top

The professional skill of a journalist is considered to be a photo of a movie star (even better - a crowned person), getting up, sorry, from a pot. In addition, security

officers and employees of KP "SMERSH" - unlike US security officers - were not the most suitable candidates for receiving sensational interviews.

In fact, 28-year-old SS-Sturmbannführer Otto Günsche on May 2 In 1945 he fell into Soviet captivity (released in May 1956).

On May 17, 1945, Günsche gave detailed testimony, from which it clearly followed that Günsche saw only the corpses of Hitler and Eva Braun, but had nothing to do with their killing. I am writing "killing"

because in the Soviet archives there is a photo of a fragment of the Fuhrer's skull with a clearly visible bullet hole in the back of the head. However, now I do not rule out that such a photo (and the fragment itself) is not authentic to the situation. Perhaps this is a fabrication to create a version of the killing, and not the suicide of the Fuhrer. The latter looks somehow more worthy. If Hitler was nevertheless shot, then it is already

impossible to say for sure who shot him. It is possible that this was done by the personal valet Sturmbannführer (Major) Linge, from whom Günsche, according to him, heard: "The Fuhrer is dead." Günsche did not take the corpses into the park, but he described

how they were taken out to two other duvets. He showed:

"The Fuhrer's legs protruded from one blanket, I recognized them by the shoes and socks that he always wore; legs sticking out of another blanket and the head of the Fuhrer's wife was visible.

Similar testimony was given by other prisoners who were in the bunker of the imperial office. Possessing all the completeness of the information, it was no longer necessary to doubt Hitler's death. But here are

the circumstances of death... Let's take the testimonies of the same Günsche. It is generally interesting with them! .. One of Hitler's last personal secretaries, Traudl Junge, in a very reliable - apparently - memoirs, conveys his conversation with Günsche in the Fuhrer's bunker after Hitler's death. According to Günsche - in Junge's transmission - he was among those with